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Managing Editor
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THE CEYLON NATIONAL CONGRESS IN DISARRAY, 1920-1; SIR PONNAMBALAM ARUNACHALAM LEAVES THE CONGRESS*

K. M. DE SILVA

The foundation of the Ceylon National Congress[1], men like Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam hoped, would mark a turning point in Ceylon politics. They regarded the Congress as a truly national organisation through which the island's various communities, and especially its two majority communities, the Sinhalese and Tamils, could pursue their common goal of responsible government for Ceylon. Within two years of its foundation, however, the Congress was torn apart by personal conflicts and communal wrangling, and was soon reduced to a hard core of low-country Sinhalese activists. The aim of this present essay is to analyse the causes of this regrettable fissure.

It is important to remember that the split in the Congress was first and last a split among the leaders, and because of the *elitist* character of the Congress the effect of the split on the Congress as a body was more far-reaching than it might have been on an organisation with wider popular support. The Congress never aspired to the role of a political party with a mass base, and the bulk of the Congress leadership would have stoutly opposed any move in such a direction had the attempt been made. Among the key figures in *elite* conflict as described in this essay were the Ponnambalam brothers, Arunachalam and Ramanathan, who played a dominant role in the formal political activities of the national *elite* in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Arunachalam belonged to the mainstream of Gladstonian Liberalism, and was a man with a radical outlook in politics, and a strong social conscience. To the end of his days he remained consistent to these principles. In contrast Ramanathan had shed his Liberalism well before the dawn of the twentieth century and was in fact a conservative in politics whose outlook became narrow and rigidly

*I must acknowledge my debt to Mr. J. T. Rutnam in the preparation of this article. He generously placed at my disposal a vast mass of material—letters, memoranda, newspaper cuttings, pamphlets and books—on the events treated in this essay. Much of this material is not readily available to scholars in the major libraries in Ceylon. However, Mr. Rutnam must be absolved of all responsibility for the views expressed in my article.

1. On the foundation of the Ceylon National Congress see, de Silva, K. M. 'The Formation and Character of the Ceylon National Congress, 1917-1919' T[he] C[eylon J[ournal] [of] H[istorical] [and] S[ocial] S[tudies]—(*CJHSS*) Vol. X (1967) (1 & 2) pp. 70-102.

'communal' with the passage of time. One other person looms large in this essay, James Pieris, who by this time had at long last emerged as a political figure of the first rank. Like Ramanathan he had long since cast off the Liberalism of his youth. Arunachalam and Pieris are central to the theme of this present study while Ramanathan despite his prominent role in the *elite* conflict of the early 1920's is of rather peripheral interest.

Elite conflict in early twentieth century Ceylon operated within the context of a colonial political structure in which power still remained very much with the British governor of the colony, and the British civil servants in the higher bureaucracy. Thus the imperial factor as personified by Sir William Manning is of crucial importance in this study, for the background to *elite* conflict was fashioned by his policies. Despite the self-imposed limits on its political ambitions the Ceylon National Congress was regarded by Manning and his key advisers in Ceylon as an intolerable challenge to the British position in the island, and they set about the business of fashioning its discomfiture with a ruthlessness that befitted a more formidable adversary.

Manning was totally insensitive to the need for constitutional reforms to meet the demands of Ceylonese politicians and frankly adopted the position that any re-adjustment of the constitutional structure was detrimental to British interests in the island. When he did send up proposals for constitutional reform in 1919—in a confidential despatch to the Colonial office—they were so limited in scope that even the permanent officials at the Colonial Office, who were no more inclined than he to make substantial concessions to the Ceylonese reformers, were embarrassed by the niggardliness of his response.[2]

It did not take Manning long to earn the suspicion and hostility of Ceylonese politicians. Once they became aware that Manning had sent home a confidential despatch on constitutional reform in Ceylon, they began urging the Colonial Office to publish it in order that there could be a full discussion upon it in Ceylon, on the lines of the prolonged discussion in India on the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms proposals. Above all they were anxious to put their point of view across at Whitehall and for this purpose they sought an interview with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Viscount Milner. Though the permanent officials at the Colonial Office were opposed to such an interview Milner agreed to receive a delegation from Ceylon.[3]

2. C.O. 54/814, Manning to Fiddes, private letter of 31 December 1918; C.O. 54/819 Manning to Milner, 316 of 17 May 1919. For the official reaction to these proposals see, H. R. Cowell's minute of 12 February 1919 in C.O. 54/814.

3. C.O. 54/825, H. R. Cowell's minute of 28 July 1919. Manning, however was in favour of the Secretary of State meeting a Ceylon delegation. See C.O. 54/820, Manning's telegram to Milner, 21 August 1919.

The Ceylon delegation met Milner on 15 October 1919.[4] Their chief spokesman was H. J. C. Pereira who presented their case, a permanent official at the Colonial Office conceded, "...with ability and moderation..."[5] The interview achieved little beyond the limited objective of affording the Ceylon delegation an opportunity of setting out their demands on the reform of the Ceylon constitution before the Secretary of State and his principal advisers.

A final decision on constitutional reforms in Ceylon was not taken till after June 1920.[6] In the meantime the Ceylon National Congress had been formally (and finally) established with Arunachalam as its first President. One of the first decisions taken by the Congress was to send an official delegation to Whitehall to discuss the reform of the constitution. The Congress leadership set their sights on a Ceylonese version of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. In April 1920 Arunachalam left for London to lead the Congress delegation. It was in June 1920 that Milner received them for discussions. Though Arunachalam's delegation enjoyed a standing—as the official delegation from the recently established Ceylon National Congress—which H. J. C. Pereira's group never had, the one was nevertheless as ineffective as the other in the effort to persuade Milner to embark on an ambitious programme of reforms in the face of the obvious hostility of the Ceylon government.

Manning was a shrewd judge of men and political forces and he was quick to grasp the fact that the real weakness of the Congress lay not among the younger radicals to its 'left' but with regard to the more conservative elements to its 'right' who had their suspicions about Congress as an instrument for the low-country Sinhalese domination of the island's politics. He skilfully exploited these fears to win over to his side, a section of the Kandyans first, and then later on, the Tamils. Manning stage-managed the re-appearance in Ceylon politics of the Kandyan factor, as collaborators of the British, and opposed to the Congress and the reform agitation.

A three man delegation of Kandyans appeared in London and were received by Milner on 22 June 1920.[7] The Kandyan delegation was in the nature of a command performance with Manning as the impressario. (Indeed, in a private letter to Amery[8]—Milner's Parliamentary Under Secretary—Manning declared that he had encouraged the Kandyans to go to London to make representations,

4. See C.O. 54/826 for Minutes of Proceedings. See also, E. W. Perera *MSS*, H. J. C. Pereira's letter to E. W. Perera 21 October 1919, and Bandaranaike, S. W. R. D. *Ed. Handbook of the Ceylon National Congress* [hereafter *Handbook, C.N.C.*] (Colombo, 1928) pp. 293-5, for the local reaction. The minutes have been printed. The printed version appears in C.O. 54/854.

5. C.O. 54/826. H. R. Cowell's minute of 24 October 1919.

6. Manning was scheduled to meet Milner early in 1920. See *Handbook, C.N.C.* p. 198.

7. C. O. 54/854. Minutes of the Deputation to Milner from the Kandyan Association. 31302, No. 7, pp. 6-19. The spokesman was T. B. L. Moonemalle.
The delegation consisted of T. B. L. Moonemalle, J. A. Halangoda, and G. Madawala.

8. C. O. 54/842, Manning to Amery, private letter of 30 April 1920.

and the Kandyan delegation in their evidence before Milner confirmed this[9]). The Kandyans, Manning asserted, were more loyal to the British and more desirous of co-operating with the government than the reformers, and he advised the Colonial Office that it was imperative to protect these "high-caste and well-disposed Kandyans" from the machinations of Congress politicians. The Kandyan delegation hotly disputed the right of Congress to speak on behalf of all the communities in the island and in particular challenged the credentials of the Congress delegation to represent Kandyan opinion. They accused the Congress politicians of aiming at conserving "the whole of the administrative power in their hands and [at] dominat[ing] the weaker minorities."

The delegation made a strong case for the introduction of communal electorates for the Kandyan areas to ensure adequate representation for Kandyan interests. While Milner was greatly impressed by the Kandyan delegation, he nevertheless showed no enthusiasm for extending the communal principle to the Kandyans and he conceded it only in the face of unremitting pressure from Manning who wanted it as part of a scheme of checks and balances, in his plan of constitutional readjustment.

But the extension of communal electorates to the Kandyans was much more than a matter of checks and balances. For Manning had succeeded in extending the principle of communal electorates to a section of the Sinhalese, and in gaining Colonial Office endorsement of his extraordinary stand that the Kandyans were a minority community, at a time when the Tamils were reluctant to class themselves as a minority.

The Kandyan delegation had done their work extremely well. They had queered the pitch for the Congress delegation led by Aurnachalam who for all their concerted efforts could not persuade the Colonial Office to grant them what they wanted most—a Ceylonese counterpart of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms.

The first inkling the Congress politicians had of the nature of the reforms the Colonial Office had in mind for Ceylon was when Amery made a statement on the subject in the House of Commons on 28 July 1920.[10] They were appalled at the paucity of the concessions made to them and protested vehemently against this.[11] They were especially critical of the retention and extension of the principle of communal representation on the ground that its perpetuation was detrimental to the development of a national outlook. Two other features of the new proposals attracted criticism from the Congress politicians: the wide reserve powers granted to the governor; and second, the requirement that

9. C.O. 54/854, 31302, No. 7, p. 11, evidence of T. B. L. Moonemalle.

10. *Hansard* [House of Commons] 5th Series, CXXXII, Amery's statement on 28 July 1920.

11. C.O. 54/840. D. B. Jayatilaka to Amery 2 August 1920. C.O. 54/842. E. J. Samerawickreme to Amery 31 August 1920. See also *Handbook, CNC*, p. 312 for the local reaction.

candidates for territorial seats should be residents of the constituency for which they sought election. This latter requirement had been devised by Manning as a means of preventing the educated *elite* resident in Colombo from dominating the Legislative Council. It would ensure the return of dull, safe (and pliable) backwoodsmen who were likely to support the government.

The Ceylon National Congress had the backing of the other political associations in the country (including the Jaffna Association), of the great majority of the "constitutionalist" *elite*, and the enthusiastic support of the younger radicals in calling for a rejection of the reforms. The leadership in the opposition to the reforms was taken by Arunachalam.

On 17 August 1920 he addressed the Executive Committee of the Ceylon National Congress and urged them to adopt a policy of non-co-operation with the government, and to demand the recall of Manning, as the most appropriate expressions of their deep disappointment at the meagre response to their demand for broad-based constitutional reforms. By placing his personal prestige behind the demands for a bold and decisive policy of opposition to the government which had emerged from among the younger radicals in the country Arunachalam made certain that the option of a policy of non-co-operation would become a matter of public discussion.

Critics of his policy within and outside the Congress were under no illusions about its implications. It would have meant the introduction of techniques of agitation then being popularised in India under Gandhi's influence. Thus it was no surprise that the move to organise a boycott of the reforms was stoutly opposed by two of the most prominent—and most conservative—public figures of the day, Ramanathan[12] and his erstwhile opponent for the educated Ceylonese electorate in 1911, Sir Marcus Fernando[13], both of whom deplored the attempt to introduce "Gandhian tactics" to Ceylon and protested that the people of Ceylon should not be misled into the introduction of techniques of agitation developed by "Indian extremists". Ramanathan and Marcus Fernando may have been dismissed as ageing curmudgeons out of touch with the emerging political trends of the day. But it soon became evident that there was, in fact, no substantial support from among the "constitutionalists" for a campaign of non-co-operation.

It was at this stage that James Pieris—as President-elect of the special sessions of the Ceylon National Congress scheduled for 16 to 18 October 1920—emerged as the spokesman of the "constitutionalist" leadership of the Congress. His ponderous rectitude served to dampen enthusiasm rather than to grasp the initiative. Ever since his return to Ceylon from Cambridge and Lincoln's Inn in 1887 James Pieris had been regarded as a young man marked out by virtue of a brilliant academic career (a double first and the Presidency of the Union at Cambridge) and marriage to an heiress (the daughter of Jacob de Mel) for

12. *The Ceylon Daily News*, 2 and 5 October 1920.
13. *ibid.*

a path-breaking career in politics. By the turn of the century he was in his forties, with the promise of a brilliant future behind him. He was expected to take the lead in political activity, but at every stage he showed a strange reluctance to commit himself to such a course of action. Unfriendly critics attributed this to a yearning for a senior judicial appointment, a post of District Judge. Though he was eminently suited for such a post he was never seriously considered for one. He had been anxious, however, to obtain nomination to the old unreformed (pre-1910) Legislative Council as the Sinhalese representative, but on every occasion on which his candidature was sponsored by his friends he was the standard bearer of the *karāva* caste against the claims of the *goyigama* establishment, and not the advocate of broadbased political reform.[14] In the early twentieth century he aspired to national leadership but by then he was out of touch with the emerging political trends of the period. He was no more inclined than Ramanathan or Marcus Fernando to lend support to the radicalisation of political agitation in Ceylon.

A non-co-operation campaign was anathema to him, as well as to the bulk of the "constitutionalist" leadership in the Congress. Thus the official resolution of the Congress Committee, placed before a special sessions of the Ceylon National Congress held on 16 to 18 October 1920 to discuss the reforms proposals announced earlier in the year, called for a rejection of the reforms. This resolution drafted in firm, even forthright tones, significantly made no reference to non-co-operation. But this omission was rectified in James Pieris's speech in support of the resolution:

"... we do not recommend the adoption of a policy of non-co-operation with the Government, nay, we should most unhesitatingly condemn such a proposal as contrary to the traditions of the people of this country.

"... We have carefully considered the suggestion that we should send representatives to the New Council with instructions to them to decline to participate in its deliberations. Although such a policy might commend itself to some people, from a strategic point of view, we think we should deprecate it as it savours of obstruction to Government.."[15]

All that the committee would recommend was: "... that we neither offer ourselves for election or vote..."—a campaign to boycott the elections was rigidly and scrupulously limited to this purpose alone.

As the debate on the resolution proceeded there was no doubt that the consensus of opinion was all for moderation and restraint. Apart from A. E. Goonesinha and a few of his associates there were no voices raised in advocacy of non-co-operation. The official resolution was adopted unanimously—a triumph for the massive moderation of the "constitutionalist" leadership.

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14. On James Pieris's political career before 1920 see: de Silva, K. M. 'The Legislative Council in the Nineteenth Century' Part III, Chap. VI in The University of Ceylon, *History of Ceylon*, Vol. III, *ed.* de Silva, K. M. (1973) and de Silva, K. M. 'The Origins and Character of the Ceylon National Congress, 1917-1919'. *CJHSS*. X (1 & 2), p. 75 ff.

15. *Handbook, C.N.C.*, p. 230.

The threat of a boycott of the elections to the new Legislative Council by the Ceylon National Congress was sufficient to make Manning more amenable to compromise. Negotiations soon began on the initiative of James Pieris as President-elect of the Congress, between the "constitutionalist" leadership and the Ceylon government. The first tentative discussions were between James Pieris and the Colonial Secretary of the Ceylon Government, Sir Graeme Thomson, but these did not proceed very far.[16] With the entry of Sir Henry Gollan, Attorney-General and Manning's trusted confidant, into the picture the discussions became negotiations, with Gollan acting as the intermediary between the Congress leadership and the Governor. A formal meeting with Gollan was held on 25 November at which the Congress was represented by James Pieris, E. J. Samerawickreme, E. W. Jayawardane, D. B. Jayatilleke and Arunachalam. This meeting was to be the prelude to a meeting with Manning himself on 29 November.

Arunachalam refused to join the Congress delegation to meet Manning on 29 November. He took up the position that, "... we should not meet [Manning] until we are assured that he would grant us our minimum demands".[17] In retrospect Arunachalam's stand on this issue marked a decisive stage in his alienation from the Congress. Perhaps he did not believe that much good would come of these negotiations with Manning and was dissociating himself from the odium that would inevitably attach to failure.

However, when the Congress delegation met Manning[18] on 29 November they were offered some concessions among which was a modification of the requirement regarding the residential qualification for those seeking election to territorial constituencies in the Western Province; and he declared himself amenable to consider the substitution of a property qualification as an alternative to a residential qualification as a general principle. Clause 51 of the Order in Council relating to the governor's reserve powers had been one of the crucial points of controversy. Manning explained that its provisions were only intended to be applied in time of grave urgency, and that it was improbable that these provisions would ever be brought into operation in Ceylon. Indeed he was prepared to recommend to the Secretary of State that the clause should be eliminated (as its provisions were "regarded as a slur on the loyalty of the colony") provided that it was clearly understood that if experience in the future proved that it was required, the Government would be free to take measures for its re-enactment.

16. *Ceylon National Congress, MSS Minutes*, (hereafter, *CNC MSS Minutes*) meeting of Executive Committee on 8 and 9 October 1920.

17. Arunachalam in a letter to James Pieris, 28 November 1920, *Handbook CNC.*, p. 248.

18. For the proceedings of this meeting see, *Handbook, C.N.C.*, Appendix C, pp. 85-97 (pagination of appendices follows after body of the text which ends with p. 912). See also, *CNC MSS Minutes*, Executive Committee meeting of 1 December 1920. *Ceylon Daily News*, 20 December 1920.

From James Pieris's point of view what was most important was the promise held out that as soon as an Order in Council giving effect to the amendments agreed upon at this conference was passed, the Reformed Council to be elected in 1921 would be dissolved and a general election under a new constitution should take place.

> "The steps for procuring the making of the amendments above referred to would be taken after the Order in Council had been given a fair trial, say one year from the first meeting of the Council. It was clearly understood that all motions with a view to the amendment of the Order in Council would after discussion in Council be submitted to the Secretary of State, with His Excellency's recommendations thereon; and that in making such recommendations he would give due weight to the views of the un-official members in Council."[19]

From the time Pieris initiated these negotiations with the government early in October[20] he had given the highest priority to receiving an assurance that the new constitution would be revised at the end of a year from the first meeting of the new Council, after full opportunity for public discussion.

The Congress delegation reported to the main body at a special sessions held on 18 December 1920.[21] The younger radicals were present at this meeting in full force. The official resolution introduced by three Congress leaders—James Pieris, D. B. Jayatillake and F. R. Senanayake—urging the acceptance of the reforms as the first stage in the grant of more far-reaching constitutional reforms in the near future, ran into vociferous and sustained criticism from the younger radicals. But the leadership received support from an unexpected quarter, from Arunachalam who was quite clearly convinced that the settlement with Manning was worth support. His intervention in support of the leadership at this stage was decisive in securing the overwhelming endorsement of the official resolution by the general body. Only the Young Lanka League remained steadfast in support of a boycott. They urged the Congress to reject the reforms and to initiate a boycott of British goods as the first phase in a more forceful campaign of opposition.

In agreeing to give the reforms a trial the Congress leaders were assuming that time was on their side, and that Manning and the Colonial Office could be persuaded to make other and more vital concessions in the future, if only the Congress persisted in its policy of cautious moderation and good sense. They were under the distinct impression that the next instalment of reforms would be forthcoming within a year of the introduction of the new Council (an impression which Arunachalam himself shared), as Manning had made them understand during his meeting with the Congress delegation on 29 November.

19. *Handbook, CNC*, Appendix C, p. 96. op.cit.
20. See, *CNC MSS Minutes*, Executive Committee meeting of 8 October 1920.
21. *Handbook, CNC*, pp. 246-276.

To Manning the concessions he made on 29 November 1920 were a tactical device to forestall a boycott.[22] The techniques of agitation involved in a policy of boycott and non-co-operation, he feared, would set in motion forces and pressures which the colonial authorities would have found difficult to cope with. More than once Manning and his colleagues in the administration had expressed their fears about the introduction of Indian techniques of agitation to Ceylon. By agreeing to give the reforms a trial the Congress leadership helped Manning to retain the initiative. *Elite* politics in which the "constitutionalists" in Ceylon revelled were played according to rules which Manning soon became thoroughly familiar with, and their self-imposed restraints made it all the easier for him to thwart them and outmanoeuvre them. He had extricated himself from the awkward position he was in, when the Congress seemed on the verge of responding to the meagre concessions on constitutional reform made in 1920 by embarking on a course of a boycott of the elections to the Legislative Council.

Manning was a relentless foe and the cordiality he displayed during the negotiations with the Congress leadership in November 1920 was simulated to lull his opponents into a false sense of security. As evidence of this there is the fact that every despatch he sent home at this time and immediately thereafter was implacably hostile to the Ceylon politicians. One example would suffice to illustrate this: the fact that there were only five contests in the territorial constituencies in the 1921 elections under the new constitution was proof of the very real influence of the Congress leaders who were able to have their supporters returned without a contest. To Manning, however, this was evidence that Ceylon was "not fitted politically for any extension of the elective principle."[23]

When James Pieris had led the Congress delegation in the negotiations with Manning he had returned satisfied with the assurance that the next stage of reforms would be introduced within a year of the first elections under the new constitution. However, in February 1921 when he sought clarification on this and expressed the opinion that he believed that amendments to the Order in Council of 1921 would be introduced within a year, Gollan replying on behalf of the Governor declared that a time limit of one year was unreasonable and that

> "the undertaking given by [Manning] at the meeting of 29 November [1920] should [not] be extended so as to impose upon him a responsibility which he is unable to take upon himself."[24]

It is amazing that a man of James Pieris's experience in politics should have so easily misunderstood the terms of the undertaking given on 29 November 1920. Indeed the settlement incorporated clauses which in effect were a written assurance that the next stage in constitutional reform would commence

22. See, particularly, C.O. 54/849, Manning's private letter to H. R. Cowell, 14 and 15 February 1921.

23. C.O. 54/851, Manning's private letter to H. R. Cowell, 1 April 1921.

24. *Handbook, CNC*, Appendix C, pp. 97-100; *CNC MSS Minutes*, Executive Committee meetings 25 February, 7 and 22 March 1921.

within a year of the first elections. By February 1921, when the political situation was clearly changing to the detriment of the Ceylon National Congress, Manning could afford to place the least favourable construction possible on the terms of the undertaking he had given. James Pieris contributed to his own discomfiture when he conceded—to Arunachalam among others—that "he is of opinion that the time was left indefinite."[25]

A rift between the Sinhalese and Tamils had emerged after the elections to the reformed Legislative Council in early 1921. The question of territorial representation became the focal point of the growing controversy. The first elections under the new system had returned 13 Sinhalese to territorial constituencies as against 3 Tamils. In the old Legislative Council there had been a near equality in representation between the Sinhalese and Tamil un-official members. Soon after the new Legislative Council met, influential Tamils began to campaign for the restoration of the proportion of Tamil to Sinhalese representation that existed prior to 1920.[26]

It was against the background of this demand that the question of a written undertaking given by Pieris and Samerawickreme in 1918.[27] as regards the manner of implementing modifications to the principle of territorial representation was revived.[28] Tamil politicians contended that among the modifications agreed upon on that occasion was the creation of a special seat for the Tamils in the Western Province. Surprisingly Pieris and Samerawickreme denied that they had agreed to this particular concession; they asserted that their pledge involved no precise commitment and it was merely one to accept any scheme which the Jaffna Association might put forward so long as it was not inconsistent with the various principles contained in the resolutions adopted at the conference of December 1918, the most important of which was that of territorial representation.

Manning watched this development with deep interest and satisfaction. He informed the Colonial Office that Ceylonese leaders were

> "violently squabbling among themselves as to the representation of the Western Province electorates; ... one of the most patent facts which has been brought out is that there is very considerable division between the Tamils and the Sinhalese..."[29]

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25. Arunachalam's speech on "The Present Political Situation", 15 March 1921. *Speeches and Writings of Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam*, Vol. I (Colombo, n.d. 1925?), p. 173.

26. Among the first to do so was A. Kanagasabhai a leading Tamil politician, who raised this question in a letter to Ramanathan, 7 January 1921 even before the elections took place. Kanagasabhai's letter is in the possession of Mr. J. T. Rutnam.

27. Reproduced in de Silva, K. M., 'The Formation and Character of the Ceylon National Congress, 1917-1919.' *CJHSS* Vol. X (1 & 2) p. 102.

28. This was revived by the Jaffna Association in an official letter to the Ceylon National Congress, See, *CNC MSS Minutes*, meeting of the Executive Committee of the Ceylon National Congress of 26 July 1921 which discussed the problem at length.

29. C.O. 54/849, Manning's private letter to H. R. Cowell, 14 February 1921.

Though he had won a section of the Kandyans over to his side in 1920, Manning had no intention of falling captive to a single collaborating group. The opening now available to him of detaching the Tamils from their association with the low country Sinhalese in the common purpose of agitating for constitutional reform, was too good to miss, because the Tamils, though smaller numerically than the Kandyans, were more sophisticated and articulate politically. There was besides the fact that the Tamils were regarded, not least by Manning himself, as a majority community.

On 25 February 1921, Arunachalam had presided for the last time at a meeting of the Executive committee of the Congress. The next executive committee which was held on 7 March saw James Pieris, the new Congress president, in the chair. Released from the restraints that had been imposed upon him by virtue of his position as President of the Ceylon National Congress, Arunachalam delivered an address on the 'Present Political Situation' on 15 March 1921 in which he came out in support of A. E. Goonesinha and the younger radicals, and in doing so dramatised the conflict between the conservatism of the Congress leadership and the liberal, if not radical, instincts of men like himself who were more receptive to pressures for the democratisation of politics in the country and to a firmer commitment to a program of agitation for self-government. More important, the disharmony between the *elite* leadership of the two majority communities assumed more serious proportions when Arunachalam, through this speech, made his disenchantment with Congress leaders a matter of public controversy. The following extracts from his speech are of crucial significance in this respect.

> "We hear a great deal nowadays about the Ceylon National Congress as a power in the land, which it no doubt is. People are almost falling over each other's heels to join it and to bless it. But there was a time not so long ago, when things were different. The very name gave a shock, even to gentlemen some of whom are now Congress leaders. They objected to the word 'Congress' as savouring of Indian disloyalty and sedition and would have nothing to do with the word. Then, 'National', was an absurd and ludicrous epithet. Some of our reformers had to walk warily. The first meeting of delegates from various parts of the Island in December 1917, was, in deference to these feelings, called a Conference on Constitutional Reforms. By December 1918, the prejudice against 'National' had dissipated; that term might pass, but Congress-no, not for the world. So that meeting had to be called the Ceylon National Conference. After the lapse of another year it was possible to call the meeting of December 1919, the Ceylon National Congress; and now it is the rage.
>
> "... I dread to think of the consequences if some of us who were advocates of full self-government had proposed the name Home Rule or Swaraj League. It would have scattered to the four winds many of the big men in our camp. But the time is not far off when all of us will be working for swaraj as vigorously as we are doing for the moderate program of the Congress. Has not His Majesty the King used the word and blessed it in his message of last month to the Indian people? The word can no longer be banned by the most timid among us..."[30]

He went on to accuse "the older and influential leaders of the Congress... [of] an incurable optimism and a child-like faith in officials, which is bound to lead to disaster. Personally I expect little good to come from our participation

30. *Speeches and Writings of Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam*, (Colombo, 1925) pp. 162-3.

in the new Council,"[31] Arunachalam added "There will be a great deal of talk and the Council will be more of a glorified debating society than ever." He advised his audience

> "to keep yourselves ready to resume the policy of non-participation at the end of a year, and for that purpose to conserve your forces and funds and to carry on a wide and vigorous reform propoganda. I would especially appeal to the younger men to devote themselves to political work. Let them not pay excessive deference to the opinions and wishes of their elders, but think and study and form opinions for themselves."[32]

Of much greater immediate significance to the political crisis that was developing between the government and the Congress, were references to "the misunderstanding about the assurances of the Governor, an example of the un-businesslike methods of the Congress Committee."

> "I take my full share of the responsibility and blame," he continued. "I am particularly grieved because my speech at the Congress is believed to have largely contributed to determining the vote of a wavering and even hostile house. But at the time I honestly believed that the Governor's assurance meant completion of the amended reform scheme and dissolution of the Council in a year from its opening. I am very sorry to learn from my friend Mr. Pieris the President [of the Ceylon National Congress] that he was of opinion that the time was left indefinite. The difference is vital. It is much to be regretted that, when the question was raised at the Congress meeting by the veteran Mr. C. E. Corea, he was not given the opportunity of developing his point and making it clear to the House."[33]

He pointed out that Colonel Wedgwood[34] was emphatic "that the term should be limited to one year and that candidates should pledge themselves to resign their seats at the end of the year or earlier if required by the Congress. Otherwise the Government might continue the Council for two, three or four years and plead that the amended scheme was under discussion with the Secretary of State."[35]

Arunachalam laid great emphasis on the need for such a pledge, and argued that the absence of a pledge would suit not only the government, but might

> "fall in with the wishes of many members who would be loth to give up so soon the sweets of their position. It is in order to protect the country from the risks of the prolonged life of an ill-constituted and mischievous council, to impress on members that they are sent there for the main purpose of shaping and improving the new constitution and to prevent them from clinging to their seats that Colonel Wedgwood advised, and the Congress committee recently decided, that, whatever might be the correct interpretation of the Governor's assurances, the additional pledge should be required of candidates. A year is quite sufficient to finish the revision and the ordinary financial and other business of the Council. The resignation of the pledged members need not interfere with its continued existence if the Governor should wish to continue it, for the quorum is only six. I strongly advise the electorate to insist on every candi-

31. *ibid.*, p. 172.
32. *ibid.*, pp. 172-3.
33. *ibid.*, p. 173.
34. The reference is to Colonel Josiah Wedgwood Labour Party M.P. who visited Ceylon in January and February 1921. He addressed a public meeting under the auspices of the Ceylon National Congress on 8 February 1921 in which he came out strongly in favour of constitutional reform on the lines envisaged by the Congress. See, *Handbook CNC*, pp. 321-331. Not surprisingly there was considerable hostility to Wedgwood from among the Europeans in Ceylon, and not least Governor Manning. *Ceylon Daily News*, 21 and 22 January 1921. See also C.O. 54/849, Manning's private letter to H. R. Cowell, 14 February 1921.
35. *Speeches and Writings of Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam*, p. 173.

date taking this pledge and not to tolerate any backsliding... there is no wavering, no difference of opinion, on the part of the electo rate. They quite see that it is supremely in their interest the pledges are required. The faltering, the humming and hawing, the 'I dare not' waiting upon 'I would', —is all on the part of interested individuals or re-actionaries. It is the duty of the electorate to keep every candidate up to the mark, and I am sure they will see to it."[36]

Within six months of this speech Arunachalam had withdrawn from the Ceylon National Congress which he had struggled so hard and so long to establish.

In the inevitable mutual recrimination that followed upon his break with the Congress, his critics sought to attribute it all to pique over his failure to obtain the Congress nomination to the prestigious Colombo seat in the new Legislative Council,[37] while Arunachalam for his part claimed in 1923 that the crucial determining factor was the breaking of the pledge given by James Pieris and E. J. Samerawickreme in December 1918 "on the basis of which the Tamils as a community were induced by [Arunachalam] to join the Reform movement and the Congress...[38] Defending himself against the cirticisms of his erstwhile colleagues in the Congress, Arunachalam in a letter to Manning hotly denied the charge that his withdrawal from the Congress was due to "disappointed ambition" over the Colombo seat.

"So far from this being the case, a seat in the Legislative Council had no attractions for me, having sat in the Legislative Council and also in the Executive Council, and I am anxious that younger men like Mr. James Pieris should have an opportunity of serving, and gaining experience, in the Legislative Council. I therefore asked Mr. Pieris to come forward for the Colombo seat...."[39]

But the position was not quite as simple or so straight-forward as Arunachalam made it out to be.

It was generally expected that Arunachalam would be the Congress nominee for the Colombo seat, and this despite his protests to D. B. Jayatilaka and others both in London and in Ceylon that he did not want to enter the Legislative Council in 1921.[40] Nevertheless as the elder statesman *par excellence* of Ceylon politics he had reason to regard it as his due that when arrangements were made for the forthcoming elections to the Legislative Council he would be formally approached to contest the Colombo seat, despite his off-repeated expressions of reluctance to enter the new Council. He was certainly entitled to a first refusal.

36. *ibid.*, pp. 174-5.

37. See, for Example, a memorandum dated 23 May 1923 to the Duke of Devonshire, Secretary of State for the Colonies, from the President and Honorary Secretaries of Ceylon National Congress issued on behalf of the Executive Committee. See *Handbook, CNC*, pp. 522-530, especially paragraph 10 on pp. 524-5.

38. Arunachalam's letter to Manning, 13 June 1923. A copy of this letter found among Arunachalam's papers is presently in the possession of Mr. J. T. Rutnam. Extracts from it were quoted by Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan in the Legislative Council in 1928, (*Hansard* [Legislative Council] 1928. Vol. III. pp. 2023-4) and by G. G. Ponnambalam in the State Council in 1939. (*Hansard* [State Council] 1939, Vol. II. p. 908).

39. Arunachalam's letter to Manning 13 June 1923.

40. *E. W. Perera MSS*, (in the posession of Mr. J. T. Rutnam) H. S. de Zylva's letter to E. W. Perera, 17 December 1932. This letter is devoted to a discussion of the causes which precipitated Arunachalam's departure from the Congress.

There are at least two versions regarding the Congress leadership and their attitude to Arunachalam and the Colombo seat. According to one of these, the understanding was that Arunachalam would be persuaded to accept the Colombo seat, and James Pieris the seat for the Low Country Products Association. But at a meeting held at F.R. Senanayake's home James Pieris indignantly refused to seek a favour from or contest his brother-in-law, H. L. de Mel who had aspirations to the L.C.P.A. seat.[41] At this point, as if to illustrate the fact that in the enclosed society of Colombo personal and family quarrels loomed larger than any differences of political principle, Arunachalam was dropped without the formality of consulting him and James Pieris given the Colombo seat. If this version of events is at all accurate Arunachalam would have had reason to feel offended at a breach of political etiquette.

The second version has it that the Senanayake brothers F. R. and D. S. (and more especially the former) then master-minding the elections to the new Council, took a small delegation to Arunachalam's home to make a formal request to him to contest the Colombo seat as the Congress candidate.[42] He would have been returned uncontested had he agreed to stand, but Arunachalam declined the offer on this occasion, and his disclaimer being regarded as final the seat was offered to James Pieris who accepted it. Here again it is argued that there was a breach of etiquette. The delegation should have returned to ask Arunachalam to reconsider his decision. Instead there was indecent haste in accepting his disclaimer without giving him the option—to which he may well have felt entitled—to change his mind. Indeed it is alleged that he did change his mind but that it was too late by then to accommodate him. The only means of doing so would have been to find James Pieris another seat, but H. L. de Mel would not move from the LCPA seat which was the most convenient alternative seat for James Pieris.

The fact remains that Arunachalam declined to stand for election to the Colombo seat in 1921. But this is not irreconcilable with the view that he was annoyed at what he regarded as the tactless manner in which the arrangements for the Congress nomination to the seat were handled by F. R. Senanayake and his associates. At the same time there is the fact that Arunachalam did sign James Pieris's nomination paper once the seat had been formally assigned to Pieris. It is also true that an attempt was made subsquently to re-canvas the decision to give James Pieris the Colombo seat. But Arunachalam did not take the initiative in this, and when attempts were later made to persuade him to stand for election against James Pieris he refused to do so. Nevertheless it took him one month—after the first approach was made to persuade him to contest James Pieris—to issue a formal statement that he would not contest the Colombo seat.

41. *ibid.*

42. This is one of the hardy perennials in the folklore of Ceylon politics. I have myself heard several versions of this theme. Dr. Michael Roberts has recorded two versions of it in his Oral History Project—the interviews with R. R. Crosette-Thambiah and J. Tyagaraja, on 5 May 1968.

This last development needs explanation. James Pieris was not a popular choice for the Colombo seat, especially among the younger radicals. For example, when an election meeting was held in Colombo on 17 February 1921 in support of James Pieris, the younger radicals seized the opportunity thus provided to question the candidate on how he stood with regard to some of the crucial political issues of the day. A. E. Goonesinha who was a prominent critic of James Pieris, was especially insistent on asking the latter to commit himself to supporting the demand for an official inquiry into the handling of the 1915 riots by the British government. Pieris was not merely quite lukewarm on this issue to the great disappointment of the younger radicals, but actually resented the fact that the latter persisted in questioning him on this. The situation was aggravated when F. R. Senanayake made a personal attack on one of the latter, A. E. Goonesinha, which included a jibe about Goonesinha's caste. At this point Goonesinha (riled beyond endurance) and his associates indignantly left the meeting and proceeded *en masse* to Arunachalam's home and urged the latter to contest Pieris.[43] To Goonasinha and his supporters Arunachalam was a more enlightened and forward-looking individual than Pieris, and much more responsive to the political ideas and demands of the radicals.

At the time the radicals made their move to persuade Arunachalam to stand for election against James Pieris—i.e. on 17 February 1921—the belief in the one year tenure of life for the new Council was still unshaken. But in the first week of March the first doubts about this had emerged and Arunachalam as a member of the inner councils of the Congress was well aware of the new situation.[44] In this context his public address on the 'Present Political Situation' delivered on 15 March 1921, quoted earlier in this essay, where he came out in support of Goonesinha and the younger radicals against the Congress leadership, and in which, moreover, he brought the issue of James Pieris maladroit handling of the negotiations with Manning on 29 November 1920 before a wider public and called upon the electorate to demand from Congress candidates a pledge to resign their seats within a year or earlier if called upon to do so by the Congress, must have caused the Congress leadership great anxiety. Arunachalam had thrown down the gauntlet but neither James Pieris nor F. R. Senanayake chose to pick it up. Thus they avoided a showdown in which Arunachalam might have committed himself more forcefully to the side of the radical critics of the Congress leadership.

The fact that Arunachalam instead of immediately declining the radicals' invitation to him to stand for election against James Pieris, kept this open without publicly committing himself to a firm decision either way, helped to

43. For Goonesinha's version of the incident see his unpublished autobiography (typescript), p. 15 ff. now in the possession of Mr. J. T. Rutnam. The incident is referred to in one of Goonesinha's articles in the series "My Life and Labour", *Ceylon Observer*, July-August 1965.

44. *CNC MSS Minutes*, Executive Committee, 7 March 1921. See also the meeting of 22 March 1921.

keep the initiative in his hands. Indeed he had taken the line that a decision would be made "after certain points of public policy had been cleared up between Mr. James Pieris and himself."[45]

On 21 March some of the leading members of the Congress met Arunachalam and discussed these points with him. Arunachalam assured them that he had no wish to enter the council and was only anxious for "the maintenance of certain principles in regard to which he wished to be sure as to Mr. Pieris's position." They suggested a conference and he acceded to it. This conference was held at the Pettah Library, Colombo and both Arunachalam and Pieris were present. We have an "official" record of the undertakings given and the promises made on the occasion.[46] On the crucial issue of the day—a pledge to resign within a year[47]— a compromise was reached. The authorised statement of the proceedings of this conference made the following points.

"3. Sir P. Arunachalam emphasised the necessity of a pledge from all candidates that they would resign at the end of a year from the opening of Council, as matters relating to the reforms had, he said, to be dealt with by that time and the Council then dissolved. The compromise, he added, was accepted by Congress and the country under that impression."

"4. Mr. Pieris pointed out that the impression was not quite correct and the course proposed would not be in accordance with the letter or the spirit of the compromise. He was, however, quite ready to resign when called upon by Congress, as he was sure Congress would not take that step unless there was undue delay in revising the Order in Council. Sir P. Arunachalam accepted the suggestion that candidates should pledge themselves to resign when called upon by Congress and that a special session of the body would be held at the expiration of one year from the opening of Council to consider the situation."[48]

The outcome of the conference was that on 24 March 1921 Arunachalam finally issued a statement that he could not contest the Colombo seat. A minor crisis was thus averted.

This review of the events relating to the nomination of the Colombo seat in the Legislative Council in 1921 would appear to provide ample justification for Arunachalam's claim that he was not interested in seeking election that year. But his disclaimer to a seat in the Legislative Council was not perhaps so magnanimous a gesture. For throughout he may have been working on two closely connected assumptions: viz, that the Legislative Council elected in early 1921 would be dissolved within a year under the terms of the agreement with Manning, and that in any event Congress nominees would be pledged to resign within a year or even earlier if called upon to do so by Congress. If the first

45. Arunachalam's speech on 'The Present Political Situation' was published in the form of a pamphlet (Colombo, 1921). The citation is from p. 13 of his pamphlet.

46. The authorised statement of the proceedings of the conference was issued to the press on 24 March 1921 under the signatures of G. A. Wille and E. T. de Silva. This statement is printed on p. 13 of the pamphlet cited in fn. 45 above.

47. On 25 February a resolution was adopted by the Executive Committee of the Ceylon National Congress calling upon all Congress nominees to seats in the Legislative Council to give a pledge that they would resign their seats within a year of the inauguration of the new council, or even earlier, if called upon to do so by resolution of the Congress.

48. This was incorporated in a resolution adopted by the Congress Committee on 22 March 1922.

were to happen he could seek election to the reformed and enlarged Legislative Council in which presumably, elected representatives would wield much greater influence than under the constitution of 1920. Or, if the latter were to happen, it would be proof that entry into the Legislative Council had served no useful purpose, and Arunachalam would gain all the credit for having publicly predicted such an outcome.

One last point. Arunachalam's claim in his letter to Manning that he was "anxious that younger men like Mr. James Pieris should have the opportunity of serving and gaining experience in the Legislative Council..." was a piece of verbal legerdemain, for Arunachalam born in 1853 was sixty eight in 1921 and Pieris the 'younger' man was sixty five.

We turn next to examine Arunachalam's claim in 1923 that the sole reason for his withdrawal from the Congress "was the breaking of the pledge given by Mr. Pieris and Mr. Samerawickreme on the basis of which the Tamils as a community were induced by me to join the Reform movement and the Congress..."[49]

The demand for a special seat for the Tamils in the Western Province was revived by Tamil politicians in the wake of the elections to the Legislative Council in 1921 where, instead of the near parity that had prevailed between Sinhalese and Tamil representatives[50] there was now a preponderance of Sinhalese representation. Sinhalese leaders were reminded that Pieris and Samerawickreme had pledged themselves in writing in December 1918 to support such a move.[51] But the latter now declared that the pledge referred to could not be stretched to include a special communal constituency for the Tamils in the Western Province. Arunachalam who had negotiated this settlement and thrown the full weight of his prestige behind it felt obliged to explain that contrary to the denial issued by Pieris and Samerawickrema, a pledge had indeed being given with regard to a special seat for the Tamils in the Western Province. Thus Arunachalam's entry into this controversy only served to aggravate matters.[52]

In his mood of increasing disenchantment with the 'constitutionalist' leadership in the Congress—and in particular James Pieris—this public disavowal of a written undertaking would have shaken his confidence in them even further. What reliance could he place now on James Pieris's undertaking extracted under pressure on 22 March 1921? And would not James Pieris's handling of the negotiations with Manning on 29 November 1920—the impression given that

49. Arunachalam's letter to Manning, 13 June 1923, cited p. 19 fn. 3 above.

50. See above p. 15.

51. *ibid.* fn. 3.

52. *CNC MSS Minutes* the Executive Committee meeting of 26th July 1921, Arunachalam came out strongly in favour of a reserved seat for the Tamils in the Western Province. Earlier he had made the same point in a statement on 'Reforms and the New Council' published in the *Ceylon Daily News*, 21 July 1921.

a promise had been obtained on the dissolution of the Legislative Council within a year of the election, the admission from Pieris himself only three months later that such was neither the letter nor the spirit of the agreement with Manning—seem more a piece of calculated bluff rather than the succession of blunders that it really was? What was described by Arunachalam himself on 15 March 1921 "as the un-businesslike methods of the Congress committee," would a few months later, against the background of a public disavowal of the pledge given in December 1918 for a special seat, have seemed a shrewd move designed to isolate Arunachalam.

Indeed, the evidence seems conclusive that the disavowal by Pieris and Samerawickreme of the pledge to support a special seat for the Tamils in Colombo did indeed precipitate Arunachalam's departure from the Congress. At the Executive Committee meeting of the Congress held on 26 July 1921 he had argued strongly in favour of a reserved seat for the Tamils in the Western Province when this was raised by H. A. P. Sandarasagara, and he was supported in this by all the Tamil representatives present. It was a stormy meeting. At least one Sinhalese member, E. T. de Silva, realised the gravity of the situation. The minutes indicate that he "was willing to accept reservation for the sake of solidarity of the Congress." The meeting was adjourned for 6 August, and when the discussions were resumed James Pieris explained his position with regard to the reservation of a seat for the Tamils in the Western Province. After prolonged discussion the executive committee rejected the proposal for a reserved seat for the Tamils in the Western Province, with ten voting for and sixteen against. This proved to be the last occasion on which Arunachalam attended a meeting of the Ceylon National Congress.

In March 1921 Arunachalam was pitching his appeal to the younger radicals, in the cause of swaraj, but by the end of the year he was, if not an ally of his brother Ramanathan, and men like Ambalavanar Kanagasabhai, at least a co-belligerent. Their narrow outlook and conservative politics would have appalled Arunachalam only a few months before he began his slow drift into their camp. Arunachalam had always been reluctant to associate himself too closely in political activity with his brother,[53] and yet the pressures of *elite* conflict drove him in the twilight of his distinguished public career into the same camp of sectional interests.

He became more conscious of the need to protect the communal interests of the Tamils. Indeed the Tamils had by now begun to think of themselves as a minority community, and even Arunachalam was inclined to take this view. The inevitable consequence, however, was a change of attitude on the question of territorial representation.

53. See, for example, Arunachalam's letter to the *Times of Ceylon* (which was published in the *Ceylon Daily News* of 21 July 1919 after the *Times* refused to publish it) in which he wrote: "You are obviously not aware, of what is fairly well known in Ceylon, that I have not always seen eye to eye with [my brother] and have not hesitated to say so publicly when the public interests appeared to me to require it."

When his erstwhile colleagues in the Congress raised the charge that Arunachalam's position on territorial representation, once he had left the Congress, was in entire conflict with that adopted by him earlier, he denied that he was ever "an unqualified supporter of territorial representation." "As I often said" he continued, "in my public addresses: 'while the general principle would be territorial representation, there must be safeguards for minorities.' Their safeguards under the existing system were communal representation and an almost equal proportion of members." "Every resolution of the Congress," he added,

"as well as the bodies which preceded it (the Ceylon Reform League, and the Ceylon National Association) contained the important qualification *'with due safeguards for minorities.'* This was inserted with the special object of disarming their... fears... until they acquired full confidence in the majority Community... and desired to... join the general electorate.[54]

All this seems plausible enough until one examines Arunachalam's use of the term 'minorities' in his speeches before his departure from the Congress in 1921. It did not include the Tamils, which is not surprising, since Arunachalam shared the prevailing opinion that the Tamils were not a minority but were one of two majority communities.[55]

In the more distant and detached perspective of history, it would be fairer to Arunachalam, the great Ceylonese statesman, to focus attention first on the magnitude of his achievement during the years 1917 to 1919 in establishing a national political organization to agitate for constitutional reforms,[56] and thereafter on the main points of disagreement between him and the Congress leadership in 1920 and 1921, rather than dwell too long on his eventual arrival in the camp of sectional interests or even on the factors that precipitated his departure from the Congress. This indeed in accordance with the views of Congress leaders like C. E. Corea and D. B. Jayatilaka who addressed the sessions of the Congress in 1924, the year of Arunachalam's death.[57]

In retrospect, the main point of divergence between Arunachalam and the Congress leadership was of course the fact that he had much more in common with the younger radical critics of the 'constitutionalist' leadership in the Congress than with the latter. Indeed early in 1919 he went on record with the

54. Arunachalam's letter to Manning, 13 June 1923.

55. An excellent illustration of the usage is provided in Arunachalam's speech at the first conference on Constitutional Reform, in December 1917. He referred to three minorities: the Europeans, Burghers and Mohammedans. See, *Handbook CNC*, p. 110; See also, *ibid*. p. 128.

56. See de Silva, K. M., 'The Formation and Character of the Ceylon National Congress, 1917-1919'. *CJHSS*, Vol. X, (1 & 2) pp. 76-98.

57. See Corea's Presidential Address and Jayatilake's remarks in *Handbook CNC*, pp. 634-5 and 657, which, incidentally, give their respective views regarding the causes of Arunachalam's departure from the Congress.

comment that his own seeming moderation in politics was dictated by "the necessity of educating and conciliating our own Tories."[58] Though he was the automatic choice as the first President of the Ceylon National Congress, he was confronted always with the inveterate moderation and resolute respectability of the Congress high command, in particular of men like James Pieris, and H. J. C. Pereira. It would appear that his problems with the Congress high command had began from the time of his return to Ceylon in August 1920 from London where he had led the Congress delegation to Milner. These problems persisted throughout the year and were aggravated by a sharp difference of opinion on the nature of the response that Congress, as a body, should make to the new constitutional proposals of 1920. He was for bold and decisive gestures of opposition while the rest of the leadership was all for moderation and compromise. Arunachalam like most men who bask too long in the glare of their personal prestige was self-righteous and self-willed, and when he found his colleagues in the Congress (many of whom he undoubtedly regarded as men of inferior ability and political sagacity) impervious to his ideas, it must have been a frustrating experience.

Late in November 1920 he had pointedly refused to join the Congress delegation to meet Manning. He had swung his personal influence behind the Congress leadership at the crucial special sessions of 18 December 1920 only because he believed that the Congress delegation had extracted an undertaking from Manning that the new constitutional structure would soon be superseded by a more advanced one.

The fact that Pieris had been quite patently outmanoeuvred by Manning on this would have strengthened Arunachalam's confidence in his own judgement, and increased his feeling of superiority over those who having embarked on a policy of negotiation and moderation against his own advice, had faltered badly. His confidence in them would have been eroded by the bickering over the nomination to the Colombo seat, and shattered irreparably by the attempt to go back on a solemn undertaking with regard to the special seat for the Tamils in Colombo.

In all this James Pieris played a leading role, but suprisingly and significantly Arunachalam's criticisms were not directed at him so much as at the younger men who were pushing their way to the leadership. He described them as

'a clique who got hold of the Congress machine, imposed its will on a weak President of the Congress machine, and his colleague Mr. Samerawickreme and compelled them and the Congress to repudiate the solemn pledge given to the Tamils."[59]

58. See, Arunachalam's letter to *The Times of Ceylon*, 28 April 1919. See also C. E. Corea's reference to Arunachalam's comment, *Handbook CNC*, p. 640.

59. *Times of Ceylon*, 14 December 1921, interview with Arunachalam, entitled 'The Reforms Muddle'.

There was no doubt that the criticism was directed at men like F. R. and D. S. Senanayake, D. B. Jayatilaka and others, many of them 'prison-graduates' of 1915, all in their forties and eager for a taste of political influence. They had solid credentials of their own in seeking to take over from the old brigade, but the latter (Arunachalam included) resented this nevertheless.

It is no exaggeration to state that Arunachalam's break with the Congress inflicted on it a blow from which it never recovered. Arunachalam's own assessment in 1921 that:

"[James] Pieris and his friends have by their blunders wrecked the Congress, destroyed its power and prestige, reduced it from a National Congress to one representing mainly a section of the Sinhalese, destroyed the feeling of mutual confidence and co-operation between the various communities, and put back the attainment of swaraj indefinitely...",[60]

was singularly accurate.

The Ceylon National Congress had prided itself on the fact that the twin principles of communal harmony and national unity were the foundations on which it had been built. But within two years of its establishment these foundations had proved to be much less solid than the claims advanced in their favour had made them out to be. Indeed the Congress structure proved to be too brittle to withstand the pressures released by the departure of Arunachalam and the bulk of Tamil members from its ranks. The Congress leadership was now more than ever on the defensive.

In mid-November 1921 two conferences were held in a desperate bid at reconciliation. But the discussions broke down on one crucial issue—the Tamils were not prepared to abandon their claim to a special reserved seat in the Western Province.[61] The Tamils had for a decade or more laid claim to the status of a majority community, but with Arunachalam's departure from the Congress,[62] they began to be increasingly conscious of their position as the most important of the minority communities. Thus the reserved seat in the Western Province was of two-fold importance: firstly, it marked the transition of the Tamils from the status of a majority community to that of a minority; and secondly, it was the crucial link with Manning, who seized upon it as an emotional issue to be exploited to the advantage of the British, and with this begins a new phase in the establishment of communalism as a vital factor in the country's politics.[63]

60. *ibid.*
61. The most cogently argued defence of the Congress position on this issue was by D. B. Jayatilaka in his Presidential address to the Congress, 21 December 1923, see, *Handbook CNC*, pp. 593-5. See also *CNC MSS Minutes*, meeting of the Executive Committee of the Ceylon National Congress, 26 July 1921 for a brief summary of James Pieris's view of this problem as it emerged at that time.
62. On 28 January 1922 the executive committee of the Ceylon National Congress had before it a letter from Arunachalam in which he asked that his name be removed from the list of Executive Councillors of that body. The Committee responded by appealing to Arunachalam to reconsider his decision, which however he refused to do. And on 18 February 1922 the Congress Committee finally accepted Arunachalam's decision to resign from the Committee.
63. The second part of this study of the Ceylon National Congress in Disarray will be published in Vol. 3 No. 1 of this journal. It will bear the title "The Ceylon National Congress in Disarray II: The Triumph of Sir William Manning, 1921-1924."

FEUDAL POLITY[1] IN MEDIEVAL CEYLON: AN EXAMINATION OF THE CHIEFTAINCIES OF THE VANNI

S. PATHMANATHAN

I. Origins and evolution

During the early years of the thirteenth century a period characterized by a considerable extent of central control in Ceylonese history came to an end. On the disintegration of the Polonnaruwa Kingdom a sort of feudalism had emerged and this feudal polity, in its essentials, lingered on until the British conquest of the Island. In this period the political unity of the Island remained only an ideal hardly ever realized save for the brief interlude of seventeen years during the reign of Parākrama bāhu VI (1415-67). Authority was localised and confined to regional units of varying size and importance.

Political developments during the early thirteenth century led to the rise of two kingdoms, the kingdom of Jaffna in the North and that of Dambadeniya which embraced the central highlands and the south-western lowlands, and a number of autonomous chieftaincies known as the Vanni. In the two kingdoms the king's authority was increasingly constrained by the power of traditional ranks that controlled the provinces and their sub-divisions. Although monarchy retained the traditional forms of ceremonial and other outward trappings, its authority was diminishing even in the integral units of the two kingdoms. The principal centres of feudal power, were, however, the chieftaincies of the Vanni which were, for the most part, confined to the dry zone.

The Vanni chieftaincies may be classified into five broad groups, namely; (1) the chieftaincies of 'Jaffnapatnam'; (2) the principalities of Trincomalee, (3) the chieftaincies of the Mukkuvar; (4) Sinhalese Vanni and (5) the chieftaincies

1. Feudalism is primarily a western concept. The political and social institutions that followed the kingdoms which flourished in medieval Europe once when the central power weakened are described as feudal. The feudal system which had its origins from Roman times, developed again with modifications in Europe after the decline of central authority in the Roman Empire and reached the highest stage with the disintegration of the Carolingian Empire.

   Some writers, however, use the term feudalism loosely that they apply it to any system where political power was exercised by those who held the land. The absence of central control and the importance of land in socio-economic relationships are two essential features of a feudal society. These were the main characteristics in medieval Ceylonese society.

of the Veddas[2]. Although these chieftaincies played a significant role in medieval politics their importance has not still been investigated and recognised fully. Many of them had disappeared during the period of Portuguese and Dutch rule in the maritime provinces.[3] Only those of 'Jaffnapatnam', which had sustained a spirit of resistance against the first two European powers, viz. the Portuguese and the Dutch managed to survive until the end of the eighteenth century.

The Dutch records which, unlike the local chronicles, contain fuller and more reliable details, generally refer to the area of lands situated between Kutiraimalai and Trincomalee in northern Ceylon—lands known to have been subject to the control of the kings of Jaffna, as areas of the Vaṉṉi.[4] However,

2. The commandment of Jaffnapatnam, one of the three divisions of the Dutch possessions in Ceylon, embraced most of the lands which were formerly included in the Kingdom of Jaffna. The territories within this commandment were classified by the Dutch into four groups namely, (*a*) Jaffnapatnam, (*b*) the various islands, (*c*) the Vaṉṉi and (*d*) the borders of the Vaṉṉi. The Vaṉṉi consisted of the provinces of (1) Panaṅkāmam (2) Mēlpattu, (3) Karunāvalpattu, (4) Muḷḷiyavaḷai, (5) Karikkaṭṭumūlai (6) and Teṉṉamaravaṭi.

In the areas that form the present Trincomalee district there were in medieval times at least three chieftaincies, namely Kaṭṭukuḷampattu, Tirukōṇamalaipattu and Kottiyarampattu which were subject to the control of Vaṉṉi chiefs. Even during the early nineteenth century the last of these divisions was nominally subject the authority of a Vaṉṉiyanār.

The dominant group among the inhabitants in Puttalam and Batticaloa were the Mukkuvar who were the descendants of mercenaries and divers who had come from Malabar in South India. The Vaṉṉi chiefs in these regions were also Mukkuvar.

The chieftains of the Mahāvaṉṉi which included parts of the North Central and Northwestern provinces were Sinhalese. Vijayabāhu II was one of them. In the reign of his grandson Bhuvanekabāhu I (1272-82) Tīpa, Himiyāṇaka, Kadalīvata and Āpāṇa were some of the chiefs who held sway over the Sinhalese Vaṉṉi.

The *Malala Kathāva* which records some folk traditions concerning the fortunes of some Malala (Malabar) chiefs refers to the chiefs of the Veddas of the four Vaṉṉis namely, Hatigamana, Wenda kaduwe, Māgalla and Olupukare.

see *Instructions for the Dessave of the District of Jaffnapatnam, the Islands and the District of the Wanni belonging thereto*, 26th July, 1661, p. 80, and *Instructions for the Guidance of the Opperkoopman Anthony Pavilioen, Commandeur, and the council of the District of Jaffnapatnam with adjacent Islands and the province of the Wanni*, 31st October, 1658, pp. 83-86 in the *Instructions from the Governor-General and council of India to the Governor of Ceylon* 1656-1665 [trans. Sophia Pieters, Colombo, 1908]. *Memoir of Ryclhloff Van Goens* (Governor of Ceylon, 1660-1675) to *Van Goens* Jnr. (Governor of Ceylon, 1675-1679), p. 44. *Selections from the Dutch Records of the Ceylon Government*, No. 3 [trans. Reimers, Colombo, 1932]; *Memoir of Jan Schreuder* dated 17.3.1762 (trans. E. Reimers, Colombo, 1946) pp. 56-58; Simon Casie Chitty, *The Ceylon Gazetteer*, Cotta Church Mission Press, 1834, pp. 78-80, appendices 1 and 2; S. A. Raghavan, *India in Ceylonese History, Society and Culture*, London, 1964, p. 180.

3. The Portuguese administered the kingdom of Kotte which consisted of the south western lowlands from A.D. 1591. They conquered Jaffnapatnam around 1621. In 1658 the Dutch overcame the Portuguese and administered the maritime provinces of Ceylon until the British conquest in 1796.

4. Memoirs of Ryckloff Van Goens, translated by Sophia Pieters, Colombo, 1910, pp. 31-33.

in his *Manual of the Vanni*, Lewis asserts: 'In the Sinhalese chronicles, it appears to have had a more extensive application than that given by the Dutch for it included the Nuwarakalāviya district which was the Mahavaṉṉi'[5].

The Vaṉṉi was a much larger area in medieval Ceylon. In the thirteenth century the Vaṉṉi area was so extensive as to include parts of the three traditional territorial divisions of Rājaraṭa, Māyaraṭa and Rohaṇa.[6] It is not possible, however, to determine more precisely the territorial limits of the Vaṉṉi from the evidence of local chronicles. The *Conquista*,[7] which reflects the political conditions of the sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries, asserts that apart from the chieftaincies of 'Jaffnapatnam' Puttalam,[8] Trincomalee, Batticaloa,[9] Panava[10] and Ruhuṇu were among the principalities that were subject to the authority of chiefs who held the rank of Vaṉṉiya(r).[11]

The word Vaṉṉi and its variants as used in Sinhalese, Tamil and Pāli texts had four different connotations: a caste group (among both Tamils and Sinhalese),[12] a feudatory province, a feudal chief and lastly a wide belt of territory confined primarily to the dry zone.[13] The question arises as to how both, the feudal chieftaincies and an extensive and contiguous region in the island came to be known as the Vaṉṉi.

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5. J. P. Lewis of the Ceylon Civil Service served as Government Agent in the Vavuniya District. see J. P. Lewis, *Manual of* the Vaṉṉi Districts, Colombo, 1895, p. 1.
6. *Cūlavamsa* (*C V*) ed. W. Geiger, 2 vols., Pali Text Society, London, 1925, 1927, translated into German by W. Geiger, translated from German into English by C. Mabel Rickmers, 2 parts, Colombo, 1953. LXXXIII, v. 10, LXXXVIII vv. 87-89, LXXXIX, v. 53. *Pūjāvaliya* (Pjv) ed. Rev. Kiriella Gnanavimala, Colombo, 1965, pp. 785-789. *A contribution to the History of Ceylon, Translated from the "Pujavaliya"* by G. Gunasekara Mudaliyar, Colombo, 1895, pp. 37, 42.
7. *The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon* by Fernao de Queyroz represents an analytical study of a period of Ceylonese history. This work, started in A.D. 1671 and completed in 1686, was based on a variety of sources that included the works of Barros (1496-1570), Diogo de Couto (1542-1616), Joaõ Rodriguez de sa.y.Menezes (1608-1682) and Faria y Souza (1581-1649). Moreover, Queyroz sought and obtained first hand information from several of the Portuguese who had served in Ceylon. Although the Portuguese rule in Ceylon constitutes the main theme of his work, Queyroz gives a fairly accurate and lengthy description of the kingdoms and principalities in the island with which the Portuguese had dealings. see *The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon* (Conquista) trans. by Fr. S. G. Perera, Colombo, 1930, pp. 47-58, 66-72.
8. Parākramabāhu VI (1415-67) subdued the *Mukkuva* chief of Puttalam after a bitter and prolonged military campaign. A copper plate grant of Bhuvanekabāhu VII dated in saka 1469 (A.D. 1546/7) mentions of Navaratna Vaṉṉiya, a *Mukkuva* chief who was living at Luṉuwila and was ruling over the area of Puttalam.
9. The Conquista refers to three 'Vaneas or Princes' who were ruling separate territories adjacent to the lagoon. Conquista, p. 64.
10. Rycloff Van Goens mentions of Iḷañciṅka Vaṉṉiyaṉ who was living in Erāvūr. *Memoirs of Rycloff Van Goens* (1663-1675) translated by Reimers, Colombo, 1932, p. 44.
11. *Conquista*, pp. 47, 51.
12. Lewis remarks: 'A caste peculiar to the Vaṉṉi is one that takes its name therefrom, Viz; the Vaṉṉiya caste. There is also a Sinhalese caste of the same name found only in the North Central province and the Vavuniya district'. see *Manual of the Vanni Districts*, p. 87.
13. The dry zone, the Central highlands and the low country wet zone are three principal geographical divisions of the Island. The first of these includes the Northern, North Central, North Western and the Eastern provinces and a part of the Southern province.

Tennent conjectures that the name must have been derived either from the word *vaṇa* (forest) or from the word *vahni* (vaṉṉi in Tamil) on account of the intense heat of the region.[14] This explanation does not take into account historical evidence. Gnanapragasar, who pioneered the study of the early Tamil settlements in the Vaṉṉi contends that the Vaṉṉiyar, who belonged to a warrior caste, had come over to Ceylon, in the armies of foreign invaders, settled in regions where anarchy prevailed and gradually established principalities in the region of *Aṭaṅkāpaṟṟu*[15] and Trincomalee.[16] Nevertheless, he does not attempt to examine on a chronological basis the process by which the chieftaincies of the Vaṉṉi had evolved.

Commenting on the origins of these chieftaincies Indrapala asserts:[17]

'The traditions in the Tamil chronicles refer to a time when invaders and settlers from South India, including the Vaṉṉiyar, occupied parts of the present Northern and Eastern provinces and set up chieftaincies there. These were undoubtedly the chieftaincies which later came to be known as the Vaṉṉi. There were a few prominent leaders, one of whom was Māgha who were responsible for the creation of Vaṉṉi chieftaincies in the Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts.[18]

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14. Manual of the Vaṉṉi districts, p. 1.

15. The Vavuniya district is popularly referred to as *Aṭaṅ*-kāppaṟṟu probably on account its traditional resistance to authority by the chiefs of the region against the major power, the Portuguese and the Dutch in particular.

16. Fr. S. Gnanapragasar, S. J. pioneered research on the History of the Ceylon Tamils. *Yalppāṇa Vaipava Vimarcanam* (a critical History of Jaffna) and *The Kings of Jaffna during the Portuguese Period of Ceylon History* (Reprinted from Catholic Guardian, 1920) were his main contributions. Reference may be made to S. Gnanapragasar, *Yālppāṇa Vaipava Vimarcanam* (YVV), Achchuvely, 1928, p. 40.

17. K. Indrapala, 'The Origin of the Tamil Vaṉṉi Chieftaincies of Ceylon'. *The Ceylon Journal of Humanities*, Vol. I, No. 2, July 1970, pp. 135-136.

18. He adds: 'It is difficult to trace how this name came to be applied to Sinhalese chieftains, too. One possibility is that the term Vaṉṉi became current for chieftains in the abandoned regions of Rajarata and in the forest tracts else where after Vaṉṉi chiefs from South India established themselves in the Northern parts of Ceylon. Another possibility is that the term was introduced into the island before the migration of South Indian Vaṉṉi chiefs, in the same manner as South Indian administrative terms came to be introduced. Vaṉṉi, however, was not used in South India as an administrative term and the Vaṉṉi chiefs there were not heads of administrative units', (*Ibid.* p. 119).

If the term Vaṉṉi was not used in South India as an administrative term there cannot be any possibility of it ever having been introduced into Ceylon in the same manner as other South Indian administrative terms came to be introduced.

Indrapala's contention that the Vaṉṉi was not used in South India as an administrative term is wrong. Even a Ceylonese text, the Upāsaka Janālaṅkāra refers to a Pāṇḍya Vassal, Cōḷagaṅga, who provided succour to the Buddhist monks who had fled to the Tamil country during the confusion that followed Māgha's invasion of Ceylon around A.D. 1215, as a Vaññā sāmanta. Feudal chiefs and other dignitaries who held high ranks in the administration were generally referred to also as *Samantas* in India. In the Cōḷa kingdom the chiefs called Vaṉṉiyarnāyaṉ had territorial jurisdiction during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The Madras Tamil Lexicon defines the term Vaṉṉimai as a Petty chieftainship. According to the same work the word Vaṉṉiyaṉ denotes (1) a feudatory prince (2) a commander and (3) a samanta.

The belief that Māgha created the Vaṉṉi chieftaincies is based on a superficial and selective study of the Tamil chronicles, in particular the *Maṭṭakaḷappumānmiyam*, a text that records the traditions and legends relating to Batticaloa. In order to ascertain the validity of the assertion that Māgha created the chieftaincies of Batticaloa the relevant sections of that chronicle may briefly be summarized here:

> When Maṉuvaraṭaṉ, the ruler of Kalinga learnt of the unfavourable developments in Ceylon he sent his third son called Mākōṉ (Māgha) with instructions to propagate Saivism and to install Cukātiraṉ as the ruler of Maṭṭakaḷappu. Mākōṉ and his army landed at a spot in Maṇipuram (Jaffna), proceeded to Maṭṭakkaḷappu, and had Tiṉaciṅkaṉ and his kinsmen put to death. Moreover, he conquered the province and appointed Cukatiraṉ, a Kālinga, as its ruler. With the help of the *Paṭaiyāṭci* he occupied Tōppāvai (Polonnaruwa), divided its territories and gave them to the members of the *Paṭaiyaṭcikulam*.[19] Maṇarriṭal (Jaffna), Tirukkōṇai (Trincomalee) and Mannār were placed under the chiefs of the Tirukkulam (Kurukulam). He gave Maṭṭakaḷappu to the chiefs of the Mukkuvar, raised a fortress at Maṇmunai and placed it under Cukatiran. The chiefs of the Mukkuvar whom he had brought from Malayāḷam (Malabar) and Kollam (Quilon) were raised by him to the rank of *Vaṉṉipam*.[20]

On the evidence of the foregoing account it cannot conclusively be proved that Māgha founded the Vaṉṉi chieftaincy of Batticaloa or for that matter those of Trincomalee and Maṉṉar. Although the traditions of the Mukkuvar of Batticaloa as embodied in this chronicle attribute the origins of the chieftaincy of the Mukkuvar of Batticaloa to Māgha these traditions do not prove that the Vaṉṉi chieftaincy of that region had its origins under Māgha. The Mukkuvar were not of the Vaṉṉiyar community. They had come from Keraḷa and not from the Tamil country. In South India the community of Vaṉṉiyar and the feudal chieftaincies of the Vaṉṉi were to be found, for the most part, in the Tamil country and not in Kerala. Therefore, the Mukkuvar could not have been responsible for the origins of the Vaṉṉi in Ceylon. Māgha was not a Vaṉṉiya by caste or rank, nor did he come from the Tamil country. The tradition that

19. The term *Paṭaiyātci* would convey the meaning, 'leader(s) of the army'. However, in South India one of the subdivisions of the Vaṉṉiyar caste was known as *paṭaṭyatci*. Māgha's army in Ceylon may have included the Vaṉṉiyar. Māgha is said to have brought an army of 12,000 men, mostly *Keraḷas* on his arrival. However, in course time this number increased to 40,000. It may therefore be assumed that the Vaṉṉiyar and other military groups who were already in the Island were also won over by Māgha to swell the ranks of his army.

20. The *Mattakkaḷappu Mānmiyam* purports to relate the history of the Tamils of Batticaloa. Nevertheless it alludes to several episodes in the history of the Island. In this work, as in any other Tamil chronicle from Ceylon, legends have been mingled with historical traditions and folklore. Certain expressions in the text suggest that this chronicle was written on the initiative of a Dutch officer during the eighteenth century. The custodians of the manuscripts have made interpolations subsequently. The work in its present shape appears to be a compendium of several traditions, legends and historical poems rather than being the work of a single author.

Among the Tamil chronicles only this work records the traditions relating to Māgha's conquest. The account of Māgha as recorded in this text, is fairly authentic and is corroborated by Sinhalese traditional history. See *Maṭṭakkaḷappu Mānmiyam* (*MM*), ed. F. X. C. Nadarajah, Colombo, 1962, p. 95.

Māgha conferred the rank of Vaṉṉipam on the chiefs of the Mukkuvar does not necessarily mean that the Vaṉṉi chieftaincy of Batticaloa had its origins in the time of Māgha.

The tradition recorded in the chronicle concerns only an episode in the history of the chieftaincy in Batticaloa. Invasions and conquests often result in the transfer of power from traditional ranks to the allies and supporters of the conqueror. Mukkuvar who had swelled the ranks of Māgha's army seem to have wrested political power from local chieftains and this is implied in the chronicle's account of Māgha's invasion.

The chronicle asserts that Māgha displaced Tiṉaciṅkaṉ and appointed in his place another dignitary, Cukatiraṉ, as the chief of Maṉmuṉai.[21] This evidence suggests that there was a local chieftain ruling in that region on the eve of Māgha's invasion. Moreover, the chief appointed by Māgha to rule Maṉmuṉai was a Kālinga and not a Vaṉṉiya(ṉ). Thus, it is clear that the tradition embodied in this chronicle cannot support the claim that Māgha created the Vaṉṉi chieftaincy of Batticaloa. The tradition itself does not claim that Vaṉṉiyar of South India or chiefs from South India who had already acquired the rank of Vaṉṉipam before their arrival in Ceylon were settled in Batticaloa and vested with political authority by Māgha. The tradition would rather suggest that the local chieftaincy had evolved before Māgha's invasion. In raising chiefs to the rank of Vaṉṉipam Māgha was only accepting and adapting a prevailing institution rather than introducing a major innovation in regional government.

Another Tamil chronicle, the *Koṇēcar Kalveṭṭu*, incidentally refers to the Vaṉṉi chiefs.[22] This work states that Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ, a grandson of Maṉunītikaṇṭa cōḷaṉ came to Ceylon, renovated the shrines at Kōṇēsvaram, organised on an elaborate scale the temple services and endowed it with land grants and deposits of treasure. He is also credited with having settled in the Trincomalee region several families whom he had brought from the Cōla country. Moreover this text asserts that he brought Taniyuṇṇāppūpāḷaṉ from Madurai, raised

21. Magha is associated with two chieftaincies in Batticaloa, namely Maṇmuṇai and Maṭṭakkaḷappu. The chieftain appointed by Māgha to administer the first of these was a Kālinga; the one appointed to rule the second principality was a Mukkuva. see *MM*, pp. 53-56, 95.

22. *The Koṉēcar kalveṭṭu* (KK) [published together with Sri *Takṣiṇa Kailācapuraṇam* ed. by P. P. Vaittiliṅka Tecikar, (Point Pedro), 1916] pp. 3-6. Written partly in verse and partly in prose, records the traditions and legends relating to the Koṇesvaram temple in Trincomalee. The historical traditions recorded in this work centre round Kuḷakōṭṭaṉ, some chiefs to the Vaṉṉi, Gajabahu and some kings of Jaffna all of whom had dealings with the temple.

The authorship of this work is attributed to *Kaviracar* whose date cannot be determined easily. In its present from the text cannot go back to a period earlier than the nineteenth century for it shows an awareness of the British presence. The original text may have been written in an earlier period—probably during the seventeenth century. The work seems to have been subsequently revised from time to time with interpolations by several hands. Despite its limitations it is a useful source for the study of local History, society and culture.

him to the dignity of a *Vaṉṉipam* and vested with him the government of the town of Tirukōṇamalai. Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ brought another chief from Tirunelveli, made him the ruler of Kaṭṭukuḷam paṟṟu and conferred on him the rank of a *Vaṉṉipam*.[23] This text does not expressly state that families which were brought from South India and settled in Trincomalee were Vaṉṉiyar. Nor is there any conclusive evidence to show that the two chiefs who were raised to the rank of *Vaṉṉipam* were of Vaṉṉiya descent.

It could of course be argued that Kuḷakōṭṭaṉ otherwise called Cōḷakaṅkaṉ was a Vaṉṉiya as the *Upāsaka Janālaṅkāra*[24] testifies that Cōḍagaṅga, a Pāṇḍya vassal, was a vañña sāmanta and because the Gaṅgas of Paṅkalanāṭu had borne the title Vaṉṉiya(r) nāyaṉ. Nevertheless, it is difficult to establish his identity and the chronology of the events associated with him. There were in Ceylon several princes who had the name Cōḍagaṅga. A prince called Cōḍagaṅga kumāra lived at the Ceylonese court during the reign of Gajabāhu II (1133-55).[25] The nephew of Nissanka malla (1187-1196) who usurped the throne after putting to death Vikramabāhu, the brother of that king, was a Cōḍagaṅga.[26] Another Cōḍagaṅga who was a contemporary of Māgha is known from the Sanskrit inscription at fort Frederick, Trincomalee.[27] Yet another Coḷanganga is known to Ceylonese tradition.[28]

Even if we assume that Kuḷakkōṭṭaṉ otherwise called Cōḷakaṅkaṉ was a Vaṉṉi chief and that he is identical with Cōḍagaṅga mentioned in the epigraph at Fort Frederick, it cannot be established that the Vaṉṉi chieftaincies of Trincomalee had their origins under him because the traditions embodied in the same chronicle presuppoe that the Vaṉṉi existed in an earlier period. The same work asserts that king Gajabāhu had gone to Koṇesvaram and summoned the *Vannipam*, the temple authorities and several others in order to reorganize

23. *Kk.*, pp. 2-3.

24. *Upāsakajanālaṅkāra*, ed. by Moratota Dhammakanda Thera, revised by Kosgoda Pannasekhara Thera, Weligama, 1914, p. 157.

25. *CV.*, LXX, v. 238.

26. *CV.*, LXXX, v. 29.

27. This inscription mentions that Coḍaganga came to the Island in Saka 1245 (A.D. 1223). As this record was engraved on a door jamb found with images it may be assumed that the missing portion of the epigraph recorded certain benefactions of Cōḍagaṅga to the temple of Koṇēcar. See S. Paranavitana, 'A Fragmentary Sanskrit Inscription from Trincomalee', EZ, V, p. 173.

28. The *Cūlavamsa* claims that Bhuvanekabāhu I (1273-1284) repulsed the attacks of the Tamil generals Kalingarayar and Cōḷagaṅgadeva who invaded the island from the opposite coast (CV., XC: 32). This Cōḷagaṅgadeva may be the one mentioned in an inscription of the Pāṇḍya King, Maravarman Kulasekhara (1268-1310), found at the Sundaresvara temple at Aruppukkōṭṭai in Ramnad, South India.

the temple services.[29] This ruler may be identified as Gajabahu II (1133-55) who spent the last years of his life at the palace he had erected at Kantalāy.[30] These traditions suggest that the origins of the Vaṉṉi chieftaincies definitely preceded Māgha.

The existence of the Vaṉṉi before the thirteenth century is hinted also by another work, the *Nikāyasangrahaya*,[31] a Sinhalese chronicle written in the fourteenth century. This work asserts that Parākramabāhu I conquered the 364 Vaṉṉis.[32] This may appear to be authentic in the light of that king's dealings with the *Vyādhas* (Veddas). The *Cūlavamsa* testifies that Parākramabāhu enlisted 'thousands of Vyādhas' in his armies.[33] Later traditions attest that some principalities inhabited and dominated by the Veddas were also known as the Vaṉṉi.[34]

All the Ceylonese sources that refer to Vaṉṉi belong to the Post Polonnaruwa period. Nevertheless, the absence of any references to the Vaṉṉi in the sources of the Polonnaruwa period cannot be a valid argument to show that these chieftaincies had their origins only after Māghas invasion. The local chronicles do not give detailed accounts about administration and local government. Religious and dynastic history were their main themes for treatment. They took notice of these chieftaincies only after they had developed and emerged as centres of feudal power.

There are several other indications that these Vaṉṉi chieftaincies had their origins before Māgha's invasion. Firstly, the Vaṉṉi chieftaincy as a feudal institution had attained a mature state of development during the thirteenth century. The privileges of the chiefs were well defined; they were autonomous and had their own retainers and paraphernalia according to their rank.[35] Secondly, they were spread over a wide and contiguous belt of territory embracing

29. The account of Gajabahu as given in the chronicle may be summarized as follows: When the services at the Koṇeçar temple were interrupted by the death of the Pāśupata brahmins Gajabahu came to Tirukoṇamalai, summoned the *Vannipam*, the *tānam*, *Varippattu* and the nāṭṭavar and inquired as to why the temple services were discontinued. On being informed that it was due to the death of the Pāśupata brahmins he raised to the 'rank of *mutanmai*' (chief priests) two brahmins who had come from abroad. Moreover, he endowed the temple with 1100 gold pieces. The king also proclaimed that a tenth of the grain tax and of the proceeds from the sale of all commodities should be reserved for the temple, *KK*, pp. 11-13.

30. *CV.*, LXXI: 1-5.

31. The *Nikāyasaṅgrahaya* (Nks) otherwise called *Sasanāvatāraya* written by Dhammakitti Mahāthera purports to relate the history of the Buddhist sects on a chronological order and against a historical background.

32. *Nikāyasaṅgrahaya* ed. by D. P. R. Samaranayake, Colombo, p. 85.

33. *CV.*, LXIX: 20.

34. see F.N.1.

35. In the reign of Parakramabahu II (1236-72) his son, the *yuvaraja*, Vijayabahu presented to the Vaṉṉi chiefs of Rajarata chairs, white umbrellas, fly-whisks and other insignia when they paid homage to him at Anuradhapura. *CV.* LXXXVIII: 87-89.

parts of all the three territorial divisions.[36] *Lastly, Vanni* chieftains were found in the territories that were under the control of the kings of Dambadeniya as well as those subject to Māgha. Vijayabāhu III himself is said to have attained the rank of a 'Vaṉṉi king' and is credited with the conquest of the chiefs in the Mahāvaṉṉi—a region beyond Magha's control. In the reign of Parākramabahu II a part of this territory had come to be known as the Mahavanni. If these chieftaincies had their origins under Māgha it is difficult to explain how the term Vaṉṉi was applied to denote a region that was an integral part of the Dambadeniya kingdom ruled over by Magha's contemporary, Parākramabāhu II. As Māgha and his two contemporaries at Dambadeniya, Vijayabahu III and Parākramabāhu II (1236-1271) had connexions with the Vaṉṉi, the origins of the Vaṉṉi as a territorial unit and the Vaṉṉi chieftaincy as a feudal institution must go back to a period before Māgha's invasion. Moreover, it may be added that the view that the chieftaincies called the Vaṉṉi had their *origins* in the thirteenth century ignores the process of evolution in historical developments.

II

Vanniyar in South India

Since the Ceylonese chronicles do not record any reliable traditions about the origins of these chieftaincies the South Indian evidence relating to the Vaṉṉiyar could be considered here as it is bound to throw some light on the origins of these chieftaincies in Ceylon.

In South India, as in Ceylon, the term Vaṉṉi denoted a community, a feudal chieftaincy and a belt of territory.[38] As a caste of professional warriors the Vaṉṉiyar were prominent in the medieval South Indian military system. Since the references to Vaṉṉiya soldiers and regiments are from the reign of Rajarajā I onwards[39] it may be inferred that the military requirements of Cōḷa imperialism had contributed towards the emergence of the Vaṉṉiyar as a distinct social group—a caste of professional warriors. The mode of remuneration for

36. The *Pujāvaliya* asserts that Vijayabāhu III secured control of Māyaraṭa, 'after having brought under his authority the Sinhalese living in the Mahavaṉṉi'. The account implies that the Mahavaṉṉi was a part of Mayaraṭa. The *Culavamsa* states that Vijayabahu III attained the rank of a Vaṉṉi raja (*Vaṉṉi rājāttam samupāgata*). His son Parākramabāhu II is said to have brought under his influence the Sinhala kings in the land of the Vaṉṉi and the Vaṉṉi kings living in Rājaraṭa and Rohaṇa are said to have acknowledged his lordship. See *Pjv.*, p. 32, *Cv.*, LXXXI: 11; L XXXIII: 10; LXXXVIII: 87-89; LXXXIX: 53. That part of the *Cūlavamsa* which deals with the reign Parakramabahu II is believed to have been written in the reign of Parakramabahu IV (1302-1326). Nevertheless, the account is partly based on contemporary sources—monastic records.

37. *Cv.* adds: '... *Vanni rājārattam samupāgata*'. Cv., LXXXI, 11; *Pjv.* p. 32.

38. The *Madhurāvijayam*, a sanskrit text attributed to Gangādevi, the consort of the Vijayanagara prince kumāra Kampaṇa who conquered the Tamil country, asserts that Bukka I the Vijayanagara king, ordered his son, Kampaṇa, to subdue the kings of the Vaṉṉi in his southern expedition. See S. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar, *Sources of Vijayanagara History*, Madras, 1919, pp. 33-34.

39. Annual Reports on Epigraphy (ARE) Madras, 1920, No. 556 of 1919; ARE., 1928, p. 2; ARE., 1934/35, Nos. 122, 126, 136, 142, 144-147, 153-159, 171.

military service in the Cōḷa administration was often the assignment of land to be held on service-tenure, a practice common in India in medieval times. In Cōḷa terminology such assignments to the Vanniyar were referred to as *Vaṉṉiyaparru*.[40]

Cōḷa inscriptions also refer to feudal chiefs who held the rank of *Vaṉṉiya(r)ṉayaṉ*. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries princes belonging to three feudatory families in the Cōḷa kingdom, namely, the Gangas of Paṅkalanāṭu, the Malayaman chiefs of Kiḷiyūr and the Ceṅkeṇi-chiefs otherwise called Cāmpuvarāyar of Paṭaiviṭu[41] bore such titles as *Vaṉṉiya(r)ṉayaṉ* and *Vaṉṉiyamātēvaṉ* which could be interpreted as 'the lord of the Vanniyar'.[42] These titles suggest that these chiefs were also generals who had under their charge regiments of the Vaṉṉiyar.

There is evidence to suggest that the Vaṉṉiyar had connexions with the Veḷaikkārar, one of the regiments created by the Imperial Cōḷas. An inscription refers to a certain Vaṉṉiyanācci as a *Vēḷaikkāri*.[43] This evidence suggests that some feudal chiefs who had the title *Vaṉṉiya(r)nāyaṉ* could have belonged to the group of *Vēḷaikkārar*. Several inscriptions from South Arcot, which record the oath of loyalty by the *Veḷaikkārar* to their chiefs, Vaṉṉiyanāyaṉ—the Malayamāṉ of Kiḷiyūr establish a connexion between the Vēḷaikkārar and the Vaṉṉi chiefs of that region.[44] These epigraphic records testify that the *Vēḷaikkārar* were a sort of 'household warriors' and that the chiefs who held the rank of *Vaṉṉiya(r)nāyaṉ* had *Vēḷaikkāra* regiments in their service. Furthermore, the association of the Vanniyar with the *Veḷaikkārar* is suggested by a Pāṇḍya inscription which mentions the *Vaṉṉiyavaṭṭam* along with several other regiments which were units of the *Perumpaṭai*—the great army, synonymous with the *Mahātantram* and the *Mahāsenai* of the Tamil inscriptions. Ceylonese inscriptions of the Polonnaruwa period attest that the division called *Perum-*

40. K. A. Nilakantasastri, *The Cōḷas*, 2nd ed., Madras, 1955, p. 505.

41. Two Malayaman chiefs of Kiḷiyūr namely, *Malayamān Periya uṭaiyān* and Rāmaṉ *Porkuṭaṅkuṭuttan* had the title *Vanniyanayan*. Pṛthvī Gangaṉ a chief of Paṅkaḷanāṭu and a vassal of Kulottunga III (1178-1218) was called *Vanniyamātēvan* (the great lord of the Vaṉṉi(yar). Among the Sambuvaraya chieftains Ceṅkēṇi Ammaiyappaṉ was otherwise known as *Vanniyanāyan*. He was also a vassal of Kulottunga III. See ARE., 1934/35, Nos. 122, 126, 136, 142, 143-147, 153-159, 170, 171, see also pp. 61-77. ARE., 1911 p. 34. No. 234 of 1910; S. Pathmanathan, *The Kingdom of Jaffna*, Circa A.D. 1250-1450. Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of London, 1969, pp. 107-110.

42. The epigraphist who examined these inscriptions defines the title Vaṉṉiyanāyaṉ as one that denotes a chief of the Vaṉṉiyar. See *ARE.*, 1934/35, p. 61.

43. As *Vanniyanācci* is the femine form of *Vanniyanāyan* it could be inferred that some of the chiefs who held the rank of *Vanniya(r)nāyan* were *Veḷaikkarar*. See *ARE.*, 1934/35, No. 122.

44. Several epigraphs from Tirukkoyilur in South Arcot district record the oath of loyalty taken by several members of the *Vēḷaikkāra* community to *Vanniyanāyan*, the Malayaman of Kiḷiyūr. The *Veḷaikkāra* folk pledged to be loyal to him and perish with him in the event of his death. *ARE.*, 1934/35; Nos. 122, 126, 136, 144-147, 153-159.

45. T. N. Subramaniam, *South Indian Temple Inscriptions* (SITI), II, Madras, 1954, p. 622, Ins. No. 706.

paṭai had been serving in Ceylon.[46] As in South India, the *Perumpaṭai* of Ceylon could have included of the Vaṉṉiyar. Moreover, as the *Vēḷaikkāra* regiment constituted the *Mahātantram*[47] in Ceylon it could be assumed that some of the *Vēḷaikkārar* were Vaṉṉiyar.

It would be useful to consider here the origins of the term *Vaṉṉipattu*. The existence of territorial units called *Vaṉṉi(ya)paṟṟu* in Ceylon and the Cōḷa kingdom cannot be a mere accidental coincidence. From the time of Rājarāja II onwards Cōḷa inscriptions refer to units called *Vaṉṉiyapaṟṟu*. Such units are generally defined by epigraphists as land holdings held by Vaṉṉiya regiments.[48] The term *paṟṟu*, frequently mentioned in South Indian inscriptions denotes a unit of territory—an administrative unit.[49] The term Vaṉṉipaṟṟu could have come into vogue in Ceylon in the same manner as in the Cōḷa kingdom. It may have either been introduced during the period of Cōḷa rule (993-1070) or adopted later, in the Polonnaruwa period, owing to the influence of South Indian regiments. The earliest Vaṉṉi chieftaincies of Ceylon could have evolved from land holdings given to Vaṉṉiya regiments on service tenure.

The assignment of landgrants for military service, the combination of military and administrative functions on a regional basis in the hands of generals and the heritable nature of military and administrative ranks are likely to have been among the factors that contributed to the development of the 'pockets' of feudal power in medieval Ceylon.

The term *Vanniyanār* which was generally applied to the chiefs of the Vaṉṉi in South India and the Tamil speaking areas of Ceylon is derived from the title *Vanniya(r)nāyaṉ* which was originally a military title signifying the rank of a general. This development was the result of a process of progressive growth

46. Inscriptions of the *Ticai āyirattu aññurruvar*—'The five hundred of the thousand directions'—from Padaviya and Viharehinna in Ceylon mention of the *Valaṅkaipperumpaṭai*, 'the great army of *Valaṅkai* group'. Palaeographically, these inscriptions could be assigned to the twelfth century, see A. Veluppillai, *Ceylon Tamil Inscriptions* (CTI), Peradeniya, 1971, pp. 55-56.

47. The Polonnaruwa slab inscription of the *Vēḷaikkārar*, dated in the 55th year of Vijayabāhu I (1055-1110), testifies that the army of the Veḷaikkārar constituted the *Mahātantiram*. The *Veḷaikkārar* were a composite group which included such groups as Malayāḷis, Telugus, *Valaṅkai*, *Iṭaṅkai*, *Piḷḷaikaḷṭanam* and *Parivārakkontam*. They were also affiliated to the *Vaḷañceyar*. The *Perumpaṭai* of Ceylon also included within its ranks the *Valaṅkai* and the *Vaḷañceyar*, see *SII*, IV, 1396 and *CTI*, pt. 1, pp. 55-56.

48. The term *Vaṉṉiyapaṟṟu* is explained as one that denotes either lands held under military tenure or lands in the enjoyment of soldiers, see T. N. Subramaniam, *South Indian Temple Inscriptions*, Madras, 1957, III, pt. 2 (Epigraphical Glossary), and also *Madras Tamil Lexicon*.

49. Paṟṟu is a Dravidian word (Paṟṟu in Malayalam and Tamil; Pattu in Canarese) which denotes a territorial division consisting of several villages. This word came into vogue in Ceylon presumably after the Cōḷa conquest. In South India a paṟṟu was a unit of a nāṭu. Some times, however, the nāṭu, was the subdivision of a paṟṟu. see Mahalingam, *Administration and Social Life under Vijayanagara*, p. 181 and also *Madras Tamil Lexicon*.

in which the general became a feudal chief exercising territorial jurisdiction. However, the original significance of the title was subsequently forgotten and in course of time it came to denote, only the rank of a feudal chief.

It may be recalled that some feudal chiefs in the Cōḷa kingdom, who had the rank of *Vaṉṉiya(r)nāyaṉ* in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, were also generals who had under their charge regiments of the *Vēḷaikkārar*.[50] *Vēḷaikkārar* had come to Ceylon during the period of Cōla rule and their settlements were to be found even after the fall of Cōḷa power.[51] They were employed by the Sinhalese kings until the end of the twelfth century. Some of them held positions of high rank in the government. In the reign of Jayabāhu (1110-1011) the general Cētarāyaṉ, a Vēḷaikkāra, was the head of a territorial division called Mahamaṇḍala.[52] The combination of administrative and military functions in the hands of generals was not unusual in the Polonnaruwa period.[53] In the light of these considerations the origins of the Vaṉṉi chieftaincies may be sought in the changes that occurred in the military and administrative systems in Ceylon during the period of Cōḷa rule and the centuries that followed thereon.

Political conditions in the Polonnaruwa period provided a convenient atmosphere for the evolution of these chieftaincies. Except for the reigns of Vijayabāhu I and Parākramabāhu I the country witnessed political instability. Frequent wars and the lack of effective central control produced a sense of insecurity. Under such circumstances generals and local chiefs could wield greater influence and power as testified by the manifold examples in history.

Commenting on the period of Vikramabāhu and Mānābharaṇa the *Cūlavamsa* records:

> 'The officers belonging to the retinue of the monarchs on both sides who were established on the frontiers, fought continually. And even the rulers did evil to the people letting their retainers plunder the towns and commit highway robbery. The slaves too and the workmen of good family despised their masters. They became mercenaries to the kings and worming themselves into their confidence, they by means of offices conferred on

50. See f.n. 41.

51. The Veḷaikkara regiments came to Ceylon during the Cōḷa Conquest in the late tenth and early eleventh centuries. Their settlements in the island were to be found even after the fall of Cōḷa power. In consequence of their revolt Vijayabahu I (1055-1110) had to evacuate Polonnaruwa for a time. But, ultimately he suppressed the revolt. Two inscriptions of his reign record the transactions of the *Veḷaikkārar*. In the reign of Gajabahu II, the *Vēḷaikkāra* regiments acted in collusion with his cousins and rivals, Kit Srimegha and Srīvallabha, and revolted against him. In the time of Parākrama bāhu I (1153-1186) there was a *Veḷaikkāra* army stationed at Kottiyar. A thirteenth century inscription from Padaviya records the construction of a vihāra by Lokanātha, a *Vēḷaikkāra* general, see *SII*. IV, 1396, 1398; *EZ*. IV, p. 191-196, *JRAS* (CB) New Series, VIII, pt. 2, pp. 261-264. *Cv*., LX, 36-44; LXIII: 24-29; LXXIV, 44.

52. *CTI*., pt. 1, p. 26.

53. Rakka, a general of Gajabāhu II, exercised authority over the hill country. In the reign of Parakramabāhu, the general Nārāyaṇa was in charge of the province around Anuradhapura. Bhūta, another general of this king was appointed to administer Rohana.

See *Cv*., LXIX, 6-11; LXX, 5-6; LXXII, 65-69; LXXV, 196.

them attained even greater power. The people dwelling in places difficult of access like the Samantakūṭa and so forth, no longer paid to the monarch the taxes formerly levied on them. They despised the king, became renegades and dwelt independent, each in his own region.'[54]

Moreover, it may be observed that even under Parākramabāhu there were settlements which enjoyed local autonomy.[55] After the death of this king the Polonnaruwa kingdom declined and disintegrated when Māgha conquered Polonnaruwa in A.D. 1215. The breakup also facilitated the culmination in the process of the evolution of the feudal chieftaincies. The Vaṉṉi chieftaincies emerged as independent or autonomous centres of political power and began to play a crucial role in the politics and the administrative management of the Island. During the late thirteenth century the title Vaṉṉiyaṉār or Vaṉṉirāja was no longer confined exclusively to the chieftains of the Vaṉṉiyar caste. It came to signify the rank of any feudal chieftain in the dryzone and all the lands subject to the authority of such chiefs was collectively known as the Vaṉṉi.

54. *Cv.*, LXI: 63-71.
55. *Cv.*, LXXIV: 48.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TEA INDUSTRY IN CEYLON: THE FIRST PHASE, c 1870 TO c 1900

L. A. WICKREMERATNE

> "The 'tea mania' has now fairly set in and many estates have extensive tea nurseries and some are planting tea under coffee and cinchona trees. Oh! ye gods of agriculture, how in the name of commonsense do you expect all these products to thrive in the same six feet square of soil"[1]

An anonymous Haputale planter's lament made in 1885 merely reflected the confusion which prevailed throughout the planting districts in Ceylon following the rather dramatic collapse of the coffee industry.

Contemporary documents clearly show that part at any rate of the confusion had been engendered by an unwillingness to accept the probability that the coffee industry was really on its last legs. Instead, in the late 1870's when the coffee leaf disease had spread its ravages far and wide and could no longer be shrugged off as a passing misfortune, G. H. K. Thwaites, whose views were widely sought after, expressed the view that imported varieties of coffee seeds—firstly the Liberian obtained with the assistance of Dr. Joseph Hooker of Kew Gardens and subsequently a lesser known West Indian variety—could arrest the disease. Although the newer varieties, which were incidentally distributed free to planters and peasants, seemed to stand up better to the disease, ultimately they too succumbed. Consequently by 1880 Thwaites too had abandoned all illusions regarding the condition of the coffee industry.[2]

Interestingly, Henry Trimen, who succeeded Thwaites as the Director of the Royal Botanical Gardens, was in turn hopeful. Although he conceded that the leaf disease had not diminished notably, Trimen expressed satisfaction that coffee planters were overcoming a prejudice they had against experimenting with the *Coffea Liberica* variety. Moreover, Trimen urged planters to resort to—if their means permitted them to do so—"high cultivation and liberal manuring." He suggested that the government should obtain the services

1. *T[ropical] A[griculturalist]*, 1885-1886, p. 46.
2. Report on the R[oyal] B[otanical] G[ardens], G. H. K. Thwaites, *A[dministration] R[eports]*, 1875, Part IV, p. 39.
   Also *A.R.* 1876, Part IV, p. 183 c. *S[essional] P[apers]*, 1879, no. 35.

of a trained entomologist and complained that "no combined effort" had hitherto been made to prevent the spread of the disease "on the lines indicated by its known nature."[3]

The expert view of the matter was shared by some at any rate of the run of the mill European coffee planters in Ceylon. "Coffee is still king in Ceylon. Who says coffee in Ceylon is rapidly going downhill past recovery?" asked an irate planter who reported that there were coffee estates in Dolosbage which had produced unprecedented quantities of coffee.[4] Another planter in Panwila reported that he had got "splendid coffee crops" despite the leaf disease and added that this was merely "proof of what can be done by careful cultivation."[5]

Such robust hopes notwithstanding, the more general picture that emerges from the evidence was that the collapse of the coffee industry had gravely embarrassed the majority of European planters. Many planters were financially ruined and were constrained to leave Ceylon and start planting ventures in other countries.[6] Considerable information was from time to time published in the contemporary *Tropical Agriculturalist* concerning the *emigre* planters and their activities elsewhere.

Individual coffee planters who opted to stay behind in Ceylon, came to terms with the crisis in a variety of ways. For one thing inspired by hopes of obtaining reasonably quick cash returns, the European planters took to the cultivation of certain products which had hitherto been confined largely to the Sinhalese peasants. In fact over the years the Government Agents had been consistently encouraging peasants to grow "other products" as a means of supplementing peasant incomes which were chronically dependent on the vagaries of rice cultivation.

As if to make a virtue out of plain necessity, European planters were exhorted to grow a variety of crops and not make the "mistake" of depending on a single staple. Indeed among contemporary documents, the *Blue Books*, in particular, provide us with the average figures of an impressive number of products which were now being grown in the plantation districts. But as no distinction has been made between European and purely native ventures, one cannot gauge the precise extent to which European enterprise was attracted to "other products" during the transitional period between the collapse of the coffee industry and the emergence of tea.

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3. Report on the R.B.G.; *A.R.* 1881, p. 4 D; Report on the R.B.G.; *A.R.* 1882, Part IV, p. 8 D ff.
4. *T.A.* 1881-1882, p. 498.
5. *T.A.* 1884-1885, p. 391.
6. Ferguson, John, *Ceylon in the Jubilee Year*, London, 1887, p. 330. Also, Henderson, J. A. and W.E. *An Account of Tea Cultivation and Manufacture in Ceylon*, Colombo, 1893.

There are however frequent references to pepper, nutmegs and cardamoms. The European planter was no doubt encouraged by the fact that these products together with cinnamon and citronella oil were after all traditionally profitable exports.[7]

Particular mention may in this context be made of the beginnings of the cocoa industry. Among European planters who took to its cultivation the best known was probably Boyd Tytler who inspite of being a successful coffee planter had been for years experimenting with cocoa cultivation in Kundasale. According to Ferguson, Tytler was the first to plant cocoa in Ceylon. It is worth noting that Tytler who was certain that cocoa would flourish throughout Dumbara, had evidently pinned his hopes on cocoa to recover the money which he had invested in coffee. Tytler hoped by these means to "take a trip round the world" and celebrate his freedom from debt.[8] There was also R. S. Fraser of Kandenuwera Estate who had visited Trinidad to acquaint himself with cocoa cultivation. Fraser had prudently grown cocoa, cardamoms and tea in addition to the original coffee which continued to yield—even as late as in 1884—"a good many thousand bushels."[9]

Figures for the period 1870-1885 show that by 1885 in the Kandy District alone there were 4353 acres under cocoa, in Matale about 3,800 and in the Badulla District—although climatically not as suited—700 acres. In the low Country planting districts of Ratnapura, Kegalle and Kalutara, the acreage in 1885 aggregated 2851.

In some ways however cocoa was not ideally suited to match the problems of a transitional period. For one thing as between the time of planting and the gathering of the nut for processing there was minimally a period of four years. The individual planter on the other hand who was struggling with his debts was looking out for crops which required a short growth period, promised quick returns, and above all, required a negligible outlay of capital. Moreover there was considerable confusion about the technical know how involved in cocoa cultivation. For example, it was only after a visit to the West Indies that Tytler was able to learn that ideally cocoa had to be grown with shade trees and that in lieu of shade trees, its life span was notably reduced.[10]

On the other hand this fact in itself proved to be a blessing in disguise. For it was now demonstrated that cocoa could be grown with sundry crops without entailing the complete clearing of the land, or the uprooting of the coffee trees which still gave the planter a small return. No doubt the practice of

7. Particular mention may be made of Charles Shand who was "indefatigable" in experimenting with new products. He departed dramatically from the beaten track even experimenting with fibre yielding plants for which purpose he improvised his own machinery.
8. Ferguson, A. M. and J. *Pioneers of the Planting Enterprise in Ceylon, No. 3, Robert Boyd Tytler*, Colombo, 1893.
9. *T.R.* 1884-1885, p. 389.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

interplanting cocoa with rubber which became a widespread and accepted method in later times long after rubber had become a fully fledged and independent industry, owed its origins to these early experiments.[11]

The interests of the European planters were not however confined to cocoa and their success with regard to a number of crops helped somewhat to dispel the prevailing gloom. A typical example was the planter who had successfully grown coffee as well as cocoa and pepper on his estates in Kandy and who declared in the *Tropical Agriculturalist* that the time was opportune for "new capitalists" to come to Ceylon to take in hand the "new products" for which the sub soil in the old coffee districts was "still good."[12] More revealingly, a detailed report on "Planting Prospects in Ceylon," published in the *Tropical Agriculturalist* in 1882, described the preoccupation with "new products" as the silver lining in a crisis atmosphere. The review compared the Ceylon coffee planter with the potatoe cultivating Irish as well as with the wheat farmer in Australia who had all "made the grand mistake of placing their sole dependence on one product".[13]

Meanwhile a discordant note was struck by those European planters—one presumes that they were a rapidly diminishing minority—who still doggedly clung to coffee. They complained that if European planters took as much interest in coffee as in the "new products," the coffee industry could somehow be restored to its pristine condition, and that it was "not fair to neglect and simultaneously cry down coffee."[14]

Gradually however circumstances not least the international price changes which made their cultivation vastly more economically remunerative induced the European planters in Ceylon to confine their efforts to the specific spheres—cinchona and tea.

Although there was little economic inducement to do so because the coffee industry was in a flourishing condition, cinchona, like tea, had been experimentally grown from the beginnings of the 1860's. By 1863, the indefatigable Thwaites was certain that in terms of climate and soil the hill districts of Ceylon —especially those elevations which were considered too high for coffee—were ideally suited for the cultivation of cinchona. Indeed by 1865 largely due to the energies of Thwaites thousands of cinchona plants had been distributed among the European planters and there was every indication that the demand for these plants would increase.[15]

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11. Wright, Arnold, ed. *Twentieth Century Impressions of Ceylon: its History, People, Commerce, Industry and Resources*, London, 1907, p. 242. Also p. 246.
12. *T.A.* 1884-1885, p. 391.
13. *T.A.*, 1881-1882, p. 2 ff.
14. *ibid.*, p. 498.
15. Report on the R.B.G., *S.P.* 1863, p. 137ff; Report on the R.B.G. *S.P.* 1865, p. 133ff; Also, *S.P.* 1886, p. 185 ff.

The visit of Clements Markham who was an expert in cinchona cultivation in India, and the publication in 1866 of a valuable report which he wrote on the prospects of cinchona cultivation in Ceylon, was in itself a reflex of the growing interest in this sphere. Markham noted that climatic and other conditions—labour and transportation costs—favoured the extensive cultivation of cinchona. He reported that already 4 acres of land had been set apart in Rothschild Estate, Pussellawa—a large coffee estate—exclusively for the cultivation of cinchona and that arrangements were being made for the opening of a cinchona estate of 600 acres.[16]

The widespread popularity of cinchona, especially during the transitional era, would hardly require emphasis. To begin with climatically cinchona could be grown in the very areas where coffee had flourished which meant that the erstwhile coffee planter could replace the moribund coffee plants with cinchona, and at the same time continue to get what income he could from the still unaffected coffee trees. Secondly, comparatively fewer demands were made on the planters' knowledge and resources both during the period of its growth as well as during the process of refining the cinchona bark for export. Thirdly, there was the prospect of a limited outlay of capital and quick returns. Above all the over-all prospects were made all the more attractive by the dramatic increases in the price of cinchona which by 1878 had increased to 12 sh. 4d. an ounce and averaged 10 shillings per ounce till about 1886.[17]

Despite the fact that as subsequent developments clearly showed, tea cultivation was comparatively more sophisticated than either coffee or cinchona, interestingly its rapid spread during this period was partly due to its appeal as a transitional crop.

To begin with there was the widespread belief that tea could be grown with coffee. Climatically the coffee lands which were invariably situated at higher elevations were basically suited for tea cultivation. More germane to cost considerations was the fact that abandoned coffee lands, or lands on which coffee was being indifferently grown, saved the planter the expense of clearing the jungle and gave him an income from the existing shrubs. Moreover such lands were invariably well roaded and drained and possessed buildings—and in some instances machinery too—which could be used for the requirements of tea.[18]

16. Report on the cultivation of cinchona plants in Ceylon. Clements R. Markham of the India Office, *S.P.* 1866, p. 208.

17. Figures concerning the fortnightly cinchona sales in London show the gradual escalation of prices.
1868 — 4sh. 8½ d. (per ounce)
1870 — 6sh. 2¾ d.
1872 — 7sh 5¼ d.
1876 — 19sh.
1877 — 12sh. 2½ d.
Till about 1880, the price averaged 12 shillings but fell to about 8 shillings in the period 1881-1883. It was only after 1886, that the price fell to 2sh. 4d. per ounce. See *T.A.* 1884-1885, p. 380.

18. Owen, T. C. *The Tea Planter's Manual*, Colombo, 1886, p. 1.

Although statistical evidence on the point is wanting, it would appear that the interplanting of coffee with tea was fairly widespread. The *Tropical Agriculturalist* which reported that the practice had become "general" advised the planters about how best the interplanting could be done.[19] Moreover in rebutting a contemporary Indian newspaper which expressed scepticism about the technical feasibility of planting tea with coffee, the *Tropical Agriculturalist* contended that "the intelligent coffee planter could master the mysteries of both."[20]

Technical considerations apart, as T.C. Owen, who during this period enjoyed a well merited reputation as an expert on tea cultivation, observed, no planter could afford to dispense with any income he might get from coffee shrubs during this period in which the tea plant was not as yet in bearing.[21] In other words in a context of manifest financial difficulties and capital scarcity, prudence suggested that the individual planter should make the best use of existing assets.

Contemporary estimates of tea production were in fact largely conceived from this standpoint. It would appear too that the role of the *Tropical Agriculturalist* was as much to impress the individual planter that tea cultivation could be taken in hand with comparatively limited resources, as to act as a medium disseminating information on various aspects of planting. The message had a wide topical appeal because the pattern of individual proprietorship—a characteristic investment feature of the coffee era—survived in the first decade of tea production in Ceylon.

But as the knowledge of tea cultivation increased and the methods of production became more sophisticated, it became evident that the possibilities of limiting the outlay of capital and of minimising running costs were not as ample as they had seemed at first. For example, technically there were serious limits to interplanting tea with other products notably with coffee and cinchona. Experience showed that when the tea plant came into its own it required ample light and air as well as room for the roots to spread, and that in consequence after about the eighteenth month of its growth the adjacent coffee plants had necessarily to be eradicated.[22] Similarly the growing tea plant had also to part company with the cinchona whose large cabbage shaped leaves provided too much shade and moisture to the tea plant although many planters were understandably reluctant to uproot the high yielding and thriving cinchona.[23]

The difficulties of the individual tea planters who was constrained to reply solely on his resources were rather more dramatically highlighted with regard to the use of machinery which of course enormously enhanced costs. It must be borne in mind that during this early period, tea was manufactured by machi-

19. *T.A.*, 1882-1883, p. 809.
20. *T.A.*, 1882-1883, p. 203.
21. Owen, *op. cit.* p. 23.
22. *ibid.*
23. *ibid. T.A.*, 1885-1886. p. 52 See. also p. 110.

very as well as by hand. The distinction was well recognised particularly in estimates of costs and had provoked considerable discussion in planting circles about the relative merits of the two methods of tea manufacture.

The fact was that as a result of the expansion of the tea industry in India firms had sprung up in Britain which were specialising in the manufacture of machinery for the different stages of tea production. Indian example inevitably influenced European planters in Ceylon and in the larger tea estates—Windsor Forest, Strathellie, Rakwana and Imbulpitiya—the manufacture of tea was being handled largely by means of imported machinery.[24] Firms like Messrs. John Walter and Company, Mackwood and Company and Brown Rae and Company in Hatton, were the local agents for British firms such as the Sirocco Works in Belfast, A. Shanks and Son, London, and Marshall Son and Company in Gainsborough.

However in terms of capital costs of machinery, the small run of the mill European planter could not afford machinery. For example, James Irvine, a tea planter in Lunugala complained that the "excessive" cost of Jackson's standard tea producing machinery "placed them beyond the reach of the great body of planters." The fact that some form of power was necessary to drive the machinery added to the difficulties. The *Tropical Agriculturalist* observed that it was "impossible in these hard times to expect each tea planter from 40 to 100 acres under cultivation to provide rolling, drying and sifting machinery for himself in an adequate tea house." The journal which made the interesting suggestion that "District Tea Factories" should be established to serve several estates in a given area, also reported that in many instances individual planters were despatching their leaves to the larger factories.[25]

Gradually however the individual tea planter began to realise that he could not altogether ignore the use of machinery. Especially in terms of costs it was more profitable to produce tea by means of machinery rather than by hand. It was estimated that as much as 5 cents per pound could be saved by using machinery and that the ratio of saving was likely to be greater with increases in the quantity of tea. There were also certain limitations implied in hand manufacture. For example, a single cooly, however efficient he was, could not roll more than 40 pounds of tea leaf. Secondly, whether uniform quality could be maintained in manufacturing tea by hand was uncertain.[26] Often neither was possible, and consequently among different individually owned European tea estates there was a striking degree of variability in the manufacture of tea, notwithstanding a certain broad uniformity with regard to the size of the estate and the inputs of capital and labour.

24. *T.A.*, 1881-1882, p. 498; 1882-1883, p. 871.
25. *T.A.*, 1881-1882, p. 716.
26. *T.A.*, 1883-1884, p. 388.

In other words, in more ways than one, the tea industry was demanding a greater input of capital which the individual European planter was hard put to meet. It was plainly a situation which challenged him and ensured that his initial eclipse by tea companies—whose emergence was an outstanding feature in the history of the tea industry in Ceylon in the period 1895-1900—would be merely a matter of time.

II

Meanwhile the Sinhalese peasants who lived in the plantation districts were themselves constrained to come to terms with the emergence of the tea industry. Their response was made evident in three rather distinct spheres: viz.

(*a*) the cultivation of tea by Sinhalese
(*b*) the question of labour on European owned estates, and
(*c*) land sales.

These aspects may be best dealt with separately.

(*a*) *Cultivation of tea by Sinhalese*

When Thwaites discussed the desirability of beginning tea cultivation and prophesied that before long the hills of Ceylon would be covered with tea, he did not have in mind merely the European planter. Thwaites declared that tea cultivation was as much suited to the Sinhalese peasant.[27]

The belief which lingered on in the 1870's especially among the provincial agents of government, was typical of a characteristically transitional period when there was no small confusion about what actually was involved in tea cultivation and little knowledge with regard to scale and costs. In 1882 for example R. W. Ievers, who was the Assistant Government Agent in Kegalle, was persuading Sinhalese peasants to take to tea cultivation. "The shrub" he wrote would "grow as easily as Lantana and would soon take the place of the now almost dead coffee on which the villager relied for money and taxes and clothes." Ievers had decided to make each headman in his district grow a small plot of tea, and was determined to advise them with regard to "the proper course of preparation of the leaf." If the peasants could not do so, at least, the leaves which they produced could always be sold to a neighbouring tea estate. In general Ievers took heart at the "keenness" of the Sinhalese to take to tea cultivation.[28] His successor, Hubert Wace, was anxious to obtain technical advice from the government regarding tea cultivation for the benefit of the peasants amongst whom he hoped to distribute tea seeds. Wace observed that as things stood the average villager knew little about either the cultivation of tea or about the preparation of its leaf.[29]

27. Report on the R.B.G.; *A.R.* 1867, p. 316; Report on the R.B.G., *A.R.* 1871, p. 530.
28. *Report on the Kegalle District, A.R.* 1882, p. 61a.
29. *Report on the Kegalle District, A.R.* 1884, p. 21a.

Some years later in the Paranakuru Korale, also in the Kegalle District, Hamlyn Price reported that peasants were growing small plots of tea in their cottage gardens. Price who was evidently anxious to encourage them had set aside 112 pounds of tea seed "of the best variety" for distribution by means of the headmen.[30]

Meanwhile in the Kalutara District, Hay Cameron, the Assistant Government Agent, was contemplating a vastly more ambitious effort to popularise tea cultivation. He hoped to set up communal peasant "tea gardens" each of ten acres extent. Such gardens situated in each of the thirty three divisions in the Kalutara District were to be extended annually by the addition of a further ten acres.[31]

Inspite of the enthusiasm of the individual Government Agents, to some extent the government frowned on the policy encouraging peasants to take to tea cultivation. Wace for example abandoned his efforts because "it was... thought undesirable to take any action towards the encouragement of this product by the villagers."[32] Similarly, Cameron who had hoped to use the fines which were imposed on peasants for default in the payment of the paddy commutation tax to finance his tea project, was told that such monies which were after all basically connected with paddy cultivation, should be more properly used for irrigation purposes.[33]

However native interest in tea cultivation was significantly diffused and was not necessarily dependent on the idiosyncracies of the Government Agents. The fact was that there was an increasing demand for the green leaf which more and more Sinhalese peasants were growing. The demand was principally caused by increases of a rather remarkable nature in the London market for Indian and Ceylon teas at the expense of imports from the hitherto traditional source of supply—China. Consequently from the beginning of the 1880's when there was an upward trend in tea prices till about 1897 it was profitable for European tea planters to produce as much tea as possible. They usually bought green leaf from peasants especially when the green leaf could be had for 5 to 6 cents per pound which was well below the production costs of the average European tea planter who had of course to cope with greater cost commitments. Indeed in 1890 R. W. Moir who was the Government Agent in the Central Province reported that "extensive facilities" were being provided by the European tea planter to Sinhalese peasants in neighbouring villages in order to obtain green leaf. This had encouraged the latter to grow tea on abandoned coffee lands as well as on chenas.[34]

30. *Report on the Kegalle District, A.R.* 1888, p. 46a.
31. *Report on the Kalutara District, A.R.* 1885, p. 153a.
32. *Report on the Kegalle District, A.R.* 1884, p. 21a.
33. *Report on the Kalutara District, A.R.* 1885, p. 153a.
34. *Report on the Central Province, A.R.* 1890, p. c7.

Nonetheless the precise extent of Sinhalese holdings in tea especially *vis-a-vis* the conventional European estates, must remain conjectural. As for the Central Province, the evidence suggests that native holdings were found least in the Uva District. Holdings in Uda Hewaheta were also reported to be "trifling." By contrast inspite of its proverbial backwardness and lethargy of its peasants, the Walapana district could boast of 317 acres of peasant tea lands by 1890. More noteworthy was the Kotmale area in which peasant tea holdings had by this date aggregated 664 acres.[35]

Meanwhile in the Southern Province as a whole native preoccupation with tea cultivation was notably more diffused. The *Tropical Agriculturalist* reported that in the Galle and Matara districts the Sinhalese were beginning to cultivate tea extensively in small plots on lands adjoining the European estates. It was suggested that the Sinhalese peasants did so in order to compel the neighbouring European owners to "buy them out by and by."[36] In 1892 E. Elliott, who was the Government Agent in the province, remarked that tea planting was becoming popular with the Sinhalese whose plots were particularly numerous in the Wellaboda and Talpe *pattuwas*.[37] More revealing were the remarks of his successor Ievers who in 1893 attributed the extension of the tea acreages in the Galle and Matara districts primarily to the efforts of the Sinhalese who were "opening up small gardens all over the District." He added that the Sinhalese who were keen on buying crown lands preferred to cultivate such lands with tea rather than with coconut because tea cultivation was comparatively more profitable.[38]

In the Matara District as a whole out of a total of 2,000 acres of tea, 1750 acres were accounted for by 8 European owned estates which were situated in the Morowak Korale. The remainder were made up of small holdings belonging to the Sinhalese and were spread out in the Morowak and Weligam Korales, and in the Gangaboda Pattuwa.[39]

It may be added that in general as in the Central Province, in Matara and Galle too, the pattern of Sinhalese tea cultivation was typically one of small peasant holdings. More genuinely entrepreneurial Sinhalese efforts in tea, even remotely on a par with the European estates, were significantly few and far between. The documents make specific though conspicuously isolated references to a tea estate consisting of 90 acres in Akuressa and to another owned by Dambawinna Ratemahatmaya in Welimada, as well as less precise references to Low Country Sinhalese who made money by cultivating tea in the upcountry planting districts.[40]

35. *Report on the Nuwara Eliya District, A.R.* 1899, p. c 21.
36. *T.A.*, 1884-1885, p. 518.
37. *Report on the Southern Province, A.R.*, 1892, p. E 10.
38. *Report on the Southern Province, A.R.* 1893, p. E 3.
39. *Report on the Matara District, A.R.* 1888, p. 168A.
40. *Report on the Matara District, A.R.* 1885, p. 89A. *Report on the Uva Province, A.R.* 1897, p. I 6.

The prevailing context in a sense held the clue to the situation. For one thing as shown elsewhere in the article changes in the techniques of tea production demanded an increasingly heavy outlay of capital. Secondly as far as the entrepreneurial minded Ceylonese was concerned, tea was as yet a hypothetical investment. It was not a "safe investment" as it seemed to Ceylonese in the 1920's when Sinhalese owned tea estates was a feature of the tea industry in the Kelani Valley and in the Kalutara District. Thirdly in the period 1880-1900 there were other spheres of economic activity which attracted the Ceylonese with his comparatively modest capital resources.

Indeed even the peasant's interest in tea seems to have waxed and waned in relation to price changes involving other products whose cultivation was in certain circumstances as economically attractive. For example in certain districts in the Central Province, Sinhalese peasants showed great interest in the cultivation of cardamoms. In Kotmale a peasant was able to sell a pound of cardamoms for about 65 cents. In fact in this area, as against a native tea acreage of 664, there were 932 acres of cardamoms. Similarly the cultivation of coconuts which could be sold for anything above 6 cents a nut was reported to have been a popular peasant preoccupation in Hanguranketa. It was also reported that Sinhalese peasants in the Nuwara Eliya District were taking in hand the cultivation of "English Vegetables". According to an Assistant Government Agent, vegetable growing was, in fact, "the chief local industry" among villagers there. In Matale the cultivation of cocoa was popular.[41]

Meanwhile there was towards the end of the nineteenth century, a notable revival of peasant interest in cinnamon and citronella cultivation, in the Southern Province. According to a breakdown of native agricultural activity in the Bentota Walallawiti Korale in 1898 there were 117 acres planted with paddy, 237 in tea, and 425 in cinnamon. In the Wellaboda Pattuwa it was reported that as much as 500 acres had been opened in cinnamon and that in several parts of the Gangaboda Pattuwa, its cultivation had been extended.[42] In the Matara District in particular fluctuations in revenue from the sale of crown lands were often brought about by peasant interest in citronella cultivation.[43]

Moreover in the Southern Province plumbago mining too militated against an exclusive preoccupation with tea cultivation. It attracted both the run of the mill peasant as well as the Sinhalese entrepreneur. In fact the demand for land which was believed to contain plumbago was an important factor in pushing up crown land sales in the Galle District especially in Diviture, Ganegoda and Ihala Kimbiya. The amplitude of plumbago deposits and the comparative ease with which these deposits could be obtained—lying as they were near the surface—without the use of costly mechanical contrivances, made plumbago mining an attractive occupation.[44]

41. *Report on the Nuwara Eliya District, A.R.* 1899, p. C 21.
42. *Report on the Southern Province, A.R.* 1898, p. E6.
43. *Report on the Southern Province, A.R.* 1889, p. E1.
44. *Report on the Southern Province, A.R.* 1887, p. 135A.
Report on the Southern Province, A.R. 1888, p. 135A.

(*b*) *Labour*

The establishment of tea estates moreover gave opportunities of employment to Sinhalese peasants in the plantation districts. These opportunities were availed of to a greater extent than has been generally assumed.

A variety of factors induced the peasants to seek employment on tea estates. Typically the average peasant who depended solely on rice cultivation looked to estates as a means of earning additional income. In his report on the Central Province, R. W. Moir remarked in 1890 that the existence of estates and the tradition of "prompt" payment which estates made to labourers, was a great boon to villagers whenever the latter were faced with crop failures of one sort or another.[45] In less exceptional circumstances too, because rice cultivation was geared to subsistence levels of production, the peasants capacity to gratify a greater amplitude of economic wants depended on income which he could earn from other sources. In the Pasdun Korale of Kalutara District it was reported in 1889 that peasants were able to afford extra rice only if they could supplement their usual incomes by working on a tea estate or in a plumbago mine.[46] Saunders summed up the relationship between peasant and estate succinctly when he remarked that the estates gave peasants "sufficient money not merely to keep themselves and their families but to pay their taxes and indulge in luxuries hitherto unknown to them."[47]

The benefits were however not entirely one-sided. During this period many European planters were confronted with the difficulty of finding labour for work on estates. The theme recurs in successive issues of the *Tropical Agriculturalist* which in 1882 expressed fears that the lack of adequate labour would impede the expansion of the tea industry in Ceylon. In fact it was claimed that already labour resources were barely sufficient for existing requirements.[48]

It was evident that the problem of a scarce labour supply had been caused principally by two factors. To begin with, there had been a considerable exodus of South Indians who had been originally attracted to Ceylon by steady wages as well as by the fringe benefits which the planter provided for them. The exodus was in turn caused by the coffee crisis when many estates were compelled to make do with fewer labourers in an effort to reduce running expenses.[49] Secondly, it became apparent that in striking contrast to the coffee industry, basically more labour was necessary both for the cultivation and manufacture of tea. It was estimated that whereas one cooly for each acre had been enough to collect "the biggest crop" of coffee, three or four coolies were necessary to pluck an acre of tea which yielded 600 pounds. More conservative contemporary estimates put the labour requirement at "three quarters of a cooly" per acre of coffee

45. *Report on the Central Province, A.R.* 1890, p. C7.
46. *Report on the Kalutara District, A.R.* 1889, p. B23.
47. *Report on the Western Province, A.R.* 1889, p. B5.
48. *T.A.*, 1882-1883, p. 872.
49. *T.A.*, 1882-1883, p. 872, Also p. 969.

as against two coolies for each acre of tea. On the factory floor too the input of labour was greater in tea manufacture. Moreover one need hardly add that the difficulties of those tea planters who could not afford machinery but were constrained to resort to hand manufacture of tea were rendered all the more intolerable, in a context of scarce labour.[50]

Theoretically, a possible solution was to induce South Indian labour to "speedily find their way back to Ceylon", if need be in greater numbers. Their influx however depended on the fortunes of the tea industry. In other words tea had to convince all and sundry that it had come to stay, that it was capable of supporting a constant wage rate, and was not merely a transitory phenomenon. Alternatively greater incentives than had hitherto been made available had to be provided to the potential immigrant labourer. Significantly a contemporary Indian journal, *The Indian Tea Gazette* in alluding to the acute "competition for labour" in the tea districts in Ceylon, made the suggestion that waste lands in and around the tea estates should with government assistance be converted to settlements for Indian labour, and urged the claims of "the thickly populated districts of Bengal", as a possible source of plantation labour.[51]

To the European tea planter in Ceylon, however, the employment of Sinhalese labour, seemed to be a simpler and less costly solution to the problem. Many at any rate were hopeful. It was said that Sinhalese women and children were "specially" fitted to be tea pluckers.[52] Some tea planters expressed the view that since the Sinhalese were reputed to be partial to the system of payment by contract, both weeding as well as plucking could be done by this means. Others felt certain that the Sinhalese could be "easily taught to pluck properly."[53]

In fact too, an increasing number of tea planters were able to vouch for the satisfactory manner in which Sinhalese labourers worked on tea estates. The *Tropical Agriculturalist* observed specifically with reference to the Kalutara District that European tea planters were not only pleased with Sinhalese labour but even thought that the Sinhalese were superior to the Tamil immigrant labourer. It was said that plucking in particular has a sphere in which Sinhalese women and children actually excelled.[54]

Meanwhile with regard to the question of wages the use of Sinhalese labour was presumably an advantage than otherwise. If one may attempt to reconstruct the picture with regard to wages it will be seen that in the absence of a statutorily defined wage rate, in different parts of the island, the rates paid for daily hire varied in relation to the demand for labour. Moreover there was also no hard and fast rule about the mode of payment, and sometimes labour was renumerated in kind. Even in the plantation areas proper, where more than else-

50. *ibid.*
51. *T.A.*, 1881-1882, p. 425.
52. *T.A.*, 1882-1883, p. 969.
53. *T.A.*, 1885-1886, p. 45.
54. *T.A.*, 1886-1887, p. 139, Also p. 851.

where there was a formal tradition of wages, it would appear that the wage rate as well as the manner of payment varied. A lot seems to have been left to the judgement of the individual planter. In general however according to John Ferguson the wages paid to Indian immigrant labour enabled a man to earn 9d. per day, and a woman and child 7d and 5d respectively.[55]

The fact was that the intrusion of Sinhalese labour did not materially alter existing wage rates in the plantation areas. One may visualise two possibilities. Firstly, that the scarcity of labour was so great as to cause an unprecedented rise in wages, a circumstance which encouraged Sinhalese in increasing numbers to come over from neighbouring villages to the estates. Secondly that the influx of Sinhalese labour was numerically so great that even after allowances had been made for a considerable reduction in the number of Indian immigrant labour on estates, there was over-all a surfeit of labour resources which caused a fall in wages. Neither situation did in fact materialise.

There was however an impression among the European planters that it was possible to obtain Sinhalese labour at comparatively cheaper rates. They believed that on account of the failure of coffee, and one may add, the limitations of paddy production, the Sinhalese villager was "more than ever dependent on European enterprise".[56] There was in other words a certain competition among the villagers themselves to get employment in neighbouring estates which gave the European planter a supply of labour and possibly placed him in a bargaining position with regard to payment of wages.[57] Indeed an European tea planter in Dolosbage reported that he could rely on as many as 1,000 Sinhalese turning up for work on his estate. Another European planter in Hunnasgiriya who would have been happy to obtain Sinhalese labour at the "usual rate" of 33 cents per day was gratified to discover that he could find "an ample supply" even at 30 cents.[58] E. Elliott too observed in his administration report for the Southern Province in 1886, that Sinhalese labour could be got for "much lower rates" and added that the European planter who employed Sinhalese labour was invariably spared the necessity of providing lines, making advances and the "other drawbacks" attending the securing of coast labour.[59]

Meanwhile when economic pressures drove the villager to the European estates, cultural factors which might have ordinarily militated against estate work, became much less important. Among the European planters the general impression was that there was little difficulty in obtaining Sinhalese labour provided that the planter concerned realised that he was dealing with a people "who had their own bits of land", and who were reputedly sensitive about the treatment

55. Ferguson, John, *Ceylon in the Jubilee Year*, London, 1887, p. 331.
56. *T.A.*, 1884-1885, p. 875.
57. Letter of James Irvine, a Badulla planter to Aelian King, Government Agent, Uva Province, 22 April 1886. *T.A.*, 1886-1887, p. 826.
58. *T.A.*, 1884-1885, p. 875.
59. *Report on the Southern Province*, *A.R.* 1886, p. 70A.

they received at the hands of the European employer. One had to be mindful too of the predelictions of the Sinhalese labourer. For example, tea planters came to recognise the fondness of the Sinhalese for getting ready cash. It was observed that the Sinhalese were unlike the Tamils in that they did not like "long accounts or to have their money kept against advances in rice".[60]

In this context contemporary documents drew attention to the success of C. Knight who was the superintendent of the Geekiyanakande Estate in Kalutara, and who constantly employed a very large Sinhalese labour force. As happened elsewhere, Knight's Sinhalese labourers too were accustomed to make constant requests for cash advances. Because this demand could not always be conveniently met, Knight began a system of issuing *tundus* or paper chits in lieu of cash for amounts ranging from ten cents to a rupee. The *tundus* which circulated freely in the district were accepted for cash payments by boutique keepers and other traders in the bazaars. In fact it was reported that "Knight's Paper Money" was as readily accepted as the Government notes.[61]

Nevertheless in taking tea planting districts as a whole it was evident that the employment of Sinhalese labour varied in different parts. The phenomenon, which attracted considerable attention on account of its very novelty, was more evident in the Low Country tea producing districts of Kalutara, Galle, and Matara, than in the strictly Kandyan areas. In the Kalutara District in particular it was said that tea planters were virtually dependent on Sinhalese labour.[62] In 1891 it was reported that in the Pasdun Korale where customarily "a very large number of Sinhalese" were being employed on the tea estates, Rs. 168,000 had been paid to them as wages for the year.[63] By 1894 according to the Kalutara Planters' Association, the wage bill for Sinhalese labour for the entire district amounted to Rs.300,000.[64]

By contrast, in the Kandyan areas, although the employment of Sinhalese labour on estates was becoming "more and more common", there was a certain antipathy to the idea of working for wages often at considerable distances from home, and having to do so cheek by jowl with Indian immigrant labourers.[65] The prevailing prejudice was well put by a Sinhalese Headman who declared that Sinhalese who worked on tea estates had in popular estimation become "like Tamils".[66] In fact the *Tropical Agriculturalist* claimed that on account of this antipathy, the European planter in the Low Country had a distinct advantage over his counterpart in the Kandyan areas.[67]

60. *T.A.*, 1886-1887, p. 850 ff.
61. *ibid.*
62. *ibid.*
63. *Report on the Kalutara District*, *A.R.* 1891, p. B 15.
64. *Report on the Kalutara District*, *A.R.* 1894, p. B 16.
65. *Report on the Matale District*, *A.R.* 1888, p. 89a.
66. *Report on the Central Province*, *A.R.* 1893, p. C18.
67. *T.A.*, 1886-1887, p. 851, p. 139.

The evidence also suggests that to some extent even in the Kalutara District, social factors determined Sinhalese attitudes to work on estates. In some estates although Indian labour had been employed to do the main portion of the work, it was only low caste Sinhalese women who had been readily found to undertake weeding. In a particular estate the phenomenon of a number of Sinhalese women working under the supervision of the wife of an Indian *kangani* was attributed to the fact that the latter had "won the favour of the villagers". It was in general reported that Sinhalese of the "better castes" confined their participation in estate work to road cutting and draining and evinced great interest in lining, holding pegging, leaving the more routine tasks of plucking and weeding to others.[68]

(*c*) *Land Sales*

Finally as far as the Sinhalese villager was concerned there were also the possibilities of selling land to European planters who in view of favourable market conditions were clearly anxious to expand the cultivation of tea.

In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the coffee industry however there was little demand for land. Both cinchona and tea cultivation which were becoming increasingly popular were grown on the existing coffee lands rather than on new lands. Consequently in the period 1880-1886, the sale of crown lands which had been a lucrative source of government revenue became comparatively unimportant. In the Central Province as a whole although in 1877 as many as 13,711 acres of land had been sold, in subsequent years the acreage was progressively reduced until by 1883 the government was able to dispose of only about 3,400 acres. During the same period the selling price of an acre of crown land in the Central Province fell from Rs. 72.41 to Rs. 11.73.[69]

By 1885 a more favourable trend was made evident on account of the "revival of European enterprise" especially in the Central Province.[70] Specifically the demand for land was stimulated principally by increases in the cultivation of tea although in Dumbara and in the Matale District in particular the growing enthusiasm for cocoa cultivation was a significant factor. It was reported that in Bandarapola, Ratwatta, Hapuwida and Irriyagolle in the Matale District, planters had bought a good deal of land from the villagers for the cultivation of both tea and cocoa.[71]

Similarly in the Kalutara District and in the Southern Province, although the expansion of the tea industry was the principal factor in pushing up land sales, the demand for land for purposes of plumbago mining, the extension

68. *T.A.*, 1886-1887, p. 852.
69. *Report on the Badulla District, A.R.*, 1885, p. 24C.
Report on the Nuwara Eliya District, A.R. 1885, p. 41 A ff.
70. *Report on the Badulla District, A.R.* 1885, p. 58A.
71. *Report on the Southern Province, A.R.* 1892, p. E7.

of cinnamon cultivation—and to a lesser extent —sugar cultivation were important contributary factors. Indeed by 1892 there were in the Galle District alone 3,346 acres cultivated with cinnamon.[72]

Notwithstanding these developments, the sale of crown lands was not as great as it had been during the heyday of the coffee industry. For one thing in the Central highlands forest land was "rarely obtainable" partly because it was the policy of the Government to prevent the indiscriminate sale of crown lands.[73] Indeed over the years official policy concerning crown land sales had been almost imperceptibly hardening. In 1873 Sir Joseph Hooker had urged the government of Ceylon to reserve forests which were situated at high elevations in the Central Province. In addition, in 1883, a special report on forest administration in Ceylon had expressed scepticism about the considerations which had hitherto determined the disposal of crown lands. The report which was the work of F. D'A Vincent, an Indian civil servant, pointed out that crown lands had been simply sold to the highest bidder irrespective of considerations of climate and the need to conserve timber resources. It was said that for a slight and "temporary augmentation" of revenue, the forests of the crown had been rapidly destroyed.[74]

The note of warning did not pass unheeded particularly in the quarter of the provincial agents of government. For example in 1885, the Assistant Government Agent in the Nuwara Eliya District reported that applications for crown land above 5000 feet in the Ramboda area had all been turned down, although there was a striking dearth in the demand for crown lands in the district as a whole.[75] Meanwhile in the Western Province where successive Assistant Government Agents had themselves urged a policy of restraint in the disposal of crown lands, in 1890, the Government Agent went so far as to urge that crown lands in the entire province should not be put for sale until the government had consulted the experts and made up its mind about possible forest reserves.[76]

The policy however ran counter to the belief of the European tea planters that tea grew better on higher elevations and on clayey rather than on micaceous soil—the latter being a characteristic of soils in the low country—as well as on land which had not been impoverished by haphazard peasant cultivation. Moreover as matters stood they saw little real hope of obtaining large and contiguous tracts of land which were unencumbered by pockets of native holdings. In short the European tea planter felt that land which conformed to these criteria were likely to be found in the higher elevations rather than in the low country districts.[77]

72. *Report on the Central Province, A.R.* 1893, p. C 18.
73. Owen, *op. cit.* p. 1 ff.
74. Reproduced as an Appendix in the *T.A.*, 1883-1884.
75. *Report on the Nuwara Eliya District, A.R.* 1885, p. 41 A ff.
76. *Report on the Western Province, A.R.* 1890, p. B1.
77. *T.A.*,1883-1884.

The clamant demand for more land was heard everywhere. An European tea planter in Ceylon complained in the *Indigo and Tea Planters' Gazette* that the Ceylon Government was trifling with prospective British investors. He added that it was difficult to see how tea cultivation could be expanded in Ceylon if extensions depended solely on the acquisition of crown lands. Although the example was in all probability an extreme one, it was said that a certain British investor acting through a local agent had made arrangements for the purchase of thousand acres of crown land for tea cultivation. However the investor had been told on the eve of the appointed day of sale, that the Government had cancelled the sale by special gazette notification. Subsequent appeals to the governor himself had been futile because the official mind had been made up that the land in question should be reserved for climatic reasons.[78]

Apart from the tightening of official policies, the inability of the Survey Department to deal with even those lands which could be safely offered for sale, was a source of unhappiness both to the provincial agents as well as to the European planters. As far as the latter were concerned government surveys ensured that the lands in question would be free from claims which sometimes natives preferred. Among the provincial agents, S. M. Burrows in particular complained about the dilatoriness of the Survey Department and in 1887 suggested the adoption of a "general survey" of those parts in the Matale District which were most sought after by Europeans.[79] Similarly in 1895 Herbert White who was the Government Agent in Uva made a forceful plea for the expeditious survey and disposal of land, especially waste lands.[80]

Above all the Government Agents were concerned with the alienation of village lands by peasants to Europeans. Indeed when difficulties of one sort or another prevented Europeans from obtaining as much land as they would have liked from government, they turned to native land owners. There was every indication that the sale of native lands to Europeans was taking place to a very considerable extent. With regard to the Matale District, Burrows affirmed that he could mention "at least a dozen estates . . . entirely made up of the purchase of land in small blocks from the natives".[81] His successor G. S. Saxton reported that land sales of this sort had occurred "frequently" in 1896, especially in the Kaikawala, Yatawatta, Paldeniya and Asgiri Udasiya Pattuwa areas, in the Matale District.[82] In particular Saxton reported that an entire village in which there had been in 1891, several houses and gardens had been reduced to a mere "27 people living in boutiques and houses on the roadside".[83]

78. Reproduced in the *T.A.*, 1884-1885, p. 473.
79. *Report on the Matale District, A.R.* 1887, p. 92a.
80. *Report on the Uva Province, A.R.* 1895, p. 14.
81. Quoted by E. M. de C. Short in *Report on the Matale District, A.R.* 1896, p. C 12.
82. *Report on the Matale District, A.R.* 1897, p. C 12.
83. *Report on the Kegalle District, A.R.* 1896, p. J17.

Matale was merely typical of what was happening elsewhere. Herbert White for example reported that in the Uva Province native land sales to Europeans were "far too prevalent".[84] Meanwhile it was reported that in the Kegalle District alone well over 10,000 acres of peasant land had been sold to Europeans. In the Central Province as a whole Allanson Bailey remarked in 1896 that although "exact figures" were not available, "large extents of land had been purchased from natives by planters for the cultivation of tea".[85]

To some extent official objections to the indiscriminate sale of native lands to Europeans for tea cultivation were based on legal considerations. The fact was that more often than not the lands which peasants sold to Europeans were chena lands or the so called "high lands" in and around villages which peasants often encroached on for purposes of cultivating dry grains. Such encroachments had been made possible because, although the government was opposed to chena cultivation, individual Government Agents often permitted a certain amount of chena cultivation on the ground that its rigid suppression would react harshly on the economic wellbeing of the peasant. Consequently in various districts from time to time a *corpus* of rules evolved to regulate and control chena cultivation in preference to putting a stop to it altogether.

When land transactions between Europeans and peasants were taking place extensively, the government contended that the occupation of chena lands by peasants did not give the latter the right to sell such lands to third parties. On the other hand, the peasants were accustomed to lay claim to legal rights on the grounds of cultivation for a number of years as well as on the basis of taxes paid to government on the produce of chena lands. As one Government Agent observed, "defective legislation and tenderness on the part of the Courts" made it difficult for the crown to assert its rights to lands of this sort. Consequently the peasants were always in a position to offer to European planters "a good deal of land at the expense of the Crown".[86]

Secondly, it often happened that when land was being jointly held by a number of peasants, one or more shareholders would sell the land to an European planter without the knowledge of the other shareholders. Not infrequently the European purchases of such lands were challenged by the other shareholders. As H. L. Moysey, who was the Assistant Government Agent in Sabaragamuwa observed, even at the best of times shareholders were rarely able to agree among themselves about individual lots. In a subsequent report Moysey declared that dishonest native middlemen have been as much responsible for the situation as was the European who showed "great readiness to pick up land cheap."

84. *Report on the Uva Province, A.R.* 1895, p. I 4.
85. *Report on the Central Province, A.R.* 1896, p. C5.
86. *Report on the North Western Province, A.R.* 1896, p. G3.

Thirdly the demand for land inspired the activities of land speculators who exploited both the peasants as well as the prospective European buyer. The speculators were usually either Moormen or Low country Sinhalese. As a rule they turned their attention to land which had doubtful title and re-sold the lands at high prices.[87] For example in the Kegalle District where land transactions involving peasants had occurred to a remarkable extent, W. E. Davidson reported in 1896 that as many as 412 deeds had been effected which conveyed title to 116,323 acres of land, although, in truth, genuine native holdings in the entire district did not exceed 60,000 acres.[88]

In the circumstances more than one Government Agent suggested the desirability of reforming the law concerning land sales although the precise manner in which this was to be done was left undefined. After all, as Burrows who was Assistant Government Agent in Matale pointed out, both the peasant who sold his land as well as the European planter who bought the land were acting within their rights. It was indeed a moot point whether a change of law could circumvent so fundamental a right.[89]

Closely intertwined with the legal arguments were the social considerations which were pregnant in the situation. The Government Agents feared that the Sinhalese peasants who were only too ready to part with lands to European planters for the sake of obtaining cash resources would be reduced ultimately to the position of a class that had lost all real contact with the land. Indeed it was reported that no less than 300 inhabitants in a village in the Matale District had sold all their lands to a tea estate and had become solely dependent on the goodwill of its superintendent for their economic well being.[90] Similarly in Koslanda an entire hamlet, "paddy fields, houses and gardens" had been sold to an estate. The inhabitants had simply migrated to another village.[91]

But whether peasant land sales necessarily implied an imprudent sell out of home and hearth or whether, more typically, the sale of such lands to the European planter simply meant merely the disposal of the economically peripheral chena or high lands, must in the present state of the evidence remain unresolved. It was a question on which contemporary provincial agents of government were themselves clearly divided.

87. *Report on the Kegalle District, A.R.* 1891, p. J23.
Report on the Kegalle District, A.R. 1897, p. J71.
Report on the Sabaragamuwa Province, A.R. 1897, p. J4.
Report on the Kagalle District, A.R. 1896, p. J16.
88. *Report on the Kegalle District, A.R.* 1896, p. J16.
89. *Report on the Sabaragamuwa Province, A.R.* 1898, p. J2.
Report on the Kegalle District, A.R. 1887, p. 49a ff.
Report on the Matale District, A.R. 1896, p. C. 12
90. *Report on the Central Province, A.R.* 1893, p. c181.
91. *Report on the Uva Province, A.R.* 1899, p. I 11.

According to Herbert Wace, in the Southern Province village lands had been sold with great frequency irrespective of whether such lands included houses and fields.[92] Le Mesurier as an Assistant Government Agent was noted for his sympathy to the village peasant, observed that the benefits which tea plantations had conferred on the peasants "in the way of opening up land, distributing money and giving employment were more than offset by the enormous evil of a floating and unsettled population" which was the inevitable concomitant of peasant land sales.[93]

On the other hand there were the provincial agents like Allanson Bailey who believed that although the sale of peasant lands to Europeans was happening all the time, the selling of houses at fields was quite exceptional.[94] It was also reported that in the Sabaragamuwa District although villagers were "unable to resist the temptation of a little ready money", they were careful to exclude the gardens and fields on which they depended for their livelihood.[95] Aelian King held firmly to the conviction that there was "little room for alarm". He added that peasants as a rule sold the waste lands of the village and did not part with his "ancestral" lands.[96]

For his part S. M. Burrows who had evidently made a detailed study of peasant land sales did not minimise their possible social consequences. His almost philosophical musings on the subject clearly transcended the boundaries of the Matale District, of which he had been Assistant Government Agent.

> "Where are all the Natives gone to? What effect has the sale of their land upon their mode of life? What have they done with the purchase money? ... Does work on estates more than compensate for loss of products from chenas and gardens sold? What is the moral and physical result of this change also on the people?"[97]

Interestingly Burrows himself ventured no answers to his questions pleading the absence of "careful statistics". Sadly the deficiency has remained uncorrected. Nonetheless even the woefully threadbare statistical knowledge which the modern researcher is able to muster, buttresses the view that the emergence of European owned tea estates was a powerful catalyst which affected traditional peasant society in the plantation districts. As a contemporary observer noted the peasant sector had witnessed "a quiet revolution".

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92. *Report on the Southern Province, A.R.* 1896, p. E 5.
Report on the Kegalle District, A.R. 1886, p. 147 A ff.
93. *Report on the Kegalle District, A.R.* 1885, p. 167 A ff.
94. *Report on the Central Province, A.R.* 1898, p. C6.
Report on the North Western Province, A.R. 1898, p. G3.
95. *Report on the Sabaragamuwa Province, A.R.* 1897, p. J4.
96. *Report on the North Western Province, A.R.* 1896, p. G3.
97. Quoted by E. M. de S. Short, Assistant Government Agent, in *Report on the Matale District, A.R.* 1896, p. C12.

APPENDIX

CONTEMPORARY ESTIMATES

I

One of the earliest estimates concerning tea manufacture in Ceylon, was worked out by Arthur Morice in his report on the possibilities of tea production. Morice who was an experienced planter was sent to India by the Planters' Association in 1866. He went into great detail and was evidently much influenced by the Indian estimates. Nonetheless his impression of likely costs for Ceylon—unrelated as it was to actual local experience—was at best hypothetical. Moreover Morice failed to integrate, the factors of the cost of purchasing the land as well as transportation costs, in his over-all estimate. To plant 100 acres with tea:

1st year		*Per acre cost*	*Cost for total acreage*
1. Superintendence	..	£ 1 — 10 — 0	£ 150
2. Felling, burning and clearing	..	£ 2 — 10 — 0	£ 250
3. Lining, Holing and planting	..	£ 2 — 0 — 0	£ 200
4. Nurseries and seeds	..	£ 0 — 15 — 0	£ 75
5. Bungalows and Lines	..	£ 0 — 10 — 0	£ 50
6. Roads	..	£ 0 — 10 — 0	£ 50
7. Weeding and upkeep	..	£ 0 — 6 — 0	£ 30
8. Tools	..	£ 0 — 4 — 0	£ 20
9. Contingencies	..	£ 0 — 10 — 0	£ 50
Total per acre	..	£ 8 — 15 — 0	£ 875

2nd year		*Per acre cost*	*Cost for total acreage*
1. Superintendence	..	£ 1 — 10 — 0	£ 150
2. Upkeep	..	£ 1 — 5 — 0	£ 125
3. Supplying	..	£ 0 — 5 — 0	£ 25
4. Building	..	£ 0 — 10 — 0	£ 50
5. Contingencies	..	£ 0 — 10 — 0	£ 50
Total per acre	..	£ 4 — 0 — 0	£ 400

3rd year			*Per acre cost*	*Cost for total acreage*
1. Superintendence	..	@	£ 1 — 10 — 0	£ 150
2. Weeding and Pruning	..	@	£ 1 — 7 — 6	£ 137 — 10sh.
3. Supplying	..	@	£ 0 — 5 — 0	£ 25
4. Building, pans, furnaces, baskets etc.	..	@	£ 0 — 15 — 0	£ 75
5. Contingencies	..	@	£ 0 — 10 — 0	£ 50
Total per acre	.. ..		£ 4 — 7 — 6	£ 437 — 10sh.

4th year			*Per acre cost*	*Cost for total acreage*
1. Superintendence	..	@	£ 1 — 15 — 0	£ 175
2. Weeding and Pruning	..	@	1 1 — 7 — 6	£ 137 — 10sh.
3. Buildings	..		£ 0 — 15 — 0	£ 75
4. Contingencies	..		£ 0 — 10 — 0	£ 50
Total per acre	..		£ 4 — 5 — 6	£ 427 — 10sh.

5th year			
Per acre	..	£ 4 — 0 — 0	£ 400
6th year			
Per acre	..	£ 4 — 0 — 0	£ 400
Total for 6 years	..	£ 29 — 8 — 0	£2940

Returns

1st year — Nil
2nd year — Nil
3rd year — 60 lbs. per acre
4th year — 120 lbs. per acre
5th year — 180 lbs. per acre
6th year — 240 lbs. per acre

II

By the 1880's however, actual empirical evidence enabled planters to work out more precise estimates.

The following details were part of a notably precise estimate which a contemporary planter C.S. Armstrong of Rookwood Estate, had worked out. It gave an idea of how much the manufacture of tea would cost without using machinery.

Armstrong took as the basis of reckoning an estate of 150 acres bearing 400 lbs of tea per acre.

		Cents
1.	Superintendence including Factory Overseer at Rs. 20 per acre, cost per lb. of tea	5.000
2.	Weeding at 87 cents per acre, Rs. 10.44 per acre per annum ..	2.610
3.	Ordinary pruning at Rs. 6 per acre	1.500
4.	Nurseries, Rs. 225	.375
5.	Supplying at Rs. 4.50 per acre	1.125
6.	Roads and drains at Rs. 3 per acre	.750
7.	Tools say Rs. 150	.250
8.	Transport from estate F.O.B.	2.200
9.	General transport	.400
10.	House and tappal Coolies, medicines, stationery, contingencies and export duty on medical aid	1.540
11.	Unkeep of Buildings at Rs. 450 per annum	.750
12.	Manuring 30 acres per annum at Rs. 100 (Rs. 3,600)	5.000
	Total expenditure per lb.	21.500
	Add cost of plucking and manufacture as below	17.500

	Cents
Plucking (including baskets, sacks etc.)	7.000
Withering, Rolling, Firing	6.500
Sorting, refining, packing including lead solder and chests	4.000
	17.500

Thus total cost 400 lb. per acre F.O.B. at per lb. tea hand made		39 cts.
Value of 400 lb. tea at 60 cents per lb. nett..	Rs.	240
Less cost as above 39 cents per lb.	..Rs.	156
Nett profit per acre	..Rs.	84

III

Contemporary planters were also interested in the implications of introducing machinery.

It must be premised that once an estate had been brought into bearing, certain stages in the manufacture of tea had necessarily to be carried out by hand. Pruning and plucking were obvious examples. In the early 1880's simple contrivances sufficed to carry out the processes of withering and fermentation. Machinery was really used therefore in rolling and in firing.

The prevailing belief was that the use of machinery would reduce the cost of manufacture. "... the nearer we work up to its full power the cheaper we are able to manufacture our tea, as there is no loss in Coolie Labour at machinery", remarked Armstrong.

He estimated that an estate consisting of 150 acres and yielding 500 lbs. of tea per acre would require the following machinery.

1.	One Jackson's Universal Roller fixed and ready for use	Rs. 1,200
2.	One Davidson's sirocco (used for firing tea and as an alternative to charcoal firing)	Rs. 1,300
3.	To drive the roller a 16 to 18 feet water wheel will do, or if there is no water power, a 2½ H.P. engine costing	Rs. 1,500
4.	A second sirocco	Rs. 1,300
5.	Cost of a sorting machine	Rs. 1,950
	Total	Rs. 6,250

Reduction in Costs—Manufacture	*Cents*
Plucking per lb. tea	7.00
Withering, Rolling	.41
Firing including firewood, Sorting by hand, Refiring packing in half chests including chests	3.50
Total cost of plucking and manufacture by machinery	11.16

In other words a saving of 6.34 cents as against hand rolling and charcoal firing which would amount to 17.500 cents (See Specimen B).

Reduction in Costs—Labour

Difference in labour required for Withering, Rolling and Firing 1,600 lbs. of tea leaf.

Compare	(a) by Hand	—	Withering	: 2	coolies
			Rolling	: 40	,,
			Firing	: 16	,,
			Total	: 58	coolies
With	(b) By Machine	—	Withering	: 2	coolies
			Rolling	: 3	,,
			Firing	: 8	,,
			Total	: 13	coolies

IV

But at a time of patent capital scarcity, planters were above all interested in assessing outlay.

In the following estimate, which had a clearly topical appeal, it was assumed that 100 acres of land would be purchased. 50 acres were to be brought into tea cultivation. The remainder was to be left partly as a forest reserve for timber and field and partly for the cultivation of vanilla, pepper and cardamoms.

(*a*)	Value of 100 acres at Rs. 30 per acre	Rs.	3,000
(*b*)	Cost of opening and planting tea, erection of some buildings and upkeep for the first year of 50 acres at Rs. 90 per acre	Rs.	4,500
(*c*)	Upkeep of Second year	Rs.	1,250
(*d*)	Upkeep for Third year, including cost of putting up factory etc.	Rs.	750
	Total	Rs.	10,750

In terms of returns, the value in the Fourth year of 15,000 lbs. of tea at 50 cents per lb. (300 lbs. per acre)	Rs.	7,500
Less cost of production which includes running costs for Fourth year as well as costs of putting up and completing buildings etc.	Rs.	4,500
	Rs.	3,000

From the Fourth year, 450 lbs. of prepared tea can be fixed as a fair average in low altitudes giving a profit of Rs. 90 to Rs. 100 per acre.

SINHALESE BUDDHISM: ORTHODOX AND SYNCRETISTIC, TRADITIONAL AND MODERN

(Review Article)

KITSIRI MALALGODA

Although the literature on Sinhalese Buddhism has been growing steadily since the early 1960's, much of it has the disadvantage of being confined to articles which assume a good deal of background knowledge on the part of the reader, and which, furthermore, are scattered in several professional journals or collections of essays which rarely have anything approximating to clearly unified, or unifying, themes. The appearance of a full-length work on the subject is, therefore, very welcome. Richard F. Gombrich's *Precept and Practice: Traditional Buddhism in the Rural Highlands of Ceylon*[1] is all the more welcome because—excluding the purely historical treatises—it is the first full-length study of Buddhism in Ceylon in English since Copleston's (1892).

The main problem on which the study is focussed is not a new one; it is, on the contrary, the very same problem which has been raised—though not adequately discussed or analysed—again and again since the days of the pioneer works of the nineteenth century: are the Sinhalese who call themselves Buddhists in fact Buddhists?

To the early Protestant missionary who began the study of Buddhism in the hope that he would thereby be better equipped to overthrow it, this seemed a very natural question to ask. For him, religion was a clearly definable and consistent set of beliefs and practices, and adherence to a religion meant strict conformity to those beliefs and practices together with its essential corollary—the outright rejection of all other beliefs and practices. This definition of religion — a very Protestant one—conditioned the missionary's view not merely of the Buddhist, but also of the Christian convert; 'nominal Christianity'—partly a consequence of this definition itself—was a problem that he was compelled to grapple with continuously in the missionary field.

Early answers to the question referred to above were invariably in the negative: the Sinhalese are not Buddhists. Nominally, of course, there are; but in reality, they are either devil-worshippers (the term generally used in the earlier works) or animists (the designation preferred by later writers).

1. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971), xiv + 366 pp. With appendix, glossary, bibliography and index. £ 4.00.

This interpretation of Sinhalese religion, once presented in this fashion, refused to give way easily; or rather, it was repeated and re-repeated by a whole series of observers until it made its way, with hardly a question or a challenge, into general accounts of Buddhism such as Eliot's (1921), works of distinguished orientalists like Geiger (1960), popular outlines of comparative religion such as Bouquet's (1941), and finally, into the writings of some social scientists working on Ceylon in the 1950's—notably Wirz (1954) and Ryan (1958).[2]

It was Obeyesekere (1959) who first challenged this point of view effectively in his review of Ryan's *Sinhalese Village* which was published in an early issue of this journal. In this review, Obeyesekere directed particular attention to Ryan's discussion of the religion of Pelpola, and he questioned the methodological soundness—from the sociological point of view—of trying to separate 'Buddhist' from 'non-Buddhist' beliefs and practices. His plea was for the study of Sinhalese Buddhism as "one interconnected system"; and citing examples from (a) theories of causality and (b) the pantheon, he went on to demonstrate how Buddhism was in fact dominant in both the ideology and behaviour of the Sinhalese villager.[3] This was a theme that he developed further in his subsequent writings (1963 and 1966), and the answer that emerged out of them to the question referred to at the beginning of this review article was that the Sinhalese—though not exactly according to the definition that the Protestant missionaries would have preferred—were Buddhists after all. This answer gained the independent support of other scholars who were doing fieldwork in Ceylon at the time, in particular Ames (1964b, and even more explicitly in his two brief popular articles: 1965a and 1965b); and Gombrich too, on whose thinking Obeyesekere's influence is evident and acknowledged, comes out strongly in support of the same point of view.

Thus if the central problem tackled in Gombrich's book is not new, nor is his answer to it. What then is his contribution?

1. Saying that the Sinhalese are Buddhists is a statement about the orthodoxy of their religious beliefs and practices, and orthodoxy in this case must be measured in relation to the Pali Canon, or more precisely, in relation to the Pali Canon as interpreted by the ancient commentaries which, in the form that they have survived, were written down in the fifth century. It is a measurement of this nature that Gombrich seeks to achieve (the doctoral

2. Gombrich (pp. 45-50) refers to all these writers excepting Bouquet who, in the same vein as the others, wrote: "Hinayana is still 'the little vehicle', because it does not and cannot appeal to the masses of any population .... It is true that it is the Buddhism of Burma and Ceylon. But anyone who knows these countries is well aware that the real popular faith of their peoples is not Hinayana but a thinly veiled animism". (*op. cit.*, p. 167).

3. A few years before Obeyesekere's review, Slater (1951) put forward a substantially similar point of view in relation to Burmese Buddhism. Against the nineteenth-century observers of Burmese religion, according to the general consensus of whom, "the Burman has added to his animism just so much Buddhism as suits him", Slater argued (p. 20): "it is nearer the truth to say that he has added to his Buddhism just so much animism as suits his Buddhism".

thesis, of which this book is a revised version, had the more straight-forward title 'Contemporary Sinhalese Buddhism in its relation to the Pali Canon')—a task for which he was more qualified than anybody else who had done field-work in Ceylon by virtue of his training in Indian philology—and it is after such a comparison that he arrives at the conclusion: "I found the Buddhism which I observed in Kandyan villages surprisingly orthodox. Religious doctrines and practices seem to have changed very little over the last 1,500 years [i.e. since the time that the commentaries were written down]" (p. 40); "[The] doctrines of the villagers would have been approved by Buddhaghosa and ... most of their religious practices would have been familiar to him and his contemporaries" (p. 45).

This lack of change is of course in the *structure* of beliefs and practices rather than in their *content*. For instance, the personnel of the Sinhalese pantheon has changed somewhat over the ages; but "the status of the whole pantheon in its relation to the Buddhist religion has changed not at all. The traditional Sinhalese Buddhist framework for interpreting reality has remained unaltered ....[The] presence of 'Hindu' or 'animist' super-naturals in the Buddhist's universe is not a novel or syncretistic feature, but has always been the case" (pp. 48-49). This is a historical and textual argument, and I wish that Gombrich had done a more thorough examination of the texts and historical sources to illustrate it; 1,500 years is a long time and certainly with regard to *content*, there can be, and generally are, variations even within the same period between different regions, e.g., between the Kandyan areas and the Low Country "and even between smaller areas" as Gombrich himself is eager to point out (p. 154). His study of the Canon, on the whole, appears original and adequate; but the same is not true unfortunately of his examination of the historical sources for the 1,500 years about which he so boldly generalizes. The ideas of the Pali Canon, furthermore, have in fact been mediated largely through Sinhalese works written during those 1,500 years; Gombrich, while conceding this, avoids the necessity of having to examine them—asserting quite cavalierly: "But these Sinhalese works closely follow the Pali texts" (p. 103). There is no evidence in the book of his having read any of the major Sinhalese works, let alone of having compared the substantial body of Sinhalese literature bearing on this subject with their corresponding Pali texts. But then, despite these limitations in its elaboration, the main argument itself is both plausible and refreshing, and the way that it is arrived at illustrates how insights gained from the anthropological study of contemporary society can be used with profit to re-examine and reinterpret the past.

2. If Gombrich's examination of the past is only sketchy, his study of the present is by far the most detailed single piece of research on the subject that has been published to date. After presenting the central thesis regarding the orthodoxy of Sinhalese Buddhism in the first chapter, the details are worked out with admirable dexterity and lucidity in the subsequent chapters on the

Buddha (ch. 3), causation, non-human inhabitants of the Sinhalese Buddhist universe and attempts to influence them (ch. 4), karma and merit (ch. 5), morality and ethics (ch. 6), monastic teaching, meditation and eschatology (ch. 7); and finally, as negative case—i.e. as an instance where Buddhism, or at least Buddhist organization (as against ideology), *has* changed—the intrusion of caste into the monastery is discussed in the final chapter.

The enquiry is focussed geographically on the 'rural highlands of Ceylon'; its ethnography therefore is a useful complement to the data collected by others mostly in the Low Country.

3. Gombrich's concern, as the title of the book says, is with *precept* (what people say they believe and say they do) and *practice* (what they really believe and really do). This implies a study of religious behaviour (in addition to the study of religious statements, both oral and textual), and in order to do this, he introduces a simple distinction between *cognitive* (what people say about their beliefs and practices) and *affective* (beliefs, in this case, inferred by the observer from what people really do). The distinction itself is of course not new, but its explicit application to the study of Sinhalese Buddhism is new; and the results amply justify its use for it helps us to understand aspects of religious behaviour which, in the absence of a helpful categorization, appears confusing. In relation to the Buddha, for instance, the argument runs, he is viewed by his followers at the cognitive level as human and dead; but as revealed by the ritual and ceremonial connected with the worship of his relics, and the recitation of his qualities as a spell *etc.*, he is treated at the affective level as if he were alive. Gombrich's concepts are simple—and so much the better for it—and they are used with exemplary skill. One shortcoming though, especially in view of his generally commendable familiarity with the relevant sociological literature, is that he has failed to give recognition to the work of some of his predecessors. No reference at all is made to Singer's (1961) distinction between 'text' and 'context', a theme which is directly relevant to Gombrich's interests, and which has in fact been applied to the study of Sinhalese Buddhism, albeit only briefly, by Ames (1964); and the discussion of the treatment of the Buddha as if he were a king (pp. 131-33) is carried on with no reference to the work of Hocart (1950) who too, incidentally, had been given this explanation by some of his Kandyan informants.

A third distinction which is as crucial to Gombrich's study as the two mentioned above—between precept and practice, cognitive and affective—is the one that he employs between traditional and modern (Buddhism). In handling this third distinction which has important historical implications, in contrast to the other two of which the implications are mainly behavioural, Gombrich is not quite at his best. This is largely the result of the lack of sufficient historical depth in his enquiry, a feature which has already been alluded to, and a feature which is surprising in view of the claim that Ceylon was chosen as the field of study precisely because of its long and continuous history (pp. 17-19).

True enough, the primary comparison in the book is between two historical epochs: the contemporary times and the period of the Pali commentaries. But between these two points of contact, there often appears a yawning gulf stretching literally across 1,500 years. Perhaps Gombrich is not to be entirely blamed for this for historians have not been sufficiently helpful in bridging this gulf; but one could still complain, quite justifiably I think, that he has not made full use even of the material that is available. His style and approach thus stand in sharp contrast to those, for example, of his distinguished fellow-enthusiast, Bechert (1966).

The distinction between traditional and modern is introduced by Gombrich in the following words (pp. 55-56):

> [There] are in Ceylon today broadly two types of Buddhism, the traditional and the modern. It is not surprising if those Sinhalese Buddhists who have been educated in English are themselves uncertain under these circumstances about the validity of indigenous traditions, and tend to cull their own Buddhism at least as much from western sources as from local clergy and customs; and this may be said with equal force of the Buddhist nationalist movements and organizations which have arisen within the last ten (*sic*) years, always under educated urban inspiration and leadership. I disagree with those Europeans, like Copleston and Clifford, who consider the last hundred years to have produced a Buddhist revival: it was the previous hundred years, the period in which the three modern (*sic*) Nikāyas were founded in which Sinhalese Buddhism revived; this other Buddhism is something new. When I say that Sinhalese Buddhism is orthodox it is not to these recent movements that I refer; indeed, I wonder whether they are not heading towards the first genuine syncretism in Ceylonese Buddhist history.

Gombrich himself provides a brief and unsatisfactory, and in historical details somewhat erroneous, sketch of the development of these new features of Buddhism,[4] and in a footnote at the end of it, refers the interested reader to Bechert's study. His own interest, as is claimed in several places in the book and also expressed clearly in its sub-title, is in traditional Buddhism,

4. It is not correct to say that Mrs. Besant became the leader of the Theosophical Society immediately after Madame Blavatsky's death in 1891, or that Olcott merely remained its nominal head thereafter (p. 52). It was not in 1880 (but four years later) that Anagārika Dharmapāla first went to India; and he was not taken to Madame Blavatsky by Olcott; it was rather Blavatsky herself who took Dharmapāla with her—to some extent against Olcott's wish. It was not "under the auspices of Mrs. Besant" (p. 54) that Dharmapāla represented Buddhism at the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893; and it was not "at that time" (but in 1895) that Max Müller wrote him the letter quoted on p. 54 (of which, incidentally, the source is not given in the book). By themselves, these errors are of no great consequence; but they do point to the superficial nature of Gombrich's knowledge of modern Buddhism. One should not, perhaps, complain about that too; but what has happened (as I shall show below) is that this has vitiated his interpretation of traditional Buddhism.

not in modern. In practice, however, he falls short of using this distinction consistently (discrepancy between precept and practice!); nor does he seem to appreciate fully the implications of making this distinction. Let me illustrate.

1. In order to find out what the villagers know about the Buddha (pp. 82 ff.), Gombrich examines two main sources: (a) temple art (paintings and sculpture) and (b) two thin paper-back books which together form the first grade primer of Buddhist Sunday schools. The latter source, he considers so important that he not merely reads them with his fellow-pupils in the bottom class (for children about five years old) of a Sunday school, but also in Appendix II of the book[5] gives translations of the first two chapters of one of the books, along with the full tables of contents of the primers used in the two bottom classes and a list of other books in use at the school. The evidence thus presented is then discussed in the text.

In the first place, the validity of presenting Sunday school primers as 'evidence'—the word is Gombrich's, not mine—of what the villagers in general know about the Buddha is questionable; but leaving that question aside, are there no problems about using them in a study of *traditional* Buddhism? Gombrich himself is not unaware of the modernist origin of Sunday schools and of their close and uninterrupted connections with the Young Men's Buddhist Association of Colombo. But although he mentions of this fact (p. 83), he is not bothered to pursue the matter any further. The conclusion that he arrives at after examining the two sources mentioned above is that "Someone who reads the *Nidānakathā* [The fifth century introduction to the Pali prose commentary on the *Jātakas*] will find in it almost everything now known about the Buddha by a Sinhalese villager" (p. 99). This statement may very well be correct; but then, are we also to conclude that the Y.M.B.A., through its network of schools, is disseminating traditional and orthodox Buddhism? And if so, where is the difference between traditionalism and modernism that Gombrich says there is?

2. Even more problematic than the Sunday school primer is the (now) well-known, but enigmatic, manual, *Bauddha Ädahilla*, for here the author himself is unsure of its origins. The table of contents of this work too is given in translation as an appendix, and Pali verses from it are quoted and discussed extensively in the text. (The index entry under *Bauddha Ädahilla* omits to refer to some of the relevant pages.) A closer scrutiny of its contents, or in the minimum, a comparison of its various editions should have been the obvious preliminary procedure to adopt in relation to a source which has been used as extensively as this one. But Gombrich is content to use just one edition (by Kiriällē Ñāṇavimala, Gunasena, Colombo, 1955) and he attempts to give the work as early a date as possible. The devotional verses given in this work, he speculates, "originated in the context of the daily ritual at the Temple of the

5. The reference on p. 84 should be to Appendix II, not I.

Tooth" (p. 141). The only basis for this speculation is that the same verses were used by the monks at that temple at the time that Hocart (1931) recorded their rituals in the 1920's. And as for the possible date or period of the composition of these verses, Gombrich's surmise is that they "were composed in mediaeval Ceylon between say 1200 and 1500" (p. 115). "In my opinion", he says further, "a later date is most unlikely, as the sixteenth century saw a great decline in Pali learning. This does at least suggest that Christian influence can have played no part in their formulation" (*ibid.*).

Certain verses in the *Bauddha Ädahilla* may be mediaeval, and certain others perhaps even ancient; but what Gombrich does not tell his readers and what he does not seem to know himself is that the compilation as a whole, as it exists now and has become popular in recent times, is a late nineteenth century Low-Country work. It belongs to the tradition of popular Buddhist manuals which emerged from the Buddhist presses from the 1860's onwards. The earlier, and shorter, versions had titles such as *Pratipatti Dīpaniya* (31 p. Colombo, 1868). The enlarged version with its utterly untraditional title—*Buddha Ädahilla*—was the work of the famous Mohoṭṭivattē Guṇānanda who was as good an imitator of Christian institutions and practices as he was an opponent of them. Quite apart from its suspect title, there is at least one definite piece of internal evidence in the copy of the *Bauddha Ädahilla* that Gombrich has used which should have led him to think that some parts of the compilation were nineteenth century; its table of contents (as translated on p. 329) mentions "Praise of the Three Jewels composed by King Vajirañāṇa of Siam". Vajirañāṇa was none other than Mongkut (of 'Anna and the King of Siam' fame) who reigned from 1851 to 1868.

It is pertinent to note that Mohoṭṭivattē's compilation—along with Olcott's *Buddhist Catechism*, the then equivalent of the present Y.M.B.A. primers—was used by Mohoṭṭivattē's contemporary in Ceylon, Copleston, precisely to illustrate 'modernism', or as he put it, "what the leaders of the modern school wish the Buddhists of Ceylon now to practise and believe" (p. 469).[6] He did so, however, with some caution; "it is not easy", he wrote, "to say whether these books represent a new departure, or continue the tradition of the past" (pp. 469-70). The pity is that eighty years after it had been stated as clearly as this, Copleston's question still remains unanswered. Gombrich obviously could not provide an answer because, in the first place, he did not ask the question correctly. It is strange indeed that Copleston's observations on the *Buddha Ädahilla* and escaped Gombrich's notice—or is it that he deliberately chose

6. I have not seen a copy of Mohoṭṭivattē's original compilation, but the contemporary sources leave us in no doubt that it was his work. (At that time, apparently, it had the title *Buddha*—rather than *Bauddha—Ädahilla*). See for instance, Mohoṭṭivattē's obituary in the *Sarasavi Saňdaräsa* of 23 September 1890, reprinted in Vimaladharma (1937:47). Copleston, who does not name the compiler, says that it was "issued from the Kotahena temple, of the Amarapura sect, some twenty years ago [i.e. *circa* 1872]" (p. 470). Mohoṭṭivattē was the chief incumbent of that temple at the time.

to ignore them?—because "my learned (though partial) predecessor" as Gombrich likes to call him (p. 19 *n*) is either quoted or referred to in several other contexts in the book.

3. Features which are generally considered as 'modern' have, and have had, their clearest manifestations in the Low Country rather than in the Kandyan areas, in urban rather than in rural areas, among the laity rather than among the monks, and among the English rather than among the Sinhalese educated. The point however is that neither the influence of these features nor indeed their occurrence has ever been confined exclusively to the set of categories mentioned first in this list of dichotomies; in many different ways, some very clear and obvious but some much less so, they have penetrated into the second set as well. As a result, the distinction between traditional and modern is not an easy one to apply to the contemporary field situation. It ought to be applied with great caution, always paying attention to the media and processes of communication—the pamphlet, the journal and the newspaper; the public meeting and the itinerant preacher; the B.T.S. and the Y.M.B.A. and their schools; and since more recently, the radio—which have (or had) been operative for several decades. In this context, the history of the *Buddha Ädahilla* is instructive: at the time that Copleston wrote, its popularity was largely limited to the Low Country (*op. cit.* p. 470); but now it is known and used by Buddhists all over the island. Its devotional verses may not be incompatible with tradition (Gombrich, however, having traced them, without forwarding sufficient evidence, to mediaeval times,[7] refuses to examine the interesting *prima facie* case for Christian influence), but if so, one is able to discern here, historically, a rediscovery or revitalization of tradition (through a modern medium, i.e. the printed word) rather than an uninterrupted continuity of it. This might very well be the case with regard to the daily ritual at the Temple of the Tooth too. There is no reason at all to assume that the content of the ritual has remained the same since mediaeval times. The seemingly wild possibility that some at least of the devotional verses came to the ritual from the *Buddha Ädahilla*, rather than *vice versa*, as late as the turn of the century, should be examined with all seriousness. Someone who has no knowledge of the historical background, to cite a parallel, will not be surprised at seeing 'Buddhist flags' and 'Kandyan dancing' (*ves nāṭum*) in the Äsaḷa Perahära at Kandy; indeed these are likely to be considered very traditional and essential features of the Perahära, although in fact they are very recent additions to it.

The rediscovery of tradition is a process which has been repeated and re-repeated several times in the history of Buddhism in Ceylon, at times, with the assistance of some other Theravāda country such as Burma or Thailand. These foreign contacts which helped to revive the tradition may also have caused

7. By itself, his point about the decline of Pali learning after the sixteenth century has no weight against the possible composition of some of the verses later. The study of Pali was revived in the middle of the eighteenth century, and since then, has never reached the earlier ebb.

some changes in it, albeit perhaps not very conspicuous ones. In more recent times, however, when westerners and the westernized have played a leading role in 'reviving' Buddhism, the changes that occurred as a result of their efforts have been far more pronounced because (a) these efforts took place in a period of very pervasive contact with the West and Christianity (contacts more pervasive, it is hardly necessary to say, than those which Ceylon has had with Burma or Thailand), and (b) they took place also in a period of fundamental changes in Sinhalese society itself. This is not the place to take a comprehensive view of these changes;[8] it will suffice to comment briefly on just one sphere —the vocabulary of Buddhism—to which Gombrich devotes ch. 2 of his book.

This sphere happily is particularly instructive because it illustrates how changes and innovations which began in the Low Country (in fact, within a small segment of it) in the nineteenth century have been rapidly universalized. I have already referred to the untraditional nature of the term *ädahilla* as applied to the Buddha. The term itself is of course not new; but traditionally it (or rather its plural form, *ädahili*) referred to beliefs and practices pertaining to gods rather than the Buddha. The Christian missionaries, not surprisingly, adopted the term to refer to their own form of worship; and then, in imitation of them, Mohoṭṭivattē (and after him, others) applied it to the worship of the Buddha too. The use of the term *āgama* as the generic equivalent of 'religion' is another neologism introduced, again, by the Christian missionaries in the nineteenth century. (*Sāsana* and *dharma* may have appeared to them as too closely linked with the Buddhist tradition).[9] It is still not uncommon to hear the term *āgama* used—without the adjective *Kristiyāni*—to refer to Christianity. *Buddhāgama* was the term that the missionaries used to refer to Buddhism; it was only later that it gained acceptance among the Buddhists themselves as a term of self-reference. (In 1815, the Sinhalese version of the 'Kandyan Convention' referred to *Buddhasāsana* and *Dēvāgama*). Some of the other expressions such as *āgama vaśayen* (from the point of view of religion), *samaja* (*sic*) *vaśayen* (from the societal point of view) and *dēsapālanē* (politics) used by some of Gombrich's informants (pp. 249-50) are even more recent additions to the vocabulary of the Sinhalese which have been accompanied by significant changes in their conceptual apparatus. Gombrich does provide some comments on both *āgama* and *ädahilla* (and other words related to them), but these com-

8. Gombrich while failing to see the subtle and indirect influence of the West in many situations where it can be found, tries to locate it in his comments on forest-dwelling monks (pp. 283-84) in a situation where it is of little or no importance. The revival of forest-dwelling fraternities and meditation was initiated by some Amarapura and Rāmañña Nikāya monks in the nineteenth century through contact with Burma, and not with the West or westerners. What is really modern is not the *āraññna* (with or without European monks in it) but the urban meditation centre patronized, in their spare time, by the middle class *upāsakas* and *upāsikās*.

9. Although in the eighteenth century, the Indian Catholic priest, Jacome Goncalvez, who lived in the Kandyan kingdom and wrote in Sinhalese and Tamil, had not hesitated to use terms such as *veda* and *dharma* to designate the Christian doctrine.

ments (pp. 58-60) are limited to their etymology. More relevant and useful would have been some observations on the semantic changes that these words have undergone *within* the Sinhalese language.

Another difficulty with regard to the vocabulary of Buddhism comes from the different levels on which Gombrich carries on his discussion. The 'raw material' for the book was provided by the data collected in interviews with monks—thirty-four in all, in about as many temples situated between ten and twenty miles from Kandy—during the author's first sojourn in Ceylon between August 1964 and August 1965. The examination of lay opinion on religious matters was much less systematic; but throughout the book the author's emphasis is on the concepts and categories used by the 'villagers', i.e. laymen. (A second visit to Ceylon in the latter half of 1969 was made use of by the author to "broaden" his knowledge of lay opinion; but no claim is made to having conducted systematic interviews with laymen in the same way as they were done with monks). Now, obviously, there is no sharp distinction in the religious vocabulary of monks as a group as opposed to laymen as a group—there are different kinds of monks just as there are different kinds of laymen—but there are no doubt differences in the vocabulary of the religiously more knowledgeable as opposed to that of the less knowledgeable; and monks, on the whole, are more likely to belong to the former group. This comes out clearly in the discussion of the *laukika/lokottara* dichotomy which Ames (1964) had viewed as the Sinhalese equivalents of the Durkheimien categories of the profane and the sacred. Dismissing Ames's suggestion as irrelevant, Gombrich writes (p. 58):

> It is perfectly true that these two words would be fair translations of 'profane' and 'sacred' respectively.... But these terms are pure Sanskrit, and purely learned; I have never heard them used in conversation, and to most villagers they are not even intelligible.

Perhaps correct; but in the chapter on the Buddha, where again the emphasis is on what the villagers in general know of him, Gombrich has no hesitation in quoting a monk who does use the term *lokottara* (pp. 81-82).

It is only natural and expedient in doing fieldwork to look for informed, rather than uninformed, informants. This was indeed one of the reasons why Gombrich chose to interview monks (rather than laymen): "monks have many more opinions on religious topics than do most laymen" (p. 38). Furthermore, religious knowledge, of monks as well as laymen, is not a constant; it varies considerably over time and space closely depending on the media and processes of communication—on education in the wider sense of the term. In this limited sphere at least, contrary to Gombrich's opinion (quoted earlier, which he expresses in opposition to previous observers such as Copleston), there has been a 'revival' during the last hundred years. It is not difficult to quote Gombrich himself in support of this: "Monastic education has now become more standardized, and there can be little doubt that the general level has risen" (p. 272); "the Five Precepts are almost universally known by rote, and their

meanings also are generally known and understood, though the specific meanings of the Pali words are often not known—but this knowledge is on the increase because of *daham pāsal* (Sunday schools) and religious instruction in state schools" (p. 254).

One surprising feature about Gombrich's book—surprising that is in view of the raw material that went into its production—is that it is on the whole better, and has greater depth and detail, in places where the discussion is focussed on laymen rather than on monks. Compare the two long and superb chapters on 'The Buddha' (ch. 3) and 'A Sketch of the Universe as seen from Mīgala' (ch. 4) with the 7th chapter, much less than half the length of the other two separately, where two subjects which have little in common, 'The Monastic Ideal and the Decline of Buddhism', are put together. One feels a sense of weariness in the author and a gradual waning of his enthusiasm for the sociological perspective. The comments on the monks have the character of a set of brief field-notes on their activities as teachers, preachers, 'beggars', landlords and meditators; the same data could have been presented much better if some attempt were made to organize the material around the broader themes of the traditional role (or roles) of the monk in Sinhalese society, the dilemmas and contradictions inherent in this role, and the attempts of the monks to resolve them *etc.* As a result of Gombrich's reluctance to raise these larger issues, what could really have been one of the best chapters of the book disappointingly ends up as a dull assortment of ill-digested data.

Apart from telling us what a small sample of monks think of caste distinctions, the 8th chapter on 'Caste in the Monastery' adds very little of importance to what is already known about the subject of *nikāyas* while much of what is new in it is either debatable or unsubstantiated or plainly incorrect. For example:

(*a*) "Ryan's conjecture... that some of the Amarapura schisms were on doctrinal [rather than caste] lines seems to be without foundation" (p. 310 *n*).

Gombrich's refutation is as unconvincing as Ryan's conjecture as neither of them has taken the trouble to examine the evidence carefully.

(*b*) "It [i.e. the Amarapura Nikāya] does not normally recruit from the *goyigama* or the very low castes, though in this certain *nikāyas* [i.e. different ordination traditions within the larger Nikāya] are exceptional (see below)" (p. 310).

In my reading of the pages 'below', I failed to come across the information promised here. The recruitment of Goyigamas to the Amarapura Nikāya, far from being exceptional, is, and has been, pretty much the normal practice in a large part of *uḍa raṭa* (in Sabaragamuva and Ūva).

(c) "I was . . . told by all the Rāmañña monks whom I interviewed (and am sure it is true) that the Kandyan (*uḍa raṭa*) branch [of their Nikāya] admits only *goyigama* men, just like the Siyam Nikāya. Indeed, caste has penetrated the Rāmañña Nikāya so deeply that one of their young monks tried to convince me that they are socially superior to the Siyam Nikāya, claiming (untruly) that the Siyam Nikāya admit some low-caste men while the Rāmañña does not" (p. 310).

It would have been good if the scepticism that was maintained with regard to the latter statement was applied with equal force to the former as well—for that statement too is incorrect in so far as it refers to the whole of *uḍa raṭa*. We also learn, two pages later, that "*all* the Rāmañña monks" with whose statements Gombrich so readily agreed numbered only three (one of whom had already shown himself less than reliable on this subject)!

In short, Gombrich's discussion of the *nikāyas* does little justice to the complexity of the subject.

The weakest part of the book is perhaps its description of the ethos of Sinhalese society where the author relies neither on systematic interviews nor on controlled and comparative observation, but simply on impressions gathered in a random and haphazard manner. The hazards of this task were apparently not unknown to the author, for in the introduction he wrote (p. 15):

> Unfortunately ethos is so general a thing that it is difficult to observe it in the field and perhaps impossible to describe it in testable and refutable statements. The best we can usually do is to characterize it by negative example: an English gentlemen would never kick a dog or a lady. At this point anthropology has become an art rather than a science.

What seems more likely is that it has regressed to the level of the travelogue, the fore-runner of ethnology which was in turn the fore-runner of anthropology. The travelogue can of course be as informative as the 'scientific' anthropological account; the only problem is that one can never be quite certain as to whether it is informative more on the subject which it purports to be about or on the personal experiences and the attitudes and prejudices of the traveller himself. Consider the following passage on the alleged masochism of the Sinhalese (pp. 265-66).

> This masochism seems to me to find expression in the gruesome scenes depicted in *many* temples. Not only are paintings of tortures in hell *fairly common; a couple of* famous temples have permanent exhibitions in sculpted tableaux of old-time Sinhalese tortures, and these are visited by tourists from all over the country. *One* such torture shown in three-dimensional lurid colour is the impalement of a man on a sharp pole which enters the anus and comes out at the chest. The flimsy pretext

> for these displays, which are highly profitable, is that they illustrate the perils of wrong-doing. What chiefly distinguishes them, to my mind, from their western equivalents such as Madame Tussaud's Chamber of Horrors, is that in the West the audience is generally supposed to identify with the executioners who are giving the victims 'their just deserts', whereas the Buddhist shows explicitly identify the spectator—you miserable sinner—with the sufferer in hell or on the stake. The spectator's psychology need not comply with this prescription, but my own conclusion (which might be empirically tested by a researcher with a strong stomach) is that these horrible spectacles are outlets for suppressed aggression, but primarily in masochistic rather than sadistic form.

The italics in the passage are mine, and they are put there to illustrate the manner in which the author, carried away by the rhetoric of his amateur psycho-analysis, loses his sense of proportion and objectivity; note the vagueness and the descending order of his supporting evidence: many, fairly common, a couple of, and finally, one. By this time, he also seems to have forgotten his own more sober account of the themes of Kandyan painting and sculpture presented in an earlier part of the book (pp. 91 ff.) where there are no references at all to "gruesome scenes depicted in many temples".

As an afterthought, perhaps, on the extreme sentiments expressed in the passage quoted above, Gombrich adds in a footnote (p. 266 *n*):

> On the other hand, gruesome depictions of hell were probably just as common in mediaeval European churches; coming from a culture which in this respect has become more squeamish, I may be over-reacting to a sight which natives take lightly.

But self-analysis can scarcely be an adequate corrective to a partial and highly selective examination of evidence.

To be fair by Gombrich, I must add in conclusion that he does not in any way intend his book to be a definitive work; he is deeply conscious of the ambitious nature of its scope, and therefore of its possible shortcomings (p. 39); in fact, he does not present his book as more than an "imperfect draft" (p. viii). Imperfections, to be sure, there are in the book (as in all books), but we cannot complain about his decision to publish it without the revisions that could have improved it for Gombrich is only too correct when he says that revision is a process which can never be completed. Contrary to the opinion of a previous (anonymous) reviewer (T.L.S., 1971:862), I do not consider *Precept and Practice* "an epoch-making piece of research" and "a landmark in the study of religion": not in the study of religion in general, nor for that matter, even in the study of Buddhism in particular. *Precept and Practice* must be examined in the context of the ongoing discussions in the field of sociology of Buddhism—it is no doubt his unfamiliarity with the work done in this field during the last ten years or so that has led the previous reviewer to such ecstatic ejaculations—and as far as these discussions are concerned, there is no doubt that Gombrich has

made an extremely valuable contribution, as much by the problems that he has solved as by the many problems that he has raised and left unsolved or only partially solved. That the book has far surpassed the author's own modest estimate of it and that it deserves the careful attention of all those interested in the subject require no special emphasis for those indeed are the only reasons I can give for having discussed it at this unusual length. Gombrich's entry into the study of Sinhalese Buddhism is specially welcome at this juncture as some of his predecessors of the early 1960's have already begun to disperse in pursuit of other interests. Going by the quality of his first performance, we can, with confidence, look forward to seeing the results of his future research.

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A CATALOGUE OF NINETEENTH CENTURY BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS RELATING TO CEYLON*

VIJAYA SAMARAWEERA

The British Parliamentary Papers of the nineteenth century, which number nearly eighty thousand, have been described as 'the richest and most important collection of printed government records in existence in any country'.[1] They have been recognised as fundamentally important source-material for the study of nineteenth century Britain and her colonial empire, but many a student has been deterred from using them because of their complex, indeed often confusing, methods of indexing. In recent years, however, several guides and select lists have appeared as aids for consulting the papers,[2] and the Irish University Press has launched a project of re-printing the parliamentary papers grouped under a wide range of subjects. The present compilation is intended to offer students of nineteenth century history of Ceylon a guide to the material relevant to British rule found scattered in the collection of parliamentary papers. The material falls into two main categories. The majority concern statistical returns and 'information papers'—of revenue and expenditure (e.g. entry 4), of imports and exports (32), of the civil and military establishments (6), etc. —which for the period from 1821 onwards are also to be found in the 'Blue Books' of the colony.[3] To the first category too belong 'Accounts and Papers', i.e. cor-

* I am indebted to Mr. W. J. F. LaBrooy for allowing me the use of his check-list of parliamentary papers. It enabled me to fill in some gaps and omissions in my compilation.

1. E. L. Erickson, 'The Sessional Papers—Last Phase', *College and Research Libraries*, XXI (1960), 343. On Parliamentary Papers generally see also, H. H. Bellot, 'Parliamentary Printing, 1660-1837', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, XI (1933), 85-98; P. and G. Ford, *A Guide to Parliamentary Papers*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956; T. P. O'Neill, *British Parliamentary Papers*, Shanon: Irish University Press, 1969.
2. See, M. I. Adam, J. Ewing and J. Munro, *Guide to the Principal Parliamentary Papers relating to the British Dominions*, 1812-1911, London: Oliver and Boyd, 1913; A. H. Cole, *A Finding-List of Royal Commission Reports in the British Dominions*, Cambridge, Mss.: Harvard University Press, 1939; P. and G. Ford, *A Breviate of Parliamentary Papers*, 1900-1916, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957; P. and G. Ford, *A Breviate of Parliamentary Papers*, 1917-1939, Shanon: Irish University Press, 1969; P. and G. Ford, *Select List of British Parliamentary Papers*, 1833-1899, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953; H. Temperly and L. H. Penson, *A Century of Diplomatic Blue Books*, 1814-1914, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1838. On Parliamentary Indexes see, 'British Parliamentary Papers: Catalogues and Indexes', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, XI (1933), 24-30.
3. On Ceylon Blue Books see, H. de Silva, 'Blue Books of Ceylon, 1821-1938', *Ceylon Today*, XIV (1965), 20-27. The Blue Books are available at the Public Record Office, London, in the Colonial Office records series 59.

respondence, dispatches and reports of inquiries relating to colonial events and issues, as for example those relating to Governor Sir Fredrick North's war with Kandy in 1802 (1), the case of J. D. Rossier (10), important in relation to the conflict that developed between the Governor and the Supreme Court in the first decades of the century, the reports of the Commission of Eastern Enquiry (19), and Lord Torrington's Governorship (52). The material found in these papers is by no means comprehensive, but the very selective nature is of importance for it indicates precisely what the British Government wanted to reveal in Parliament about developments in the colony.[4] The second category, reports and minutes of evidence of House select committees, is more valuable. The work of the two select committees on Ceylon appointed in the mid-century (40 to 42 and 44 to 47), for example, provides a mine of information, while another select committee, on the affairs of the East India Company (18), though not directly concerned with Ceylon, brought to light material pertaining to Ceylon through its investigations, among which the evidence of W. M. G. Colebrooke and Sir Alexander Johnston is particularly noteworthy.

The present compilation relates only to the papers laid before the House of Commons. There were two types of papers presented before the Commons, sessional and command papers. Sessional papers originated within the House and from 1801 onwards were numbered consecutively for each session according to the order of printing and have been distinguished by round brackets. The command papers, arising outside and communicated to the House by Royal Command, were numbered between 1833 and 1868-69 in a series—1 to 4222—also consecutively, but without regard to session, and would be distinguished by square brackets. From 1870 onwards the command papers were given a pre-fix—C.—and a new series begun—C.1 to C. 9550 ending in 1899—; though square brackets continued to be used in the papers, following the practice adopted by other compilers, they have been dispensed with here. Titles of papers have always proved to be a problem to compilers of parliamentary papers. Titles or names of authors in the usual sense are not to be found, and no common method of titling the papers was followed. We have been guided by two considerations: titles should be informative of the contents of the papers and should approximate, where possible, to the originals. References given in the present compilation are first to the year or session in which the paper was printed, second to the printer's number, third to the volume of the sessional set in which the paper was included and fourth to the title.

Annual reports, which the Governors of the colony were required to submit home in common with rulers elsewhere in the empire and which beginning from 1846 were laid before the House of Commons yearly, forms the appendix.

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4 cf. S. Lambert, 'The Presentation of Parliamentary Papers by the Foreign Office', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, XXIII (1950), 76-83. For an examination of a controversy that arose over an alleged attempt of the government to 'control the flow of information to Parliament' see, G. J. Alder, 'The "Garbled" Blue Books of 1839—Myth or Reality?', *Historical Journal*, XV (1972), 229-260.

They were variously titled: initially as 'reports showing the past and present state of Her Majesty's colonial possessions', subsequently as 'reports on the blue books' because the Blue Books were submitted together with the reports, and later as 'papers relating to the colonies' and finally from 1889 onwards as 'colonial annual reports'. These reports, though brief, contain much valuable information and taken together could be utilised to charter the course of colonial developments over the years from 1846. Among the reports relating to Ceylon are Torrington's famous letter on the state of the colony (90), a resumé of the achievements of British rule since inception by Sir Hercules Robinson (110), and a discussion of problems concerning the immigration of Indians to Ceylon (121).

1.	1803-04	(48)	IX	*War in Ceylon, papers.*
2.	1814-15	(224)	IX	*Colonial establishments, estimates of charges.*
3.	1819	(319)	XVIII	*War in Ceylon, papers.*
4.	1819-20	(56)	IV	*Revenue and expenditure, 1815 and 1816, abstracts.*
5.	1819-20	(88)	IV	*Officers of the civil government who have held appointments at £150 or above in 1816, schedules.*
6.	1819-20	(86)	IX	*Colonies, comparative list of military staff, 1792, 1800 and 1818.*
7.	1821	(64)	XIV	*Colonies, account of colonies in the possession of the United Kingdom, 1792 and 1820.*
8.	1821	(622)	XIV	*Pensions and allowances payable from the revenue of Ceylon, etc.*
9.	1821	(653)	XIV	*Revenue and expenditure, 1816, 1817 and 1819, abstract.*
10.	1825	(513)	XXIV	*Government of Ceylon, papers.*
11.	1826	(332)	XXVI	*Commission of Eastern Enquiry, instructions.*
12.	1828	(191)	XXI	*Colonial acts, schedule to the printed copies of legislative acts in colonies.*
13.	1828	(539)	XXIII	*Colonial Debt of the Ceylon Government, account; revenue and establishments and salaries payable annually in Great Britain on account of Ceylon, returns; cinnamon trade, correspondence; cinnamon imported into England, returns.*
14.	1829	(167)	XXI	*Offices in colonies, appointments subsequent to the passing of an Act of Parliament of the 54th year of his late Majesty King George III, returns.*
15.	1829	(344)	XXIII	*East India Company, military establishments maintained in Ceylon annually, 1796-98.*
16.	1830	(212)	XXI	*Revenue and expenditure, correspondence.*
17.	1830	(352)	XXI	*Revenue and expenditure, correspondence.*
18.	1831-32	(735-III)	XI	*Select committee on the affairs of the East India Company, minutes of evidence.*
19.	1831-32	(274)	XXXII	*Reports of Lieutenant-Colonel Colebrooke, one of His Majesty's Commissioner's of Inquiry, upon the Administration of the Government of Ceylon; upon the Revenues of Ceylon; and Report of Charles Hay Cameron, one of His Majesty's Commissioners of Inquiry, upon the Judicial Establishments and Procedure in Ceylon.*

20.	1833	(332)	XXVI	*Charter of Justice of* 1833; *instructions accompanying and correspondence relating to the Charter of Justice of* 1833.
21.	1833	(434)	XXVI	*Colonies, offices abolished or salaries reduced,* 1830-33; *dimunition of expenditure,* 1830-33.
22.	1833	(698)	XXVI	*Supplementary commission and additional instructions to Sir R. W. Horton.*
23.	1834	(570)	VI	*Select committee on military establishments and expenditure in the colonies, report.*
24.	1834	(617)	XXXXIV	*State of the aboriginal tribes in British possessions, papers.*
25.	1834	(228)	XLIV	*Salt monopoly, correspondence of Sir R. W. Horton.*
26.	1840	(527 A)	VIII	*Tariffs and duties, ordinances of Governor and council.*
27.	1843	(186)	LII	*Revenue from the sale or export duty on cinnamon,* 1830-43, *amount; alterations in the duty,* 1830-43, *returns.*
28.	1843	(257)	LII	*Importation and exportation of cinnamon, cassia, tea, silk, etc., returns; quantities retained for home consumption, returns.*
29.	1843	(568)	LVIII	*Abolition of slavery, correspondence.*
30.	1845	(530)	VIII	*Revenue and expenditure,* 1842 *and* 1843, *returns.*
31.	1845	(640)	XXXI	*Civil service, minutes and correspondence.*
32.	1847	(93)	XLI	*Existing tariffs, revenue received, imports and exports,* 1842, 1843 *and* 1844, *returns.*
33.	1847	(495)	XLI	*Dismissal of Robert Langslow, correspondence.*
34.	1847	(657)	LIX	*Imports of sugar, coffee etc., from Ceylon,* 1831-46, *returns.*
35.	1847	(716)	LXIII	*Railways, correspondence.*
36.	1847-48	(361-IV)	XXII	*Select committee on sugar and coffee planting, eighth report, evidence.*
37.	1847-48	(41)	XLII	*Import and export duties,* 1845, *abstract.*
38.	1847-48	(369)	XLII	*Commercial, coffee planting and financial difficulties of Ceylon, dispatches of Torrington.*
39.	1847-48	[933]	XLII	*Finance and commerce of Ceylon, reports and correspondence.*
40.	1849	(297)	XI	*Select committee on Ceylon and British Guiana, first report.*
41.	1849	(573)	XI	———*Second report.*
42.	1849	(591)	XI	———*Third report.*
43.	1849	(1018)	XXXVI	*Affairs of Ceylon, papers.*
44.	1850	(66)	XII	*Select committee on Ceylon, first report.*
45.	1850	(106)	XII	———*Second report.*
46.	1850	(605)	XII	———*Third report.*
47.	1851	(36-I; 36-II)	VIII	———*Third report, minutes of evidence.*
48.	1851	(99)	XII	*Commission sent to Ceylon, report and correspondence relative to evidence accompanying the report.*
49.	1851	(634)	XII	———*Evidence, with documents relating to the inquiry.*
50.	1851	(303)	XXXV	*Wolfendhal church, memorial from Sinhalese Episcopalians.*
51.	1851	(414)	XXXV	*Military establishments, expenditure or charge to the British Government,* 1849.
52.	1851	[1301]	XXXV	*Affairs of Ceylon, papers.*
53.	1851	[1413]	XXXV	*Court Martial of Captain Watson, papers.*
54.	1852	(571)	XXXI	*Repeal of cinnamon duty, instructions.*

55.	1852	(355-IV)	XXXII	*Colonial church legislation, Ceylon, petitions and representations.*
56.	1852	(568)	XXXVI	*Fixed establishments, 1850, report of the Finance Committee of the Executive Council.*
57.	1852-53	(88)	LXV	*Ceylon committee on forgery of documents, account.*
58.	1852-53	(410)	LXV	*Idolatry of native inhabitants, correspondence.*
59.	1852-53	(919)	LXV	*Basses lighthouses, correspondence.*
60.	1852-53	(927)	LXV	*Idolatry of native inhabitants, correspondence.*
61.	1852-53	(985)	LXV	*Idolatry of native inhabitants, correspondence.*
62.	1857	(45)	XXVIII	*State of Ceylon, correspondence.*
63.	1860	(457)	XLV	*Ceylon railway, accounts and papers.*
64.	1860	(527)	XLV	*Galle harbour, reports and correspondence.*
65.	1862	(234)	XXXVI	*Galle harbour, reports and correspondence.*
66.	1862	(440)	XXXVI	*Charges, civil, military and naval, defrayed out of the Imperial Exchequer, 1855-60, returns.*
67.	1863	(491)	LXIII	*Basses lighthouses, further correspondence.*
68.	1865	(215)	XXXVIII	*Military expenditure, correspondence.*
69.	1866	(183)	XLIX	*Treatment of prisoners, correspondence.*
70.	1867	[3904]	XLVIII	*Legislative Council, petitions relative.*
71.	1867-68	(39)	XLVIII	*Legislative Council, correspondence relating to the petitions.*
72.	1870	C.162	XLIX	*Descriptive catalogue of the Pali, Sinhalese and Sanskrit manuscripts, correspondence.*
73.	1871	C.289	XLVII	*Ceylon railway, papers.*
74.	1872	C.611	XLII	*Deepening of the Paumben channel, correspondence.*
75.	1872	C.521	XLIII	*Deepening of the Paumben channel, correspondence.*
76.	1873	C. 761	XLIX	*Paumben ship canal, further report.*
77.	1874	(66)	II	*Colombo Harbour Act.*
78.	1874	C. 990	XLV	*Colombo harbour improvement, correspondence.*
79.	1876	(154)	LIV	*Ecclesiastical endowments, papers and correspondence.*
80.	1877	(123)	LXI	*Ecclesiastical endowments, correspondence relating to memorials.*
81.	1881	C. 2983	LXV	*Ecclesiastical subsidies, correspondence.*
82.	1883	C. 3800	XXVI	*Egyptian exiles in Ceylon, correspondence.*
83.	1884	(49)	LIV	*Burgher, Sinhalese and other native magistrates and judges, 1873-83, returns.*
84.	1884-85	C. 4243	LXXXIX	*Egyptian exiles in Ceylon, correspondence.*
85.	1898	(66)	LXXXIX	*Lighthouses abroad, expenditure, 1896-98.*
86.	1899	C. 9370	LVIII	*Recent land legislation, correspondence.*
87.	1899	(4)	LXXXIX	*Lighthouses abroad, dues received and expenditure, 1897-98.*

Appendix

88.	1846	(728)	XXIX	*State of the Colonies, annual reports, Ceylon etc., 1845.*
89.	1847	(869)	XXXVII	——— 1846.
90.	1847-48	[1005]	XLVI	——— 1847.
91.	1849	[1126]	XXXIV	——— 1848.
92.	1850	[1232]	XXXVI	——— 1849.
	1851	[1421]	XXXIV	——— 1850.
94.	1852	[1539]	XXXI	——— 1851.
95.	1852-53	[1693]	LXII	——— 1852.

96.	1854-55	[1919]	XXXVI	———	1853.
97.	1856	[2050]	XLII	———	1854.
98.	1857	[2198]	X	———	1855.
99.	1857-58	[2403]	XL	———	1856.
100.	1859	[2567]	XXI	———	1857.
101.	1860	[2711]	XLIV	———	1858.
102.	1861	[2841]	XL	———	1859.
103.	1862	[2955]	XXXVI	———	1860.
104.	1863	[3164]	XXXIX	———	1861.
105.	1864	[3304]	XL	———	1862.
106.	1865	[3423]	XXXVII	———	1863.
107.	1866	[3719]	XLIX	———	1864.
108.	1867	[3812]	XLVIII	———	1865
109.	1867-68	[3995]	XLVIII	———	1866.
110.	1868-69	[4090]	XLIII	———	1867.
111.	1870	C. 85	XLIX	———	1868.
112.	1871	C. 334	XLVII	———	1869.
113.	1872	C. 523	XLIII	———	1870.
114.	1873	C. 709	XLVIII	———	1871.
115.	1874	C. 882	XLIV	———	1872.
116.	1874	C. 1102	XLIV	———	1872-73.
117.	1875	C. 1183	LI	———	1873-74.
118.	1876	C. 1622	LI	———	1874-75.
119.	1877	C. 1825	LIX	———	1875-76.
120.	1878	C. 2149	LV	———	1876-77.
121.	1878-79	C. 2273	L	———	1877.
122.	1880	C. 2598	XLVIII	———	1877-78.
123.	1880	C. 2730	XLVIII	———	1878-79.
124.	1881	C. 3094	LXIV	———	1879-80.
125.	1882	C. 3218	XLIV	———	1879-80.
126.	1882	C. 3388	XLIV	———	1881.
127.	1883	C. 3794	XLV	———	1882.
128.	1884-85	C. 4404	LII	———	1883-84.
129.	1886	C. 4904	XLV	———	1884-85.
130.	1887	C. 5239	LVII	———	1885-86.
131.	1888	C. 5249	LXXII	———	1887.
132.	1890	C. 5897	XLVIII	———	1888-90.
133.	1892	C. 6829	LV	———	1891.
134.	1893-94	C. 6857	LIX	———	1891-92.
135.	1895	C. 7629	LXIX	———	1893-94.
136.	1896	C. 7944	LVII	———	1894-95.
137.	1897	C. 8279	LIX	———	1895-96.
138.	1898	C. 8650	LIX	———	1896-97.
139.	1899	C. 9046	LXI	———	1897-98.

REVIEW

DE SILVA, CHANDRA RICHARD, *The Portuguese in Ceylon, 1617–1638* (H. W. Cave & Company, Colombo, 1972). X + 267 pp. 2 sketch-maps.

Robert Knox, whose *Historical Relation of the Island of Ceylon* (1681) is familiar to all serious students of the history of Sri Lanka, epitomized the vicissitudes of the fighting between the Portuguese and successive rulers of Kandy when he wrote: "There were great and long wars between the King of Ceylon and the Portuguese: and many of the brave Portugal Generals are still in memory among them.....great vexations they gave the King by their irruptions into his dominions, and great mischiefs they did him, though often-times with great loss on their side. Great battles have been lost and won between them with great destruction of men on both parts. But being greatly distressed at last, he sent and called in the Hollander to his aid. By whose seasonable assistance, together with his own arms, the King totally dispossessed the Portuguese, and routed them out of the land. Whose rooms the Dutch now occupy, paying themselves for their pains."

The epic struggle during the reign of Senerat and the early years of Raja Sinha II naturally receives full and careful treatment here, but this book is no mere "drum and trumpet" history. The structure of Portuguese rule in lowland Sri Lanka and the social and economic conditions in the regions under Portuguese control—which varied widely in accordance with the vicissitudes of war and peace—also receive detailed and often illuminating analysis. In one way, Dr. de Silva's task was facilitated, since Dr. T. Abeyasinghe's *Portuguese Rule in Ceylon, 1594–1612* (reviewed in this *Journal*, Vol. IX, pp. 89–92), gave him an excellent background and a masterly analysis of many of the continuing problems which confronted the Portuguese.

Dr. de Silva advances three principal reasons for the failure of the Portuguese to conquer Kandy during this period, despite several major efforts which they made to do so. Lack of sufficient manpower; stubborn resistance from the Kandyan kingdom; the failure of the Portuguese to win the lasting loyalty of the lowlanders. The last two reasons were probably more important than the first one. As the author comments (on p. 22), it is rather surprising that the periodic rebellions in the former kingdom of Kotte usually took the Portuguese completely by surprise, thus showing their alienation from the mass of the Sinhalese people. On the other hand, colonial rulers usually succeed in convincing themselves that their own "just and righteous" rule is popular with their subject peoples. This was certainly still true of the Portuguese in Angola in 1961, as this reviewer can testify from personal experience.

Dr. de Silva's most valuable contribution is contained in chapters 5 and 6, entitled respectively, "The Administrative Structure" and "Revenue and Expenditure." He shows that the system evolved under the direction of Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo (acutely analysed by Dr. Abeyasinghe) underwent some substantial modifications in 1618–38. The problem lay partly in the fact that the Portuguese attempted to take over the institutions of the kingdom of Kotte and to make only piecemeal changes to suit their immediate objectives. It is true that the traditional system of land tenure survived, although by no means unscathed as Dr. de Silva shows. In the economic sphere, a major innovation was the state monopoly of the overseas trade in cinnamon, which was continued by the Dutch when they took over. Although the surviving statistics concerning the cinnamon

trade and the revenue derived therefrom are incomplete, Dr. de Silva is able to show that if the monopoly was largely an ineffective one in 1615–28, it was tightened up and greatly improved during the viceroyalty of the Count of Linhares (1629–35) to a degree which made it yield a very substantial revenue to the Crown.

The Portuguese also greatly expanded the compulsory cultivation and purchase of arecanuts; and the cumulative effect of these changes distorted the economic structure and increased the burdens on the cultivators in ways which are convincingly analysed by the author. The impact of the Portuguese religion and language was not negligible. Both survived among indigenous minority groups for centuries after the expulsion of the *Conquistadores*.

This well-documented and well-written work once again reminds us of the great importance of the Portuguese sources, with all their admitted defects, for the history of Sri Lanka in the seventeenth century. The author has made judicious and discriminating use of them; and the task of future researchers in this field has been facilitated by Mrs. Daya de Silva's valuable "Bibliography of manuscripts relating to Ceylon in the archives and libraries of Portugal", in the *Boletim International de Bibliografia Luso-Brasileira*, Vols. VIII–IX (Lisbon, 1967–68). To sum up, Dr. C. R. de Silva has succeeded admirably in his probing inquiry into the nature and effects of Portuguese rule in lowland Sri Lanka, and his work is a major contribution to this subject.

C. R. Boxer.